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Excerpt 
The crash of Nigeria stock market which occurred between 2008 and 2009 was unusual. Events that 
preceded the crash, misconducts of market operators and regulators before, during, and after the crash, the 
reckless hypes and spins that generated lots of frenzied trading leading to the astronomical rise of Nigeria 
stock market to number one position in the world, and the synchronization and magnitude of the crash 
that followed - all exhibit signs of organized scheme. 
Thanks to the English Bubble Act of 1720with which South Sea Corporation precipitated a one hundred 
and five years securities fraud in Britain, the infamous John Law's Mississippi South Pacific Corporations 
scams that contemporaneously crashed the French market, the 2001Enron 'loophole', and the 2008 severe 
stock market crash in U.S., 1990 Indian Stock Market crash, and 2008 Kenyan Stock Market crisis, it is 
now common knowledge that severe stock market crashes are mostly induced by organized securities 
rackets. In almost all the cases, law is used as a vehicle to achieve the swindles. 
In recent time, IMF, World Bank, and IFC, in conjunction with local officials, have been accused by 
insiders, of instigating' hot money cycle' devious schemes that destroy financial markets and economies 
of weaker and poorer nations. Instrumentality of the law is implicated as the means by which the 
fraudulent schemes are executed. 
The simultaneity in the meteoric rise and precipitous crash of Nigeria stock market had all the marks of an 
organized securities scheme. The elaborate distortion of the legal and structural foundations of Nigeria 
capital market, statutory sabotage of Nigeria's SEC, unusual positioning and empowerment of Nigeria's 
Investments and Securities Tribunal and the tribunal's complicit roles, brazen misconducts of market 
operators and regulators before, during, and after the crash, atypical reticence of Nigerian government,-
all point to the crash being a organized event. Against the overwhelming weight of evidence, Nigerian 
authorities wrongly blamed global financial crisis for the crash of the stock market. 
To understand the proximate causes of Nigeria stock market's N8.1 trillion ($60bn) crash, therefore, 
analysis of Nigerian securities laws should be undertaken. This paper examines the fidelity of the critical 
strategic policy-thrust as well as the legal and structural frameworks put in place for Nigeria capital 
market by the Nigerian principal securities laws, and concludes that the chronic dysfunctions crafted into 
Nigerian Investments and Securities Acts (repealed 1,,9 and the extant) 2007, served as veritable means 
used to execute the organized securities scheme that crashed Nigeria stock market between 2008 and 
2009. 
xiv 
Unfortunately, the same irrational legal and structural frameworks with which the crash of Nigeria stock 
market was precipitated are still used to run Nigeria capital market. A cursory investigation also reveals 
that the same situation exists in Nigerian banking and other principal financial and economic sectors. 
Sadly too, Nigeria's national economy and the fate of Nigeria's 150 million citizens hinge on the 
unremitting financial market racketeering schemes. 
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CHAPTERl 
Issue, Purpose, and Scope 
1.1 Introduction 
Nigerian stock markee was ranked world's best performing market in the last 
quarter of 2007.2 The outstanding ranking resulted from the market's unusual 
prolonged bullish run that began in 2005, and peaked at N21.4tn ($150bn) total 
market capitalization in March 2008.3 Market operators and investors cheered the 
rare feat. However, that performance foreshadowed a tragedy that Nigeria ignored. 
The long bullish run that generated the spectacle was neither supported by sound 
market fundamentals nor by any positive economic foundation. The bullish run 
was abnormal, irrational, and strange. That performance was without reason, 
which in itself would have served as notice to market regulators and investors. 
Also, Nigerian capital market's regulatory framework and structural arrangement 
display array of defects that would have alerted the investing public that factors 
other than normal market forces produced that surprising performance. 
1.Note;'Capital Market' and 'Stock Market' are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to the stock market. 
2.See Official website at httpllwww.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo (visited 08/10) 
3.See Footnote 6 infra. 
1 
Imprudent investors habitually jump impulsively into the market whenever they 
see market rallies. Market operators commonly take advantage of investors' 
predictable exuberance, and often simulate bullish movements to lure unwary 
investors into the stock market. The conduct is known as crooked stock pool. A 
prudent securities investor who did requisite due-diligence prior to investing in 
Nigeria stock market would have discovered many red flags, recognized that the 
impetuous bullish runs had no rational basis, and so were contrived. 
From the numerous inadequacies in the elemental framework of Nigeria's stock 
market, it is evident that Nigerian market's spectacular performance was not real. 
If the protracted bullishness in Nigeria stock market was artificially generated, as 
was apparent, it would be true to tradition to expect the hands that created the false 
surge to eventually reap their reward. Indeed, this familiar 'predator and prey' 
, trend in the stock market led Professor Harold Bloomenthal to aptly surmise that 
". .. the problems at which modern securities regulation is directed are as old as 
the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers. " 4 
4.See Bloomenthal, H. (2008), Securities Law Handbook (2008-2009 ed.), Vol. 1,7.2007 
2 
1.1.1 The Apocalyptic Crash: It was reasonably foreseeable that Nigeria stock 
market's irrational surge would eventually capitulate under the pressure of 
accumulated bubbles. Expectedly, the market did capitulate, with astonishing 
vehemence. The accumulated bubbles suddenly busted with vengeance, triggering 
an avalanche of crash. Stock prices tumbled down with bearish alacrity, brutal in 
force, escalated in intensity and magnitude, inverse in proportion to the forces with 
which the market accellerated skyward. The result was a cataclysmic implosion of 
Nigeria stock market. The crash triggered monumental disaster that inflicted 
enormous financial losses to investors. Just between March and May 2008, the 
Nigerian stock market suffered abysmal 75% net losses in its All Share Index 
(ASI) and total market capitalization.5 In hard cash, Nigeria stock market lost a 
total sum of over N8 trillion (eight trillion Naira) ($60 billion), investors funds,6 in 
just three months. (Tab of the initial crash was variously quoted as N7.8 trillion, 
N8.1 trillion, and N9 trillion). There is no formal investigation or official report yet 
on the crash.7 Nigeria's mostly smalltime investors were ravaged by the 
apocalyptic crash. Majority of investors suffered crushing financial losses.8 Most 
of the victims lost everything; family 
5. Note; All Share Index refers to the aggregate quantity of shares traded in a stock market in a given period. Total market 
capitalization means the total value of traded equities in a given periodic session. 
6.See; Bloomberg's report republished in Nigeria's Punch Newspaper of 02/02/2009 titled 'Nigeria stock market losses, highest 
in the world'. - Nigeria's market capitalization peaked at N12.4tn in March 2008, but fell to N4.5tn by end of March 2009. 
7.Note; Absence of official inquiry into the crash of Nigeria stock market means that greater reliance is placed on unofficial 
sources such as news reports, as resource materials, for facts of the crash. 
8.For Example;See newsreport that former Ogun State Governor, Chief Shola Osoba, lost N500million($3.35million) in the 
crash; @ http://odili.netlnews/service/2009/feb/14/505.html(12/09) 
3 
nest-eggs, personal savings, business capitals, retirement benefits and gratuities, 
borrowed funds, anomalous margin loans commercial banks gave their customers 
to purchase the banks' own stocks, etc.9 Many investors sold landed properties and 
other earthly possessions, and invested the proceeds in the over-hyped stock 
market. They lost it all in the crash. It was a severe and painful national calamity. 
Yet, Nigerian government did not react. 
While victims of the crash mourned their losses, story broke out that bank 
executives celebrated their windfalls.10 It became a real life tale of the proverbial 
other peoples' money. 
World's mainstream financial news media reported the story of another world 
record broken by Nigerian stock market. llThis time, the record was unflattering. 
International news media rated the crash as the worst of its kind in the annals of 
financial market history.12 Nigeria capital market was downgraded in its rating, and 
declared the worst performing market in the world.13 
9.See news report that His Royal Highness, The Oba of Lagos, lost N850million ($5.66million) personal money in the crash; 
http://odili.net/news/source/2009/apr/13/424.html (12/09) 
10.see News report, soon after the crash, titled- "Nigerian Bank executives intensify status contest with Private Jets"; 
http://odili.net/news/source/2009/feb/20/405.html (12/09) 
1l.Note; Story of the crash was widely reported in Bloomberg, CNN Money, MSNBC Financial, Wall Street Journal, and many 
international and local newspapers. 
12.See Bloomberg Report @ http//www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo (12/2009) 
13.Bloomberg, ibid. 
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1.1.2 The Cover-Up: However disconcerting the tragic crash was for Nigerian 
victims, things got even worse. Usually when serious stock market disaster occurs 
in any nation, relevant authorities and government promptly rise up to the 
occasion, tackle the crisis headlong with the aim to protecting investors, unraveling 
the problems, and finding solutions. World-over, examples abound of radical 
financial market reforms that arose out of different governments prompt responses 
to severe stock market crisis.14 Instances where drastic market crashes provoked 
dramatic responses from authorities and governments include -Britain 184415, U.S. 
1933, 1934,2002, and 201016, India 199217, Kenya 200718, to name just a few. In 
Nigeria, the world's worst securities crisis remained ignored, while most of those 
under whose watch the crisis occurred still hold sway. 
1.1.3 Cover-Up by Market Operators, Regulators, and Government: After the 
Nigerian market crash, top financial market operators and regulators, who ought to 
be first responders to the crash, as the anointed defenders of investors in Nigeria 
capital market immediately went to work, a different kind of work. 
14.Examples include Britain, U.S.A., India, and Kenya. 
IS.Note; After South Sea Corporation's scams, then British Parliament enacted the world's first comprehensive Financial 
Regulation Act, i.e., the English Joint Companies Registration Act or Company Act of 1844. 
16.Note; After the Great Depression and 'Enron Scam' U.S. Congress enacted the revolutionary 1933/34 and 2002 Securities 
Acts. Also, President Obama's extensive financial market reform of2010 was enacted after the recent global financial crisis. 
17.Note;India responded to its stock market crash of 1990 by enacting the SEBI Act of 1992 which totally transformed India's 
Stock Market. 
18.Note;Kenyan Govt shot down its stock market and hired PricewaterhouseCoopers to audit and investigate the cause of 
Kenya's 2008 $77 million stock market crash. Afterwards, changes were enacted in the nation's financial market regulation. 
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Apparently, fearing public reprisals, Nigerian top financial market operators swung 
into intense self-absolving media campaigns and assorted propaganda.19Everything 
and everybody else was blamed for the crash. The blame game successfully 
diverted attention from the real cause of the financial tragedy. Excuses were 
invented and blamed for the stock market havoc. 
Implausible explanations were given to a bewildered nation and its agolllzmg 
citizens for the sudden collapse of Nigeria stock market. Head of Nigeria's Stock 
Exchange first attributed the crash to global food crisis.20 Given that the skeptical 
Nigerian audience failed to believe that story, excuses for the crash swiftly shifted 
to the mundane. 
"Profit-taking" by investors and "self correction" by the market were tried out as 
excuses. Those excuses did not fly either. Divestments and decoupling from 
Nigeria by undisclosed international investors whose unidentified home economies 
were allegedly hit hard by the then escalating global financial crisis, had earlier 
19.Example - news report that Dr. Akingbola, CEO Intercontinental Bank blame market crash on careless statements@ 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200902180188.htrnl (06/2010) 
20.See Nigerian Vanguard Newspaper of January 13, 2009; Also reported at http;//odili.net/news/source/2009/jan/13/30S.htrnl 
(04/2009) 
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been canvassed as the reason for the market crash, but promptly abandoned.21 Later 
on, the seemingly plausible global financial meltdown itself became the excuse for 
the crash.22 The global financial crisis explanation ostensibly resonated well with 
the exasperated Nigerian public, and, especially, with the Nigerian government, 
then mortified by the magnitude of the crash. Then President Musa Yar'adua (now 
deceased) accepted the global financial crisis explanation. Mr. President publicly 
proclaimed the global crisis excuse in every public speech he made.23 He sold the 
red-herring to the skeptical Nigerian public, probably innocently. 
1.1.4 Cover-Up by the Central Bank of Nigeria: Interestingly too, just before the 
market crash, then Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), a Harvard trained 
economist and World Bank protege, publicly announced to the alarmed nation, in 
several press interviews and public seminars, that he had devised and put in place 
sure measures that would totally insulate Nigeria's economy from impacts of the 
then burgeoning global financial crisis.24 Nigeria's apex bank chief assured 
government and people of Nigeria that, under his watch, the global financial crisis 
21. Note; Initial claim was that global crisis in their respective home economies forced foreign investors to divest from Nigeria, 
which indirectly led to Nigeria market crash. This claim was dropped and replaced with global crisis itself as a plausible excuse. 
22.See footnote 21 supra. 
23.See 'Yar' Adua admits impact of financial meltdown on Nigeria' http://odili.net/news/source/2009/jan/15/413.html(12/09) 
24. See news report 'Global Financial Meltdown: 11 Countries seek Nigeria's safety model, Says Soludo. In ThisDay Newspaper 
of Sunday, October 12,2008. 
7 
would never impact Nigeria's economy. To buttress his claims, the Central Bank 
Governor declared that eleven nations had approached him asking to be taught the 
iron-clad, global financial crisis-proof measures he invented.2s 
The CBN Governor did not name any of the nations that approached him. But his 
claims succeeded in momentarily breaking the free fall of the rapidly sinking 
market, and dissuaded many investors from exiting their losing stakes. He, thus, 
foiled timely exodus of numerous investors, and the aim was to sustain liquidity in 
the market. His actions constitute serious securities violations that occasioned 
immense financial losses to many investors who would otherwise have exited the 
market early. 
When Nigeria stock market eventually crashed and the media campaigners ran out 
of excuses, and had to revert to the global financial crisis explanation, the Central 
Bank Governor made an about-tum. He denied ever promising the nation any 
insulation from the global meltdown.26 He contended that he was misunderstood 
(not that he was misquoted). He was neither misunderstood nor misquoted. He was 
being economical with truth the entire time. 
2S.See footnote 24 supra at page 7. 
26.Note; CBN Governor made the surprising denial while explaining the $13.9bn capital flight from Nigeria. He also attributed 
the crisis to foreign investors divestments. See news report in http://odili.netlnews/source/2008/dec/5/306.html (12/2009) 
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Sadly, the intensive media campaigns that ensued drowned out vestiges of the 
crash victims' loud reservations. Mr. President's formal address to the nation 
blaming global financial crisis for Nigerian market crash finally settled the matter. 
Neither an official investigation nor public inquiry was instituted to seek the causes 
of the precipitous crash that inflicted N8trillion ($60bn) losses to investors.27 
Any discerning observer who paid close attention to the irrational behaviors of 
Nigeria capital market would have noticed abnormalities from the markets rapid 
ascension to world number one, and to its eventual descent to opprobrium. 
Between 2005 and early 2008 when the market rocketed furiously skywards, it was 
clear that the bullishness was without the requisite fundamental support. The 
spectacular performance was strange, an indication that a big crash was inevitable. 
Explanations given by Nigerian authorities for the market crash were evidently 
wrong and unconvincing. Contrary to the declared exonerations, global financial 
27.Note; Because Nigerian government failed to institute inquiry into the Nigerian stock market crash, no formal report or record exists on the 
matter. Hence, information on the crash is only gathered from unofficial and secondary sources mainly newspaper reports of unofficial accounts. 
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crisis had nothing to do with the crash of Nigeria stock market.28There was no 
nexus between Nigeria stock market and the epicenter of the global financial crisis 
for Nigeria market to be so brutally impacted by global financial crisis. This is 
because there is no Nigerian company that was listed in the U.S. or any other major 
world capital markets at the time of the global crisis, and vice versa.29 
1.1.5 Other Markets Debunked the Global Crisis Excuse: At the time Nigeria 
stock market crashed precipitously, and global financial crisis was wrongly blamed 
for it, many similarly situated emerging stock markets performed spectacularly 
wel1.30 The contrarian performance was squarely attributed to absence of linkages 
between the emerging markets and capital markets of U.S. and other major 
economies which were the origins and ground-zeros of the global financial crisis.31 
28.Note; Global financial crisis began in U.S. Capital market and spread to other western financial markets that have links with 
the U.S. market. Most developing markets without such linkages escaped direct hit from the global meltdown. For example see 
performance of Iraqi stock market (ISX) during the global financial crisis at pages 10 and II. 
29.See news report; 'Why Foreign Investors Shun Nigeria', By Nigerian SEC @ 
http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/apr/12/200.html[ 1112009] 
30.Iraqi stock market (ISX) became world's most famous contrarian performer amongst markets not linked to U.S. and other 
major economies. 
31.See for example AP News of 1011212008 "/ don't think that the current financial crisis will hurt our economy and especially 
this market because we are not connected to Ilny of the global markets and we have very few foreign investors," by Omar 
Mouwaffak - ISX Market Operator. Syndicated in World Business on MSNBC.Com (12/2010) 
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War-tom, rag-tag, Iraqi stock market (ISX) became the celebrated poster-child of 
defiance to the global financial crisis.32 Iraqi stock market lacked modem computer 
and electronic gadgets for enhanced securities trading, and failed to attract 
investors from developed economies, which turned out to be its saving grace. ISX 
performed spectacularly well at the peak of the global financial meltdown in 2008. 
ISX outstanding performance at the time was credited to insulation occasioned by 
absence of couplings with western markets. Nigerian market, lacking direct linkage 
with western markets, was similarly insulated from the global crisis. 
Source; Hadi Mizban 1 AP. 
updated 10112/2008 3:34:44 PM ET BAGHDAD - An Iraqi stock trader reacts in front of Iraq's stock 
exchange board, in Baghdad on Sunday. The ISX index has soared 20 percent since September 2008.32 
32.Report and pictorial illustration ofISX . 
33.See Associated Press report of 10/12/2008 that while the rest of the world faced financial meltdown, Iraq Stock Exchange 
. boomed. That the ISX index soared nearly 40 percent during September. The ISX is only open two hours a day, three days a 
week and brokers track trading activity on the floor with colored markers and white bulletin boards instead of computers. 
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My study shows convincing evidence that Nigeria stock market crash resulted from 
meticulously planned and assiduously executed, organized securities scheme, and 
not from global financial crisis as alleged. Top Nigerian financial market 
operatives, including securities market operators, top bankers, and financial market 
regulators ought to answer questions for securities fraud.34 
1.1.6 Plots of the Crash Hidden in Framework of Nigeria Market: Evidence of 
culpability is splashed allover in the precision distortions of the legal, structural, 
and infrastructural framework of the Nigerian capital market. As part of the 
scheme, critical safety-nets and vital anti-fraud mechanisms of the capital market 
were methodically incapacitated, in advance. Regulatory infrastructures were 
disarranged and damaging loopholes skillfully designed into the laws. Lacunas 
were artfully created and exploited in the coordinated scheme. Scope of the design 
extended also to comparable manipulations of Nigeria's other financial and 
economic institutions' frameworks. Nigerian banking laws are not spared. I will 
show details of each leg of the securities scheme later on in chapters 3 and 4. 
34.See news report dated 10/8/2010; "CEO of Oceanic Bank convicted of bank and securities frauds -- Dr. Cecilia Ibru to forfeit 
N150bn ($lbn), and go to prison for 18 months" - @ http://www.saharareporters.comlnews-page/former-md-oceanic-bank-
cecilia-ibru-convicted-bank-fraud. (10/2010). 
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Nigeria's financial-sector leaders compnsmg mostly of powerful Ivy League 
graduates35 brought home to Nigeria the decadent jurisprudential norm of the 
international economic order. Like in history's biggest financial crimes, Nigeria's 
securities and banking designs utilized the old but hitherto nameless phenomena -
legislative infidelity and the use of law for instrumentality of undue economic 
advantage, fraud, and exploitation - entrenched norms of the jurisprudence of 
international economic order. 
Similar scheme is currently going on in Nigeria's bond market, without let. The 
same scheme is being replicated in Nigeria's other financial sectors, and staggering 
amount of money is being funneled offshore under questionable circumstances, 
and nobody is asking questions.36 
1.2 Why This Topic Is Important. 
Circumstances of the Nigerian stock market crash, the dishonest securities 
framework foisted upon Nigeria in plain sight, magnitude of the resulted losses to 
mostly smalltime securities and bank investors, boldness of the cover up, and, 
ultimately, the ease with which Nigerian government accepted the excuses, all 
35.Note; Central Bank Governor, Director-General of Nigeria Stock Exchange, and President of the Securities Tribunal are all Harvard PhDs. 
36.CBN Governor funneled nearly $30bilIion overseas, after the crash, and claimed the money belonged to foreigners divesting from Nigeria. 
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suggest the existence of deep-rooted systemic rot in Nigeria's financial sector. If 
pervasive systemic rot of that magnitude happens to exist in Nigeria's financial 
sector, the implication will be inescapably dire, and could precipitate worse things. 
The situation deserves a thorough investigation. 
1.2.1 The Crash Beckons for Inquiry: It became necessary that somebody has to 
investigate Nigeria's worst financial apocalypse, if only to identify the proximate 
cause, call attention to it, and possibly prevent re-occurrence. The need for this 
study became even more compelling after my preliminary research uncovered 
alarming pattern of illusory statutory provisions, dubious legislations, and bad 
structural arrangements in Nigeria's principal financial laws. Also, I discovered a 
woven mass of complex securities designs carefully buried deep inside the bellies 
of porous, overly prolix, deceptive, and vague enabling statutes. The intricate plots 
were further augmented with flawed institutional arrangements that left Nigeria's 
capital market abysmally susceptible, and the investors, vulnerable to easy 
exploitation. The same designs exist in the Nigerian banking system. 
1.2.2 My Dissertation is a Fortuitous Opportunity: This dissertation presents me 
with the fortuitous opportunity to fully study the many inexcusable failings, 
research, pin-point, and document the immediate causes of Nigeria capital market 
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crash. The dissertation also offers me a propitious chance to examme the 
domestication in Nigeria, of the unjust legislative tactics that abound in the laws of 
international economic order.37 
1.3. Benefits of My Research. 
Benefits of my research are many and varied. 
1.3.1 Research Offers Opportunity for Redress: First, the crash of Nigeria's 
capital market and its collateral impact on Nigeria's national economy is grave. 
The crash wrecked the lives ofa sizeable number of Nigeria's 150 million citizens. 
The incident toppled Nigeria's already ailing economy and unleashed economic 
woes on most citizens and businesses. Effort expended in identifying the proximate 
causes of that grave tragedy will be good investment that would present an 
opportunity to Nigeria to improve the country's flawed securities and financial 
laws, and also offers an additional promise of saving Nigeria from terrible 
consequences of recurrence of the crash. 
1.3.2 Research Proves that Global Poverty is Mostly Induced: Second, the 
interminable cycle of severe poverty that ravages most developing countries appear 
to be induced rather than resulting from the false assumption that people mired in 
global poverty are predisposed to ineptness and laziness. The kind of cruel 
37.Note; Striking similarities exist between malevolent legislative style in int'llaw and legislative infidelity under Nigerian laws 
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exploitation that the Nigerian incident represents appears to exacerbate poverty in 
many developing nations. Scholarly investigation that identifies causative factors 
of global poverty will be a worthy undertaking. If my research uncovers any 
arrangements in domestic laws, or in the jurisprudence of international economic 
order, that contributes to abuses and mass poverty, end product of the research will 
be of benefit to the billions of victims of global poverty, and to the many that fight 
poverty. 
1.3.3 Dissertation Spotlights 'Legislative Infidelity': Finally, this research aims to 
bring to public focus the unspoken subjects of 'legislative infidelity' and 'the use of 
law for instrumentality offurthering undue economic advantage and exploitation', 
both of which are covert species of corruption that wreck havoc on the domestic 
and global stages, without attracting due attention and needed redress. This variety 
of corruption disproportionately affects developing nations saddled with poor 
legislations, and majority of the world's population who forever bear the burden of 
global exploitation with all its tragic ramifications. Investigation devoted to 
uncovering such law-based, poverty-inducing, and furtive predatory stratagems 
will be of interest to many countries. In my opinion this endeavor is worth the 
while, the matters are evidently important, and the available evidence sufficiently 
compelling to warrant the investigation. These are some of the reasons why I chose 
this topic for my dissertation. 
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1.4 Central Thesis of My Dissertation. 
The major thesis of my dissertation is to establish that the crash of Nigeria stock 
market and the resulted N8 trillion ($60bn.) losses was caused by organized 
securities scheme. To prove Nigeria's securities scheme, I intend to show that a 
pattern of nefarious arrangements was carefully weaved into the enabling statutes, 
as well as in the rigged frameworks of the Nigerian capital market. I propose to 
show that in the most critical areas, as is common with organized securities 
schemes, Nigerian market arrangement carefully deviated drastically from the 
ideal,38 in ways that clearly suggest existence of prior intention to commit fraud. I 
will also show past cases where similar pattern of manipulating basic laws were 
used to commit financial frauds in some other jurisdictions. My aim is to persuade 
Nigerian government to come clear on Nigeria stock market crash, and to enact the 
appropriate capital market and financial regulations in the country. 
I will begin my discussion by first establishing that the system of using law to 
achieve undue advantage and to advance ulterior agenda began in the annals of the 
jurisprudence of international law. I will analyze some international rules and 
regulations and show examples of the skillful misuse of law in that regard. I will 
show that the same methods were used in precipitating the Nigerian market crash. 
38. Note; Nigerian stock market arrangement is principally modeled after the United States securities market system. 
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To show Nigeria's version of using law as instrument of advancing fraud, I will 
critically review the regulatory, enforcement, and structural provisions of Nigeria's 
extant Investments and Securities Act, 2007 (ISA 2007). I will also analyze the 
Act's adjudicatory structure, balance of regulatory and enforcement powers, and 
review a few decisions of the Nigerian Investments and Securities Tribunal, with a 
view to establishing a pattern of coordinated complicity that involved the tribunal. 
In the end I will quickly review pertinent provisions of Nigeria's extant banking 
laws, if time and space permit. For the Securities Act, the purpose of my scrutiny 
will be to verify the fidelity and adequacy, or otherwise, of the relevant provisions 
of the pertinent statute, in establishing for Nigeria a transparent, orderly, and safe 
capital market, where fair and equitable principles of trade reign39• For the 
banking sector, the object will be to scrutinize some crucial provisions of the 
principal regulatory framework with the aim to determining their suitability for 
instituting safety and soundness40 in the Nigerian banking sector. 
My ultimate aim is to establish a causal nexus between Nigeria's financial sector 
law-loopholes and the N8 trillion ($60 billion) capital market crash. And also, to 
link existence of many loopholes in Nigerian laws, and the consequential collapse 
39. Note; This is the appropriate universal threshold of integrity required of every standard Capital Market. 
40. Note; Safety and Soundness are the minimum universal standard every banking institution is required to observe. 
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of Nigeria stock market, to domestication of legislative infidelity in Nigeria. The 
end purpose is to persuade respective Nigerian authorities to enact necessary 
changes. But, as a prelude, I will first define and explain 'legislative infidelity' and 
'use of law for instrumentality of undue advantage, fraud, and exploitation'. I will 
thereafter begin the analysis of select international rules to show that legislative 
infidelity originated in the jurisprudence of the world order. I will devote the rest 
of this chapter to reviewing some pertinent rules enacted by World Bank and IMF. 
1.5 Legislative Infidelity; Definition, Encounter, and Examples. 
1.5.1 Definition of Legislative Infidelity: For my purpose, I define "Legislative 
Infidelity and the Use of Law for Instrumentality of Undue Economic Advantage, 
Fraud, and Exploitation" as a law-making tradition that originated in the 
jurisprudence of international economic order. The practice consists of malevolent 
law-making tactic that intentionally creates loopholes, distortions, ambiguities, 
vagueness, and unwarranted complications in texts of laws and legislations, with 
the ulterior objective of taking pragmatic advantage of the confusion to advance 
unfair selfish goals.41 
41. Note; Taking undue advantage of other people (political or economic) is always the underlying motive behind legislative infidelity. 
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1.5.2 Encounter with Legislative Infidelity: My awareness of legislative 
infidelity ripened in Professor Dr. Christian Okeke's International Investment Law 
class at Golden Gate University. I encountered legislative infidelity while studying 
the different rules and guidelines that govern foreign direct investment 
relationships, particularly the rules enacted by the international financial 
institutions and organizations. 
Existing regulations, rules, and texts of laws that regulate conducts in international 
economic, finance, and foreign direct investment activities are inundated with 
provisions that could easily pass as random blunders.42 The supposed blunders 
consistently resulted in uncommon specie of artful legislations that usually begin 
with preambles dressed up in overly optimistic promises, but end in substantive 
prescriptions filled with converse texts that substantially derogate from the 
expressed preambular ideals. 
Initially, I misunderstood the blunders as chance mistakes, and dismissed them as 
mere coincidences. Later on, I identified striking consistency in the pattern of 
42. See World Bank's Guideline for Foreign Direct Investment, TRIPS Agreement, IMF and World Bank's Articles of Agreements, etc. 
20 
the strange mistakes. They occur in customized frequency in ways that could not 
justifiably be explained away as coincidences. 
Study of the guidelines and rules made for foreign direct investment by the World 
Bank, and other enactments made by IMF and their sister international agencies 
and organizations, revealed a consistent pattern of disruptive liaisons with 
domestic economies and internal affairs of many developing countries. Study also 
shows that slant and bias represent deliberate normative choices in international 
economic laws, rather than some random occurrences. And, that the intended 
purpose for favoring the unjust legislative style is to create binding international 
rules that serve to advance ulterior agenda. There is no coincidence about it. 
Regrettably, legislative infidelity has also drifted surreptitiously into, and polluted 
domestic jurisprudences of many developing countries, triggering economic and 
socio-political woes. Nigeria is a classic example of nations parading panoply of 
tainted domestic legislations in her banking, finance, capital market, insurance, 
petroleum, oil and gas, custom and excise, electoral, and labor, amongst many 
other critical sectors of her economy and polity. Legislative infidelity caused the 
crash of Nigeria stock market. 
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1.5.3 Examples of Legislative Infidelity in Int'l 'Legislation': There is no better 
way to explicate legislative infidelity under international law than to review few 
principal rules and regulations that exist in international economic order. It is 
common knowledge that the world order has no central legislature to enact laws, 
like the legislative arms of national governments. And that, international legal 
framework is garnered from diverse sources. 
1.5.3.a Sources of International Law: Sources of international law include laws 
allowed to be cited in, and applied by, the International Court of Justice (ICJ).43 
According to provisions of ICJ Statute, principal sources of international law 
include international Conventions, international customs as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law (Opinion Juris), the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations (this last source is subject to the 
provisions of Article 59 of the ICJ statute). 
The United Nations Charter stands out as an important international enactment. 
Another prominent source of international law that merits special mention is 
43. Article 38(1) (a), (b), (c), and (d) of the Statute ofICJ, concluded in San Francisco, 26 June 1945, entered into force, 24 
October 1945. See 1978 Y.B.U.N. 1052; 1945 Can. T.S. 7; 1945 S.A.T.S. 6; reprinted in 1 Weston & Carlson I.H.2. 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties44 known also as the Constitution of 
International Law. It is a compilation of Orga-omnis. Sources of the law of nations 
also include binding multilateral treaties,45 and Security Council resolutions.46 
1.5.3.b Insurgent Sources of International Law: Insurgent rules of international 
law emerged onto the scene after WWII, in the areas of global economics and 
finance, commandeering international recognition, support and patronage. The 
rebel sources of international law include World Bank's Guidelines for Foreign 
Direct Investments,47 IBRD's ICSID Convention, World Bank and IMF's48 
respective Articles of Agreements, as well as TRIPS Agreement,49 to name just a 
few. I will examine salient provisions of some of these insurgent enactments to 
show legislative infidelity in international economic laws. The rest of this chapter 
will focus on IMF and the World Bank. Next chapter will be devoted entirely to 
TRIPS Agreement and its laundry-list of legislative infidelities. 
44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; concluded at Vienna, 23 May 1969, entered into force, 27 January 1988. 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 1969 U.NJ.Y.B. 140; reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) and 1 Weston & Carlson I.E.! 
45. See Pacta Sunt Servanda, Article 29, Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. 
46. See Articles 24 & 25 of the Charter ofVnited Nations (as amended). Concluded, 26 June, 1945.1 V.N.T.S. XVI, 1976 Y.BUN 1043. 
47. See review of World Bank Guidelines on Foreign Direct Investment infra from page 43. 
48. See discussion on IMF's Articles of Agreement infra beginning from pages 31. 
49. See detailed analysis of TRIPS Agreement in chapter 2 
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1.6 IMF and World Bank; Exemplars of Legislative Infidelity in the 
Jurisprudence of Int'l Economic Order. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's respective Articles of 
Agreements, World Bank's Guidelines for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID 
Convention), exemplify post WWII insurgent additions to the jurisprudence of 
international economic order. Due to the significant but very controversial roles 
IMF and World Bank play in matters of global economics and finance, coupled 
with the lack of fidelity in the content and latitude of their respective enabling 
documents, the two institutions invite brief but careful examinations to identify 
cases of legislative infidelity. 
1.6.1 Origin and Brief History of the IMF, and its Metamorphosis to Infidelity: 
IMF50 and World Bank51 are the primary international financial institutions. Both 
institutions share common history - both were conceived during WW II, created at 
the forty-five nations' international economic conference held July, 1944 III 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A., and each was assigned specific duties. 
50. See official website ofthe IMF http://www.imf.orglextemaVaboutihistcoop.htm(12/2010) 
51. See official website of the World Bank at 
http://web.worldbank.orglWBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0"contentMDK:20053333-menuPK:63762 
-pagePK:36726-piPK:36092-theSitePK:29506,00.html. (12/20 I 0) 
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According to official record, IMF was created following the experiences of the 
1930's Great Depression, during which different western 
" ... countries attempted to shore up their failing economies by sharply ralszng 
barriers to foreign trade, devaluing their currencies to compete against each other 
for export markets, and curtailing their citizens/freedom to holdforeign exchange. 
These attempts proved to be self-defeating. World trade declined sharply (see chart 
below), and employment and living standards plummeted in many countries. This 
breakdown in international monetary cooperation led the IMF's founders to plan 
an institution charged with overseeing the international monetary system-the 
system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries and 
their citizens to buy goods and services from each other. The new global entity 
would ensure exchange rate stability and encourage its member countries to 
eliminate exchange restrictions that hindered trade. "52 
Beggar thy neighb4llr policies 
During the G~ Depression. counlries tried tn shore up 









Source; official website of IMF at 
http://www.imf.org/extemaliaboutlhistcoop.htm 
52. See IMP official site at; http://www.imf.orglextemal/aboutlhistcoop.htm (0112011) 
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1.6.2 Original Mandate of IMF: From the above passage, IMF's mandate was 
limited to overseeing a system of exchange rates and international payments. And, 
to ensure exchange rate stability by encouraging its members to eliminate 
exchange restrictions that hindered trade. Scope of IMF's duties were defined and 
delimited from inception. IMF came into formal existence in December 1945, 
when its first 29 member countries signed its Articles of Agreement. 53 IMF began 
operations on March 1, 194754 and now has 187 members worldwide.55 
In the beginning, from 1947, IMF evidently dedicated faithfully to the duties 
prescribed in its founding mandate, unti11971 when tum of events cut short IMF's 
job. In IMF's own account of the event that terminated its assignment, 
"[t}he countries that joined the IMF between 1945 and 1971 agreed to keep their 
exchange rates (the value of their currencies in terms of the US. dollar and, in the 
case of the United States, the value of the dollar in terms of gold) pegged at rates 
that could be adjusted only to correct a ''fundamental disequilibrium" in the 
balance of payments, and only with the IMF's agreement. This par value system-
also known as the Bretton Woods system-prevailed until 1971, when the U.S. 
government suspended the convertibility of the dollar (and dollar reserves held 
by other governments) into gold. "56 
53. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (As Amended). Concluded At Washington, 22 July 1945, 
Entered into force, 27 December 1945, 2 D.N.T.S. 39; 1946 S.A.T.S. 3; reprinted in 4 Weston and Carlson IV.A.3 
54.See IMF official website supra at page 25. 
55.IMF official website ibid. 
56.See IMF official website ibid. 
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1.6.3 Termination of IMF Job: Convertibility of the dollar and dollar reserves into 
gold is at the core of the international monetary system IMF was created to 
oversee. Implicit in IMF's slim mandate is that when the specific purpose the 
agency was created to perform ended, IMF would close shop. Except if IMF 
secures a fresh legitimate mandate authorizing it to transform itself, or to go into 
another business. Without clear new mandate, it is doubtful whether IMF can 
legitimately recreate itself as it purportedly did. IMF explains how the Breton 
Wood system, i.e., the par value system it was created to supervise ended between 
1968 and 1973, thus; 
"[b]y the early 1960s, the u.s. dollar's fixed value against gold, under the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates, was seen as overvalued. A sizable increase 
in domestic spending on President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs and 
a rise in military spending caused by the Vietnam War gradually worsened the 
overvaluation of the dollar. 
The system dissolved between 1968 and 1973. In August 1971, u.s. President 
Richard Nixon announced the "temporary" suspension of the dollar's convertibility 
into gold. While the dollar had struggled throughout most of the 1960s within the 
parity established at Bretton Woods, this crisis marked the breakdown of the 
system. An attempt to revive the fixed exchange rates failed, and by March 1973 
the major currencies began to float against each other. 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, IMF members have been free to 
choose any form of exchange arrangement they wish (except pegging their 
currency to gold): allowing the currency to float freely, pegging it to another 
currency or a basket of currencies, adopting the currency of another country, 
participating in a currency bloc, or forming part of a monetary union. "57 
57. See IMF official website at http://www.im£org/extemal/about/histend.htm (12/2010) 
27 
Upon the demise of Brenton Wood system, countries freely chose any form of 
exchange arrangement they wished, except pegging their currency to gold. And, 
subsequent attempt to revive the fixed exchange rate system also failed. That was 
when IMF's founding mandate ended, and IMF ought to have winded up. 
1.6.4 IMF's Metamorphosis: Rather than wound up when its job ended, IMF, it 
appears, recreated itself, under unclear circumstances. IMF suo-motu increased the 
purposes prescribed in its Articles of Agreement. Two ofIMF's new purposes raise 
concerns in that they both give IMF unusual mandates that initiated IMF's invasion 
of the economic and political sovereignties of weaker member nations. IMF's 
intrusive new mandates are respectively contained in Article 1, purposes (ii), and 
(v), ofIMF Articles of Agreement. Purpose (ii) empowers IMF 
"[tjo facilitate the expansion and balance growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources 
of all members as primary objective of economic policy. "58 
The above provision that empowers IMF to engross itself in the development of the 
productive resources of its members is an example of legislative infidelity. An 
open-ended enactment that authorizes IMF to involve itself in promoting and 
58.. See Article 1, paragraph (ii) ofIMF Articles of Agreement supra at page 26. 
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maintaining employment', 'real income', and 'development of the domestic 
resources' of its member nations, 'as primary objective of economic policy' 
presaged IMF's invasion of sovereignties of weaker nations. That mandate bears a 
resemblance to naked imperialism and a grosser form of legislative infidelity. 
Concomitantly, purpose (v) of IMF's expanded Articles of Agreement introduced 
the business of lending money to poor nations. Again, as mentioned above, IMF's 
original mandate did not include lending money to poor nations. Apparently, to 
placate the ominous implications of IMF's new money-lending business, fancy 
language was used in Article 1 (v) of IMF Articles of Agreement. Article 1, 
paragraph (v) declares one ofIMF's purposes to be; 
"[tjo give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. ,,59 
IMF began its two new functions without any discernible mandate. IMF Articles of 
Agreement did not empower it to alter itself or its functions. IMF's new ventures 
did not arise until IMF ran into existential threat in the 1970s, and needed to find a 
way to sustain its ebbing relevance. In IMF's own record subtitled "Helping 
59. See Article I, paragraph (v) of IMF Articles of Agreement supra at page 26. 
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Poor Countries", under a main title "The End of Bretton Woods System (1972 to 
1987), IMF explained its metamorphosis this casually; 
"[j]rom the mid-1970s, the IMF sought to respond to the balance of payments 
difficulties confronting many of the world's poorest countries by providing 
concessional financing through what was known as the Trust Fund. In March 
1986, the IMF created a new concessionalloan program called the Structural 
Adjustment Facility. The SAF was succeeded by the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility in December 1987. ,,60 
Since its creation in 1944 up till the mid-1970s, IMF did not concern itself with the 
plight of world's poorest countries. IMF's self-transmutation to serve the poorest 
countries coincided conveniently with the period the United States government 
terminated IMF's job in 1971. Subsequent events proved that IMF's later-day 
transformation was in bad faith, and driven by motives other than its declared 
altruism. With the two mandates, IMF began its controversial liaisons with the 
economies of world's poorest nations, most of whom today bear deep scars of 
excruciating poverty, worsened social and political disruptions, and increased 
corruption to show for trusting in IMF and the World Bank. IMF Articles of 
Agreement contain numerous species of legislative infidelity that time and space 
would not allow a full discussion of within the limits of my dissertation. However, 
IMF's strange immunity contained in the Agreement deserves special attention. 
6O.See IMF official website, footnote 59 at page 27 supra. 
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Ostensibly, in anticipation of spate of disputes its activities would generate, IMF 
hatched provisions in its Articles of Agreement that completely insulated IMF 
from accountability, in ways that point to legislative infidelity and misuse of law. 
In form, content, and intent, IMF's Articles of Agreement epitomizes legislative 
infidelity. A short review of the immunity clause contained in IMF's Articles of 
Agreement will hereby follow. 
1.6.5 IMF Articles of Agreement; Legislative Infidelity Epitomized 
IMF crafted a near absolute, simple but, creatively written immunity clause in its 
Articles of Agreement to potentially hedge itself from answerability and litigations. 
Section 3, Article 9 ofIMF's Articles of Agreement provides that; 
"[ t] he Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that 
it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the 
terms of any contract. "61 
IMF vests itself with immunity from judicial processes, as well as from terms of 
contracts it lawfully entered into, unless it waives the immunity. IMF then ordered 
that any waiver must be express. It remains an open question whether a law court 
can strip IMF of its unusual immunity. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Article 9 of 
IMF Articles of Agreement reinforce the inviolability ofIMF's immunity. 
61. See Section 3, Article 9 ofIMF Articles of Agreement. 
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1.6.S.a IMF's Immunity with Impunity: It is conceded that civil and criminal 
immunities for designated international entities are common, but such privileges 
are usually rooted in diplomatic immunity. IMF's case is totally different. IMF 
reserves for itself the powers to engage in ordinary commercial businesses which 
traditionally vitiate diplomatic privileges and immunities ·where they exist. In any 
case, IMF makes no claim to diplomatic immunity. IMF's immunity is delineated 
in section 3, article 9. A combined reading of sections 2 and 3, Article 9 of IMF's 
Articles of Agreement shows that IMF preserves to itself the power to dabble into 
purely commercial businesses, enter into any type of contracts, acquire and dispose 
movable and immovable properties. Disputes usually arise from normal business 
engagements. IMF retains the capacity to sue anybody, nation, or entity, in the 
event of any disputes. But, IMF shields itself against suits in any court of law, 
except with its consent. This is unjust. Nothing can be more absurd, and constitute 
an affront, than a plaintiff s access to justice that is hinged entirely on the 
benevolence and acquiescence of the defendant. A defendant placed in such an 
unusual powerful position will not easily yield to an adversary. IMF's immunity 
exemplifies travesty of justice. Totality of IMF immunity illustrates legislative 
infidelity and use of law for instrumentality of advancing undue economic 
advantage, fraud, and exploitation. That, unfortunately, also casts blur on the 
integrity threshold with which IMF operates. 
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Much has been said and written about IMF, and the consensus of opinion is a 
resounding condemnation of IMF and its activities. Tyranny of time and space 
would not permit a full discussion ofIMF's many wrongs and criticisms. However, 
a brief glimpse into IMF's evaluation by IMF's most prominent critic would shed 
light on IMF' s poor performance and disrepute. 
1.6.6 Criticisms of IMF and Its Operations in Developing Countries: IMF has 
many prized critics, but IMF's most profound reproof comes from a distinguished 
authority and an insider, Professor Joseph Stiglitz. In one of his books, 
Globalization and its Discontents,62 Professor Stiglitz assails IMF, arguing that; 
"fa} half century after its founding, it is clear that the IMP has failed in its 
mission. It has not done what it was supposed to do - provide funds for countries 
facing an economic downturn, to enable the country to restore itself to close to full 
employment. In spite of the fact that our understanding of economic process has 
increased enormously during the last fifty years, and in spite of IMF's efforts 
during the past quarter century, crisis around the world have been more frequent 
and (with the exception of the Great Depression) deeper. By some reckonings, 
close to a hundred countries have faced crisis. Worse, many of the policies that the 
IMF pushed, in particular, premature capital market liberalization, have 
contributed to global instability. And once a country was in crisis, IMP funds and 
programs not only failed to stabilize the situation but in many cases actually made 
62. See Stiglitz, 1., (2002), Globalization and its Discontents, (W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., Publishers). 
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matters worse, especially for the poor. The IMF failed in its original mission of 
promoting global stability; it has also been no more successful in the new missions 
that it has undertaken ... ,,63 
Continuing, Professor Stiglitz describes the consequences of IMF failings, thus; 
H[t}he result for many people has been poverty and for many countries social and 
political chaos. The IMF has made mistakes in all the areas it has been involved 
in: development, crisis management, and in countries making the transition from 
communism to capitalism. Structural adjustment programs did not bring sustained 
growth even to those, like Bolivia, that adhered to its strictures; in many countries, 
excessive austerity stifled growth; successful economic programs require extreme 
care in sequencing - and pacing. If, for instance, markets are opened up for 
competition too rapidly, before strong financial institutions are established, then 
jobs will be destroyed faster than new jobs are created. In many countries, 
mistakes in sequencing and pacing led to rising unemployment and increased 
poverty. "64 
The eminent Professor of Economics then blamed the problems on leadership thus; 
H[uJnderlying the problems of the IMF and the other international economic 
institutions is the problem of governance: who decides what they do. The 
institutions are dominated not just by the wealthiest industrial countries but by 
commercial and financial interests in those countries, and the policies of the 
institutions naturally reflect this. The choice of heads for these institutions 
symbolizes the institutions' problem, and too often has contributed to their 
dysfunction. While almost all of the activities of the IMF and the World Bank today 
are in the developing world (certainly, all of their lending), they are led by 
representatives from the industrialized nations. (By custom or tacit agreement the 
head of the IMF is always a European, that of the World Bank an American.) They 
are chosen behind closed doors, and it has never even been viewed as a 
prerequisite that the head should have any experience in the developing world. The 
institutions are not representative of the nations they serve. "65 
63. See Stiglitz, 1., Globalization and its Discontents, ibid at page 15. 
64. See Stiglitz, 1., Globalization and its Discontents ibid at page 18 
65. See Stiglitz, 1., Globalization and its Discontents ibid at pages 18 and 19 
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1.6.6.a IMF's Reports Described as 'Garbage': Writing a feature story on 
Professor Stiglitz, Nation magazine surmised that; 
"Stiglitz, 58, is hardly the first person to accuse the IMF of operating 
undemocratically and exacerbating Third World poverty. But he is by far the most 
prominent, and his emergence as a critic marks an important shift in the 
intellectual landscape ... "66 
According to the Nation magazine, Mr. Stiglitz was once asked what developing 
countries should do with the annual reports IMF prepares on member nations. 
Stiglitz recommended " .. . picking it up, saying 'thank you very much' and 
dropping it straight in the garbage can." The magazine then concluded that 
"Stiglitz has done more to damage the IMF's reputation than any other living 
economist. "67 
Professor Stiglitz parades an impressive profile. He is an eminent professor of 
Economics in Columbia University, the distinguished Chairman of ex-President 
Clinton's celebrated Council of Economic Advisers, past Chief Economist and 
later erstwhile Senior Vice President of the World Bank. Additionally, he is a two-
time winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics. Joseph Stiglitz's criticisms of IMF 
and World Bank bear undeniable testament to misconducts of the two institutions. 
66. See official website of Global Issues at www.globalissues.orgiTradeRelatediFreeTrade/Criticisms.asp, at p.l 0.(12/20 1 0) 
67. Official website of Global Issues ibid. 
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1.7 Four Deadly Steps for Killing Economies of Developing Nations: Writing on 
Professor Stiglitz's most damning revelation yet, London Observer reported that 
the eminent Economist gave an insider scoop about a 'four-step deadly method 
IMF and World Bank use to destroy economies of 'third-world' nations'.68 The 
newspaper recounted that Stiglitz granted exclusive interview to it and Newsnight, 
about the inside workings of the IMF, the World Bank, and the bank's 51% 
owner, the US Treasury. And that, from independent sources (not Stiglitz), the 
newspaper obtained a cache of documents marked, 'confidential' and 'restricted'. 
Also, that they showed one of the documents to the Economist, and requested him 
to translate. According to the newspaper; 
"Stiglitz helped translate one, a 'country assistance strategy'. There's an assistance 
strategy for every poorer nation, designed, says the World Bank, after careful in-
country investigation. But according to insider Stiglitz, the Bank's 'investigation' 
involves little more than close inspection of jive-star hotels. It concludes with a 
meeting with a begging finance minister, who is handed a 'restructuring 
agreement' pre-drafted for 'voluntary' signature. Each nation's economy is 
analysed, says Stiglitz, then the Bank hands every minister the same four-step 
programme. 
1.7.1 Step One is privatisation. Stiglitz said that rather than objecting to the sell-
offs of state industries, some politicians - using the World Bank's demands to 
silence local critics - happily flogged their electricity and water companies. 'You 
could see their eyes widen' at the possibility of commissions for shaving a few 
billion off the sale price. 
And the US government knew it, charges Stiglitz, at least in the case of the biggest 
privatisation of all, the 1995 Russian sell-off. .. " 69 
68.See The Observer, Sunday 29 April 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk./business/200Ilapr/29/business.mbas (0112011) 
69. See The Observer newspaper report ibid. 
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The Observer newspaper contended that Stiglitz cannot simply be dismissed as a 
"conspiracy nutter". And, that the man was "inside the game - a member of Bill 
Clinton's cabinet, chairman of the President's council of economic advisers." 
The newspaper noted that most sick-making for Stiglitz is that the US-backed 
oligarchs stripped Russia's industrial assets, with the effect that national output was 
cut nearly in half. Neither the IMF, nor the World Bank denied Professor Stiglitz's 
allegations. IMF collusion with World Bank to 'silence' local critics, make 
prescriptions that involve fire sale of state industries and infrastructures to 
conniving foreign investors at discounted prices, and bribing public officials with 
corrupt commissions when they agree to shave billions off the value of their key 
industries and infrastructures, bother on dishonesty and amount to cheating, and 
also violate several anti-corruption laws.70 
The Observer newspaper wrote that Professor Stiglitz also described step two of 
the four-step destruction of emerging nations as capital market liberalization; 
1.7.2 ({ ... After privatisation, Step Two is capital market liberalisation. In theory 
this allows investment capital to flow in and out. Unfortunately, as in Indonesia 
and Brazil, the money often simply flows out. Stiglitz calls this the 'hot money' 
cycle. Cash comes in for speculation in real estate and currency, then flees at the 
first whiff of trouble. A nation's reserves can drain in days. 
70. See Article 23, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (2004), GA Res. 58/4 (Annex); reprinted in 43 LL.M. 37 and 
4 Weston & Carlson IV.D.26. See also U. S Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1998); United States Code Title 15. Commerce and 
Trade Chapter 2b-Securities Exchange. 
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And when that happens, to seduce speculators into returning a nation's own capital 
funds, the IMF demands these nations raise interest rates to 30%,50% and 80%. 
'The result was predictable,' said Stiglitz. Higher interest rates demolish property 
values, savage industrial production and drain national treasuries ... "71 
IMF that prides itself as the champion of economic growth for poor and weak 
nations is exposed by Professor Stiglitz to be engaged exactly in the opposite. 
Professor Stiglitz's startling revelations confirm numerous accusations that IMF is 
misleading the poor and weak nations of the world, and not a sincere economic 
partner to the developing nations. 
Continuing, Professor Stiglitz also shed light on the third step of IMF's four-step 
destruction agenda; market-based pricing. The Observer reported that; 
1.7.3 {( ... At this point, according to Stiglitz, the IMF drags the gasping nation to 
Step Three: market-based pricing - a fancy term for raising prices on food, water 
and cooking gas. This leads, predictably, to Step-Three-and-a-HalJ: what Stiglitz 
calls 'the IMF riot'. 
The IMF riot is painfully predictable. When a nation is, 'down and out, (the IMF) 
squeezes the last drop of blood out of them. They turn up the heat until, finally, the 
whole cauldron blows up,' - as when the IMF eliminated food and fuel subsidies 
for the poor in Indonesia in 1998. Indonesia exploded into riots. 
There are other examples - the Bolivian riots over water prices last year and, this 
February, the riots in Ecuador over the rise in cooking gas prices imposed by the 
World Bank. You'd almost believe the riot was expected. 
71.See The Observer at p.36 supra. 
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And it is. What Stiglitz did not know is that Newsnight obtained several documents 
from inside the World Bank. In one, last year's Interim Country Assistance 
Strategy for Ecuador, the Bank several times suggests - with cold accuracy - that 
the plans could be expected to spark 'social unrest'. 
That's not surprising. The secret report notes that the plan to make the US dollar 
Ecuador's currency has pushed 51 % of the population below the poverty line. 
The IMF riots (and by riots I mean peaceful demonstrations dispersed by bullets, 
tanks and tear gas) cause new flights of capital and government bankruptcies. This 
economic arson has its bright side - for foreigners, who can then pick off 
remaining assets at fire sale prices. 
A pattern emerges. There are lots of losers but the clear winners seem to be the 
western banks and US Treasury ... ,,72 
Finally, according to the Observer, Professor Stiglitz described the last of IMF's 
four-step third-world nations' destruction methodologies as/ree trade. 
1.7.4 " ... Now we arrive at Step Four: free trade. This is free trade by the rules of 
the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, which Stiglitz likens to the 
Opium Wars. 'That too was about "opening markets",' he said. As in the nineteenth 
century, Europeans and Americans today are kicking down barriers to sales in 
Asia, Latin American and Africa while barricading our own markets against the 
Third World's agriculture. 
In the Opium Wars, the West used military blockades. Today, the World Bank can 
order a financial blockade, which is just as effective and sometimes just as deadly. 
Stiglitz has two concerns about the IMF/World Bank plans. First, he says, because 
the plans are devised in secrecy and driven by an absolutist ideology, never open 
for discourse or dissent, they 'undermine democracy'. Second, they don't work. 
Under the guiding hand of IMF structural 'assistance', Africa's income dropped by 
23%. 
72.The Observer newspaper ibid. 
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Did any nation avoid this fate? Yes, said Stiglitz, Botswana. Their trick? 'They told 
the IMP to go packing. , 
Stiglitz proposes radical land reform: an attack on the 50% crop rents charged by 
the propertied oligarchies worldwide. Why didn't the World Bank and IMF follow 
his advice? 
'If you challenge (land ownership), that would be a change in the power of the 
elites. That's not high on their agenda. ' 
Ultimately, what drove him to put his job on the line was the failure of the banks 
and US Treasury to change course when confronted with the crises, failures, and 
suffering perpetrated by their four-step monetarist mambo... 'It's a little like the 
Middle Ages, ' says the economist, 'When the patient died they would say well, we 
stopped the bloodletting too soon, he still had a little blood in him. '''73 
1.7.5 Doctrinaire Ideology of 'free-market fundamentalism' still Shapes Policy: 
Nation magazine further reported that to some degree, the mounting criticism from 
Stiglitz and other quarters has had an impact. That, IMF officials recently 
acknowledged the potential risks of capital market liberalization, and that both the 
IMF and W orId Bank have begun speaking more openly about debt relief and 
poverty reduction. However, the magazine noted that while rhetoric has changed, 
Mr. Stiglitz maintains that a doctrinaire ideology of "free-market fundamentalism" 
continues to shape policy. According to Nation magazine, Mr. Stiglitz argues that 
"[tlhe IMP and World Bank are pushing developing countries to privatize their 
pension systems, for example, which is highly controversial in the First World. The 
IMP demanded fiscal austerity in Argentina, where unemployment had reached 20 
73. The Observer newspaper ibid. 
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percent and, in December, sparked riots that led to the government's collapse. It 
preaches the gospel of free trade to developing countries - even though most 
Western countries built their economies by protecting certain industries and 
continue to subsidize domestic producers. The blind push to privatize and 
deregulate has not only failed to fuel development, Stiglitz contends, but reflects an 
idealized vision of how markets function that neither economic theory nor concrete 
experience supports. "74 
Professor Stiglitz displayed rare combination of courage and integrity to shine 
magnificent light on IMF and World Bank misdeeds. Considering the secrecy with 
which IMF and the World Bank operate, and the hermetic cocoon in which both 
institutions ensconced themselves, Stiglitz's revelation is epic. I will next briefly 
analyze the World Bank and its own variety of legislative infidelity. 
1.8 World Bank; A Model of Legislative Infidelity 
My review of the World Bank will be very brief, and limited only to the Bank's 
self-transformation, a concise analysis of the guidelines for treatment of foreign 
direct investments and (if time permits) ICSID Convention and Tribunal. 
1.8.1 History of the World Bank: Like IMF, World Bank was born in 1944, in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A. World Bank was assigned a single duty 
of helping rebuild war-torn Europe, after the Second World War.7S 
74. See Official website of Global Issues ibid, footnote 69 at page 35 supra. 




1.8.2 World Bank's Transformation: When Europe's post-war rebuild-program 
ended, World Bank's assignment finished. However, like IMF, World Bank gave 
itself another job. Like IMF too, the new job had to be veiled in a cloak of empathy 
for poor nations. World Bank easily owned up that it was originally formed to help 
reconstruct Europe after WW II, but explained its change flimsily; 
"Reconstruction has remained an important focus of the Bank's work, given the 
natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, and post-conflict rehabilitation 
needs that affect developing and transition economies. Today's (World) Bank, 
however, has sharpened its focus on poverty reduction as the overarching goal of 
all its work. It once had a homogeneous staff of engineers and financial analysts, 
based solely in Washington, D.C. Today, it has a multidisciplinary and diverse 
staff including economists, public policy experts, sectoral experts, and social 
scientists. 40 percent of staff are now based in country offices. "76 
World Bank did not explain how, and by what authority it transformed from 
specific Eurocentric rebuilding assignment, to become IMF's twin 'guardian 
angel' for the 'conflict-prone', 'natural disaster-infested', and 'poverty stricken', 
developing and transitioning economies. It appears that World Bank 
simultaneously appointed itself to IMF's same new duties, apparently with ulterior 
motives, just like the IMF. 
Also like IMF, controversies trail World Bank's activities in developing countries. 
Time and space constraints would not allow a full discussion of World Bank's 
76.See World Bank official website at p.43 supra. 
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many negative reflections. I will therefore limit my analysis of World Bank to only 
a quick review of few pertinent provisions of the bank's enacted rules for treatment 
of foreign direct investments. 
1.8.3 Opening Remark on World Bank's Guidelines for the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment. 
Long before World Bank enacted its guidelines for the treatment of foreign direct 
investment, UN General Assembly had, thirty years prior, in the Assembly's 
seventeenth session held on 14th December, 1962, passed the General Assembly's 
boldest and most laudable resolution, i.e., General Assembly Resolution 1803 on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.77 Resolution 1803 was latter 
reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 3171 during its 28th Session held 
17 December 1973.78 
Resolution 1803 's balance and profundity in defining national sovereignty, and 
tying every nation's right over her natural resources to permanent sovereignty, 
remain distinctly monumental. The ideals enunciated in Resolutions 1803 and 
77.source; United Nations (1963), "General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII); Permanent sovereignty over natural resources", 
Official Records a/the General Assembly; Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 17, (N5217) (New York; United Nations), pp. 
15-16; reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963) and 4 Weston and Carlson IV.F.l See also Professor Dr. Christian Okeke, (2008),The 
Law ofIntemational Investments, Course Syllabus, Spring 2008, p. 40. 
78.UN General Assembly Resolution 3171 passed during the Assembly's 28th Session held 17 December 1973, See GA Res. 
3171, UN GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, UN Doc. N9030 (1973); reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974) and 4 Weston and 
Carlson IV.F.2. 
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3171, as well as the bold principles carefully articulated in subsequent UN 
Resolutions 3201 (Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order) and 3202 (Program of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order),19 and Resolution 3281 (Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties),8°are so comprehensive and exhaustive that jointly, they cover 
almost the entire field of international economic engagements. The reasonable 
expectation would be that World Bank's later effort to make rules in the related 
subject area of treatment of foreign direct investments ought to have, in the least, 
acknowledged the already existing rules. Unfortunately, that was not the case. A 
short analysis of World Bank's enacted Guidelines will now follow; 
1.8.4 Legislative Infidelity and World Bank 'Guidelines for the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investments'; A Brief Analysis. 
World Bank Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment81 ('World 
Bank Guidelines' or 'the guideline') is World Bank's second exercise of doubtful 
legislative authority to enact laws and prescribe rules in the field of foreign direct 
investments. ICSID82 was the first. Both enactments appear to be made ultra vires 
79.source; United Nations (1974), General Assembly Resolutions 3201 and 3202, Official Records of the General Assembly; 
Sixth Special Session, Supplement No.1 (Al9559)(New York; United Nations), pp. 3-12. See also Prof. Dr. Okeke supra at p.43. 
80.Source; United Nations (1975), General Assembly Resolution 3281, Official Records of the General Assembly; Twenty-Ninth 
Session, Supplement No. 31 (Al9631)(New York; United Nations), pp.50-55. See also ProfOkeke, 18, supra at page 43 
81. See World Bank Group (1992). "Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment", Legal Framework for the 
Treatment of Foreign Investment; Volume II; Guidelines (Washington, D.C.; The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/THE WORLD BANK), PP. 35-44. 
82.Source, Document ICSID/2 (Washington D.C.; Int'l Center for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes). (1966) Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
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as World Bank possesses no legislative authority. Neither World Bank's Articles 
of Agreement nor any other legal instrument conferred World Bank with powers to 
enact laws. Nevertheless, World Bank enacted guidelines that purport to set 
binding rules to regulate relationships between transnational corporations and host 
states in foreign direct investments field. Enacted in 1992, World Bank's guideline, 
in a nutshell, consists of five chapters and a total of thirty-three paragraphs. 
Preamble to the guideline characteristically begins with a typical rosy claim 
". " that a flow of foreign direct investment brings substantial benefits to bear on 
the world economy and on the economies of developing countries in particular, in 
terms of improving the long term efficiency of the host country through greater 
competition, transfer of capital, technology and managerial skills and 
enhancement of market access and in terms of the expansion of international 
d "83 tra e; ... 
The preamble also proclaims that; 
H ••• respective General Counsel has, after reviewing existing legal instruments 
and literature, as well as best available practice identified by these institutions, 
prepared a set of guidelines representing a desirable overall framework which 
embodies essential principles meant to promote foreign direct investment in the 
common interest of all members ... "84 
Paragraph 1 of Chapter I of the guideline enjoins members of the World Bank 
Group institutions to apply the guidelines to private foreign investment in their 
83. See World Bank Group (1992), supra, footnote 81 at p.44 
84. See World Bank Group (1992), ibid. 
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respective territories.85 Chapter 1, paragraph 1, by implication, delivers a definite 
command to World Bank Group institutions to apply only World Bank guidelines 
to the exclusion of every other rules dealing with the same subject. Having clearly 
made the desired point that the World Bank Guideline should be the only rule to be 
applied to all private foreign direct investments by World Bank Group institutions, 
the rest provisions of paragraph one become skillfully jumbled. Paragraph 2 of 
Chapter 1 defines the scope of paragraph 1 thereof by providing in its first part that 
"[t}he application of these Guidelines extends to existing and new investments ... "86 
The effect is that World Bank guidelines apply retroactively to preexisting 
concession contracts, contrary to the norm. Rest provision of paragraph 2 is 
conveniently designed in incomprehensible and ambiguous language. 
Chapter II of the guideline lays down detailed directives for host states admission 
of foreign investors. The prolix and condescending details of Chapter II 
demonstrate World Bank's general overbearing disposition towards host states -
mostly developing host nations.87 
85. See Paragraph 1, Chapter 1 of the World Bank Guidelines; World Bank Group (1992) supra at p.44. 
86. See Paragraph 2, Chapter I of the World Bank Guidelines, ibid. 
87. See paragraphs 2 (a) and (b), 3, 4, 5, and 6 of World Bank Guidelines, ibid. 
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Chapter III titled Treatment also exhibits similar domineering and condescending 
posture towards host states, dictating to them, in undignified details, how their 
natural resources should be managed, as if the host states are colonial outposts. 
However, nothing in the guidelines compares to the draconian stipulations buried 
in Chapter IV titled 'Expropriation and Unilateral Alterations or Termination of 
Contracts'. Chapter IV, made up of eleven paragraphs and several sub-paragraphs, 
is so verbose with details that it runs into three whole pages. Paragraph 1 of 
Chapter IV enjoins states not to expropriate directly or by implication, in whole or 
in part, a foreign direct investment. Pointedly, the entire Chapter IV is devoted to 
rigorous, complex, and fuzzy-math computations of what constitutes "appropriate 
compensation" payable to foreign investors in the event of expropriation by host 
states. No aspect of foreign investors' real or imagined entitlement is left to 
chance. Every conceivable entitlement to the foreign investor is distinctly spelt out 
and decreed. Yet, no accommodation is spared in this lengthy and overly detailed 
chapter to extend any modicum of protection to the host states, or to strike any 
form of balance. All the blemishes noted in the opening chapters and paragraphs of 
the World Bank Guidelines seem to explode with intensity in Chapter IV. The 
outcome is a brazenly one sided, and overly lavish protections accorded foreign 
investors in ways that hijacked the economic and national sovereignties of host 
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states. World Bank guidelines simply tied the hands of host states, and totally 
ignored their interests, and paid no heed whatsoever to the host citizens' rights. No 
attempt was made in the Guidelines to address known misconducts of foreign 
investors. The resulted bias is very palpable. 
Probably, to give even more teeth to Chapter IV, Chapter V of the guideline 
designated 'Settlement of Disputes', in its paragraph 3, resolutely channeled all 
foreign direct investments disputes exclusively to the arbitration panels of ICSID. 
In effect, paragraph 3 simply wipes out the jurisdictions of host states domestic 
courts over all investment disputes. Implication of the above is that World Bank 
which is a for-profit business interest, makes the rules, superintends foreign direct 
investments, and seats in judgment over all the disputes. It must be noted that 
ICSID tribunal is a creation of the International Bank for Rehabilitation and 
development (IBRD) , 88 aka, the World Bank. Yet, World Bank's Articles of 
Agreement totally excludes World Bank from law suits and from accountability.89 
88.See Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States. Source; International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, document ICSID/2 (Washington D.C.; International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes). 
Note; The Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States was submitted to 
Governments by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on 18th March 1965 and 
entered into force on 14 October 1966. See also Professor Dr Christian Nwachukwu Okeke,(2008), page 43, supra at p. 44. 
89.While Section 3 of Article VII ofIBRD Articles of Agreement empowers World Bank to enter into all types of contracts, and 
to institute legal proceedings, Sections 3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9 thereof bestows the bank with ridiculously extensive immunities. 
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In fonn and substance, and for all its many failings, World Bank Guidelines seem 
to be a partisan appendage to transnational corporations, and to the west, rather 
than a principle-driven policy instrument. In sum, World Bank's Guidelines 
represent all the overt and covert trappings of regulatory infidelity and the use of 
law as instrumentality to further undue economic advantage. Factoring in all the 
controversies that trail World Bank activities,90 it appears also that the ICSID 
Convention and the Tribunals created there-under are vessels strategically 
positioned to advance the pursuit of ulterior agenda. 
To conclude the substantiation of my thesis that legislative infidelity is a 
phenomenon of the global economic order, I will in Chapter 2 briefly review the 
General Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Properties (TRIPS Agreement). 
The review in the next chapter will illustrate more profound fonns of legislative 
infidelity under the international economic order. 
90. See Professor Stiglitz's Observer newspaper interview on World Bank and IMF, inter alia, at pp 36 to 40 supra. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRIPS as an Exemplification of 'Legislative Infidelity' in International Law; A 
Brief Analysis. 
2.1 Introduction: General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)91 is a classic example of international 'enactments' that is 
tainted with legislative infidelity. TRIPS was conceived to enhance the protection 
of private economic and proprietary rights over intellectual properties, in the 
international arena. International intellectual property protection generates 
controversy between developed nations and developing nations. Accusations, 
counter-accusations, acrimonies and animosities generated by TRIPS continued in 
the international intellectual properties sector, even after TRIPS was adopted. 
Issues with TRIPS transcend the Agreement's unwieldy nature. Besides its facial 
awkwardness, TRIPS is inundated with accusations of trickery that allegedly 
occurred in the choice of forum for its negotiations, during the many rounds of its 
negotiations, and in the method of its adoption.92 Critics also charge TRIPS with 
foisting self-serving western peculiar idea of property rights on the rest of the 
world, even in places such ideas do not fit, and as an imperialistic vehicle. 93 
91. See; General Agreement on Trade-Relate Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Concluded at Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. 
Entered into force, I Januruy 1995; reprinted in (1994)33 I.L.M. 1197 and 4 Weston and Carlson IV.C.2D. 
92. See; Long, Doris E. (1994);Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements; A New Era of Protection or an Illusory Promise? 
AlPLA Q.J. 531 reproduced in Long and D'Amato, (2000), a Coursebook in International Intellectual Property, 357, 358. 
93. See; footnote 119, infra at page 74 
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Brief summation of the controversies that marked the Rounds of Ministerial 
negotiations of TRIPS will help the understanding of some of the basic contentions 
over TRIPS. 
2.2 Trip into TRIPS; A Summary of TRIPS' Major Controversies. 
Rounds of Ministerial trade negotiations over TRIPS began in Tokyo, spilled over 
to Uruguay, and ended in Marrakesh where the Agreement was adopted.94 Doris E. 
Long described the several rounds of Ministerial trade negotiations that pitted 
developed nations against developing nations, over the appropriate forum to 
negotiate TRIPS.95 According to her, controversy first arose from developed 
countries attempt to use a favorable GATT forum to address global problems 
posed by international trafficking of counterfeit products. Western proposers of 
TRIPS, led by the United States, attributed their preference for GATT forum over 
the more appropriate WIPO venue to the perceived inability of existing 
international conventions to address counterfeit trafficking problems.96 And, to 
alleged WIPO's susceptibility to developing countries politicking and their 
continued use of WIPO to lessen the level of intellectual property protections 
established under the Berne Convention.97 
94. See Long, Doris E.{l994) supra at page 50 
95. Long, Doris E.{l994) ibid 
96. Long, Doris E.(1994) ibid 
97. Long, Doris E. {l994)ibid 
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Developing countries led by Brazil and India vehemently opposed using GATT 
forum and, instead, preferred WIPO as the proper forum to address intellectual 
property protections.98 The opposers predicated their GATT resistance to GATT 
being an inappropriate avenue for intellectual property matters, and to accusations 
that GATT was also a forum mainly for the rich nations, and decried any attempt 
to include the protection of intangible intellectual property rights under GATT.99 
The contention marred Tokyo round of negotiations, and spilled over to the 
subsequent Uruguay round. The forum-shopping argument was in the end resolved 
in favor of the West. 
"Much of the debate regarding GATT versus WIPO jurisdiction was largely 
resolved by 1987, when WIPO was granted observer status in GATT negotiations 
on TRIPS. Debates regarding the balance to be struck between Berne Convention 
and non-Berne Convention issues of copyright protection, however, continued to 
be infected by this underlying jurisdictional debate. ,,100 
However, more controversies still followed TRIPS after its adoption. Some of 
TRIPS' new rifts center on the scope and intendment of the Agreement. TRIPS 
later squabbles will be spotlighted later. Meanwhile, a brief review of fidelity 
deficiencies of TRIPS substantive provisions will immediately follow hereunder. 
98. Long, Doris E.(1994), supra at page 51 
99. Long, Doris E. (l994)ibid 
IOO.Long, Doris E. (2000), 361, supra at p.50 
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2.3 TRIPS and Legislative Infidelity; Analytical Overview. 
Legislative infidelity issues provoked most of TRIPS controversies. Analysis of 
TRIPS provisions will begin with four of the preamble's pledges. First stanza of 
TRIPS preamble affirms members desire " .. . to reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade ... and ... the need to promote effective and 
adequate protection of intellectual property rights ... " 101 The second stanza 
recognizes " ... the need for new rules and disciplines concerning ... (c) [tlhe 
provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national legal 
systems; ... "102 TRIPS fifth stanza alludes to "... underlying public policy 
objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, 
including developmental and technological objectives ... ,,103 Finally, and most 
remarkably, the sixth stanza recognizes " ... the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound 
and viable technological base ... ,,104 
101. See; First Stanza to TRIPS 
102. See; Second Stanza, ibid 
103. See; Fifth Stanza, ibid 
104. See; Sixth Stanza ibid 
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TRIPS opening provisions reflect some of the Agreement's objectives, as declared 
in the preamble. However, a brief review of TRIPS substantive provisions will 
confirm that TRIPS rosy preambular promises are abandoned. In general, all of 
TRIPS substantive provisions consist of seven parts divided into 71 Articles, many 
paragraphs and numerous sUbparagraphs. 
Article 1 titled 'Nature and Scope of Obligation' enjoins TRIPS members, in 
mandatory language, to give effect to the Agreement. In a seeming demonstration 
of freewill, Article I also authorizes TRIPS signatory members to give more 
extensive protection to international intellectual property rights than prescribed in 
the Agreement, if they so wished. Remarkably, Article I additionally gives 
members the freedom to choose, within their own domestic legal systems and 
practices, the appropriate method of implementing TRIPS. The portion of Article 
I that granted members the freedom of choice states expressly that "[mJembers 
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice. ,,105 The language of 
Article 1 is plain, clear, and unequivocal in granting members the freedom to 
choose the appropriate domestic legal system for implementing TRIPS. 
105. See; Article I. 
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Article 1 freedom of choice provision expressly makes it the prerogative of each 
signatory member nation to decide her own legal system for implementing TRIPS. 
The corollary notion is that TRIPS will provide only the general framework for its 
implementation. Implicit in the freedom of choice provision, also, is that a 
signatory Member's bona fide choice of method of implementing TRIPS, which 
does not contradict the Agreement's principal framework, would be final on the 
matter. In view of Article 1, the reasonable expectation is that TRIPS will maintain 
consistency in all its provisions. And not embark on self-contradiction by later on 
dictating in particularized details specific provisions that members must enact into 
their domestic laws. As will be seen below, TRIPS turned around and made 
prescriptions of what members must spell out in their domestic laws. These 
conflicted provisions resulted to internal contradictions with provisions of Article 1 
which already deferred such authority to individual TRIPS signatory members. 
Pointless internal contradiction is one attribute of legislative infidelity. 
Paragraph 5 of Article 41, under Part III (enforcement), supports Article 1, as 
well as the conclusion that TRIPS opted expressly to not dictate judicial systems to 
its members. According to Paragraph 5, Article 41 "[ilt is understood that this 
Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement 
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of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law 
in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the 
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and the enforcement of law in general. "106 
Paragraph 5 of Article 41, read jointly with the relevant portion of Article I, 
clearly relieves Members from obligation to alter their existing legal systems in 
any particular way, for the purposes of complying with requirements of TRIPS. As 
long as members enforcement obligations of the Agreement is otherwise met. 
However, in typical legislative infidelity mode, TRIPS made an about-tum. After 
unequivocally deferring to signatory members the freedom to decide appropriate 
methods of implementing TRIPS in their domestic legal systems, the Agreement 
recanted. In stark contrast with the express provisions of Articles I and 41, TRIPS 
veered round and stipulated copious details of procedural and substantive legal 
matters that Members must incorporate into their domestic legal systems, in order 
to be in conformity with TRIPS.107 
106. See; Article 41, Paragraph 5 ofTRIPS. 
107. See; Mandatory requirements of Articles 8(1), 9, 10,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,39,40, and 41 of TRIPS. 
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Again, section 2 of Part III titled 'Civil and Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies' which covers Articles 42 to 50, also, lays out extensive details of entire 
gamut of mandatory stipulations of substantive and procedural matters which 
Members must incorporate into their domestic laws. Examples include matters of 
Fair and Equitable Procedures- Article 42, Evidence- Article 43, Injunction -
Article 44, Damages - Article 45, and Other Remedies - Article 46. Other TRIPS 
mandated requirements include Right of Information - Article 47, Indemnity -
Article 48, Administrative Procedures - Article 49, Provisional Measures - Article 
50, and a patchwork of other similar provisions. These TRIPS provisions, in effect, 
take away from members the power of choice which Article 1 clearly gave to them. 
Members whose existing laws and procedures are dissimilar and those who do not 
already have TRIPS prescribed new laws in their legal system must alter their laws 
in order to be in confonnity with TRIPS requirements. Some of TRIPS demands 
are obvious in requiring Members to alter their domestic laws.108However, a host of 
other TRIPS provisions impose changes that members must make, but skillfully 
avoided using clear and specific language that explicitly denote compulsion. 
108. See; Example, Article 8. See also TRIPS Article 33 stipulation that 20 years shall be the life of patent protection. 
57 
Many of TRIPS imposed requirements are so sweepmg that they radically 
supplanted sacred principles of procedural and substantive laws. One such drastic 
provision is Article 34 that ousted the settled burden of proof rule of justice. 
Article 34 titled 'Process Patent; Burden of Proof', provides in paragraph 1 that 
"[j] or the purpose of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights 
of the owner ... if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a 
product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to 
prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented 
process. Therefore, Members shall provide '" that any identical product when 
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process; (a) if the 
product ... is new; (b) if ... the owner of the patent has been unable through 
reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used. "109 
Shun of verbosity, the literal meaning of Article 34 is that in all process patent 
infringement litigations, the burden of proof shall be on the defendant, and not on 
the plaintiff. TRIPS, by Article 34, paragraph 1, compels signatory Members to 
alter their respective domestic laws on process patent infringement law suits, so 
that when a plaintiff attempts but fails to prove, or plaintiff is otherwise unable to 
prove hislherlits case, the burden of proof shall automatically shift to the 
defendant to disprove plaintiff's unsubstantiated (and probably frivolous) case. 
109. See; Article 34 
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Article 34 offends good conscience, and forcefully tramples upon sacred rule of 
procedural law which mandates that a person who alleges must prove. It is a 
settled principle of law that plaintiff who makes allegation against a defendant, in 
a law suit, must first put forward sufficient facts to prove the allegation. Thereafter, 
the defendant will then be called upon to defend. TRIPS flagrantly transgressed 
against this golden rule, and instead prescribed a draconian requirement that means 
in effect that a defendant upon whom an allegation is made by a plaintiff, albeit 
frivolously, shall bear the burden of disproving plaintiff's allegation. The plaintiff 
is thus relieved from offering any proof to win a process patent infringement law 
suit. Obviously, none of the TRIPS sponsors would allow similar provisions in 
their domestic laws. Article 34 is extremely harsh, impudent, clearly self-serving, 
evidently predatory, and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the national 
sovereignties of those TRIPS member nations who are not technologically 
advanced. Article 34 is one of TRIPS many glaring cases of legislative infidelity. 
Similarly, Paragraph 2 of Article 34 reiterates the vexing provisions of paragraph 
1 thereof. Those and similar self-interest provisions designed into TRIPS safeguard 
only the interests of potential patent process litigation plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in 
international intellectual property infringement law suits are most likely, and 
usually are, the technologically savvy nations and entities. In all, Article 34 is one 
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typical example of TRIPS many instances of legislative infidelity and use of law 
for instrumentality of advancing undue economIC advantage, exploitation, and 
fraud. 
It must be noted here that despite the use of seemingly permissive language in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 34, compliance with the provisions of those two 
paragraphs is not discretionary. Provisions of the two paragraphs of Article 34 
operate subject to Article 1 paragraph 1, and Article 8 paragraphs 1 and 2, both of 
which make compliance to all TRIPS requirements mandatory. Article 1 paragraph 
1 stipulates in part that any steps Members shall take for the protection of 
intellectual property rights must not contravene the provisions of the Agreement. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 8 enjoins TRIPS Members to formulate or amend their 
domestic laws, and to take appropriate measures, that suit their domestic needs, 
provided also that any steps so taken must be " ... consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.,,110 Article 1 paragraph 1 read together with Article 8 paragraphs 1 
and 2 denote compulsion, not discretion, the liberal writing style notwithstanding. 
llO.See; Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 8. 
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The provIsIOns of TRIPS which paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 command 
formulations or amendments of members' domestic laws to conform to include 
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 34. In other words, in view of Articles 
1 and 8, the demand of Article 34 that members alter their domestic laws so that 
burden of proof shall be on the defendant in process patent litigations, is 
mandatory and not permissive. The seemingly permissive tone of Article 34 
tending to suggest that Members have discretion on the matter is misleading. 
For harboring such far-re~ching demand on crucial matters of justice, TRIPS 
ironically sabotages the mission it set out to accomplish. Legal instruments 
characteristically strive to advance justice, not to propagate injustice. TRIPS is 
inherently unjust, self-seeking, opportunistic, and imperialist. Member nations 
coerced into enacting TRIPS unjust requirements into their domestic laws would 
predictably become reluctant to enforce such bad laws at home, in effect defeating 
TRIPS main purpose of protecting intellectual property rights on the international 
arena. The Agreement exemplifies legislative infidelity and use of law' for 
instrumentality of furthering undue economic advantage - a hallmark of the 
jurisprudence of international economic order. I will next briefly discuss TRIPS 
other genre of legislative infidelity which involves complicated cross-referencing 
style used in writing TRIPS. 
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2.4 TRIPS Cross-Referencing Technique; A Genre of Legislative Infidelity. 
Besides TRIPS legislative infidelity shortcomings already discussed, another 
worrisome legislative infidelity issue with the Agreement is its overly complicated 
cross-referencing style. This refers to a style in which articles of TRIPS 
excessively cross-reference different independent Conventions, Treaties, and other 
autonomous instruments, in intricate ways that appear to be calculated to confuse. 
The problem associated with this legislative draftsmanship style does not lie alone 
in the quantity of the cross-references. The tortuous designs of most of the cross-
referencing provisions also exacerbate the Agreement's comprehension ordeal, and 
invariably, leads to compliance difficulties. 
In addition to several internal cross-references to itself, TRIPS copiously cross-
references many other different international instruments. TRIPS provisions 
despoiled by excessive cross-referencing tactics include the following Articles, 
amongst others; Article 1 paragraph 3, Article 2 paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 3 
paragraph 1, Article 4 paragraphs (b) and (d), and Article 9 paragraph 1. TRIPS 
other knotty cross-references include Article 10 paragraph 1, Article 27 
subparagraph (b) of paragraph 3, Article 35, Article 39 paragraph 1, Article 63 
paragraph 2, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 64, Article 65 paragraph 1, Article 
68, Article 70 paragraphs 2, 4, 8(a), and 9, and Article 71 paragraph 2. Though the 
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cross-references are many and cumbersome in themselves, the additional 
contortions in the phrasing of some of the cross-referencing articles magnified the 
document's reading and comprehension problems in ways that suggest prior 
existence of dishonest motive. 
Independent instruments generously cross-referenced in TRIPS include the Paris 
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention and the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, WTO Agreement, 
WIPO, and GATT 1994. These separate legal instruments are profusely cross-
referenced in several articles in aberrant ways that make TRIPS exceedingly 
dependent on other instruments, tenuous to read, and impede comprehension. For 
example, paragraph 1, Article 2 of TRIPS provides that "[Un respect of Parts IL III 
and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and 
Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967)."111 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 provides further that "[nJothing in Parts I to IV of this 
Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to 
111. See Article 2 paragraph 1. 
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each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome 
Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated 
Circuits ,,112 
Comprehension of the above two paragraphs of Article 2 becomes somewhat 
beclouded and challenging. Paragraph 1 Article 2 above looks facially normal, but 
on closer examination, suffers from heavy clarity issues. Paragraph 1 seems to 
require, in effect, that to comply with Parts II, III, and IV of TRIPS, Members have 
to comply with Articles 1 to 12, and Article 19 of Paris Convention (1967). It must 
be noted that Parts II, III, and IV referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 2 comprise of 
fifty-four Articles, numerous paragraphs and subparagraphs. And that these fifty-
four articles contain the core substance of TRIPS. Most of the articles stipulate 
many other compliance requirements of their own. Paragraph 1 of Article 2, thus, 
requires that to comply with these fifty-four articles of TRIPS, plus their many 
paragraphs and subparagraphs, each Member has to skim each of the fifty-four 
articles that make up Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, to understand and comply 
with their equally vague provisions. The Member shall thereafter go over to the 
Paris Convention of 1967 and comply with each provision of Articles 1 through 
12, and Article 19, respectively, i.e. comply with the thirteen mentioned articles of 
Paris Convention (1967). The draftsmanship style is totally awkward, tortuous, 
112. See Article 2 Paragraph 2. 
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convoluted, confusing, and unwarranted. The writing style sacrifices clarity, and 
neither aids comprehension, assists faithful compliance, nor adds any value to 
TRIPS, or to TRIPS understanding and faithful compliance. TRIPS arduous cross-
referencing style defeats a principal necessity that every law must be clear and 
unambiguous, for easy understanding and even compliance. 
Again, focused on Integrated Circuit alone, Paragraph 2, Article 2 of TRIPS cross-
referenced four different independent international instruments, and provides that 
Members' existing obligations under each of the referenced instruments shall not 
be derogated by anything that is contained in Parts I to IV of the TRIPS Article. 
This is another complicated invocation of several international documents in ways 
that unduly create avoidable clarity problems, arduously tasks a reader, and 
unnecessarily hampers comprehension. When this conundrum is combined with 
the cross-referencing problems identified in TRIPS paragraph 1 of Article 2 above, 
Article 2 paragraph 2's dilemma swells. 
Furthermore, paragraph 1, Article 9 of TRIPS introduced yet another cross-
referencing scenario. Article 9 is part of Part II mentioned along with Parts III and 
IV in paragraph 1 of Article 2. Article 9, paragraph 1, creates other problematic 
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cross-references that are further complicated the more by a confusing second 
sentence. Paragraph I, Article 9 of TRIPS mandates members compliance" ... with 
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. 
However, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in 
respect of the rights conferred under Article 6 b.i.s. of that Convention or of the 
rights derived therefrom. ,,113 This is yet another instance of burdensome cross-
referencing arrangement that unduly squanders lucidity and understanding. TRIPS 
writing technique complicates the instrument, creates ambiguities, hinders 
comprehension and compliance, and militates against TRIPS becoming that 
" ... effective and expeditious procedure for the multilateral prevention and 
settlement of disputes ... ,,114 as promised. 
It will be naIve to assume that any of the above blunders came about by accident, 
arose out of craftsmanship incompetence, or are necessitated by compromise. Any 
assumptions of accident, ineptness, or exigency of compromise will be defeated on 
two grounds. Firstly, the quality of professional expertise and resources available 
to TRIPS sponsors are top notch. They are therefore above any petty craftsmanship 
errors. Secondly, careful study shows that there is a tailored pattern to TRIPS 
113. See Article 9 paragraph 1. 
114. See TRIPS Preamble, Stanza (d). 
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madness that raises reasonable suspicion of calculated bad faith. Key policies 
TRIPS set out zealously to propagate are all written in very lucid, succinct, plain, 
and easy to understand styles. Most of the provisions, or crucial portions of them, 
are spared the confusing cross-referencing to other independent instruments. An 
example is TRIPS paragraph 2, Article I which in clear language imposes western 
peculiar definition of intellectual property. See also Article 8 which lucidly 
restricts Members' rights to adapt patent laws to suit their unique circumstances, 
Article 27 (1) which effectively imposes restrictive definition on what constitutes 
patentable subject matter', Article 28 which imposes stringent definition of 
'exclusive rights' conferred by patent, Article 29 that deals with universal standard 
of how a patent applicant should disclose the invention, Article 30 that sets the 
exceptions to rights conferred by patent, Article 31 which is about the longest 
article in the entire TRIPS, Article 32 as well as Article 33 which set the duration 
of patent protection to twenty years, Article 34 which upstaged burden of proof in 
patent process infringements suits, Article 36, Article 40, and Articles 41 to 50. 
The common trend observed here is that each of the above provisions is written in 
plain and lucid language, and contains little or no cross-references, unlike the rest 
of TRIPS other provisions that appear to be intentionally jumbled to confuse. On 
close observation also, it appears that all the aforementioned lucid provisions 
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coincidentally favor only the plaintiffs in patent infringement litigations. That is 
the kind of hidden motive that propels legislative infidelity. 
2.5 Post-Adoption Controversies That Trail TRIPS; Stirring the Hornet's 
Nest. 
TRIPS continued to provoke discord on many fronts even after it came into force. 
The Agreement's post-adoption controversies are many and varied, and the line of 
hostility remains mostly between the western nations and developing countries. 
One of TRIPS earliest disputes that went to WTO's international arbitration 
tribunal was between the United States and India. 
The case became known as India Drug Patent Controversy.llS Summary of facts 
of the case explained the matter in controversy. India as TRIPS signatory had not 
within the grace period enacted TRIPS mandated domestic legislation necessary 
for granting patents to pharmaceuticals. United States filed a complaint with the 
WTO alleging, inter alia, that India's failure to craft legislation designed to permit 
patent protection for qualifying pharmaceuticals violated India's duties under 
TRIPS. The dispute arose three years after TRIPS adoption. India defended on 
115. See the Report of the Panel on India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical And Agricultural Chemical Products, (1997) 
WT/DS501R (September 5, 1997); also summarized in Long and D'Amato, (2000), A Coursebook in International Intellectual 
Property, 365, 366 and 367. 
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the grounds, inter alia, that Articles 65 of the Agreement allowed TRIPS members 
a five year grace period within which to develop complying legislation. The 
United States disagreed, contending that Article 65 required legislation to be in 
place so that India would be in compliance immediately upon the termination of 
the grace period. Prior to reaching its final decision, the WTO Panel first decided 
to resolve what it called interpretation issue, thus; "[b J efore examining specific 
measures in dispute, we first deal with a general interpretative issue, namely 
standards applicable to interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement ... " Continuing, 
the panel stated that; " ... the TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in good faith 
in light of (i) the ordinary meaning of its terms, (ii) the context and (iii) its 
objective and purpose. In our view, good faith interpretation requires the 
protection of legitimate expectations derived from the protection of intellectual 
property rights provided for in the Agreement ... " The Panel also stated that" ... the 
TRIPS Agreement ... occupies a relatively self-contained, sui generis status in the 
WTO Agreement ... which itself builds upon the experience '" under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 ... " Before reaching its final decision, the 
Panel further asserted that "[sJince the TRIPS Agreement is one of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, we must be guided by the jurisprudence established under 
GATT 1947 in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement unless there is 
a contrary provision ... The protection of legitimate expectations of Members 
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regarding the conditions of competition is a well-established GATT principle ... 
The protection of legitimate expectations is central to creating security and 
predictability in the multilateral trading system.... In conclusion, we find that, 
when interpreting the test of the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimate expectations of 
WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account, as 
well as standards of interpretation developed in past panel reports in the GATT 
framework, in particular those laying down the principles of the protection of 
conditions of competition flowing from multilateral trade agreements. "116 
The WTO Panel gave its final judgment to the United States, using some 
questionable legal theories. 
The WTO tribunal disregarded the facts of the case, fudged the law, and resorted to 
fancy moral rectitude in giving judgment to the United States. The tribunal invoked 
some nebulous ethical phrases like "good faith, " "context," "object and purpose, " 
"legitimate expectations of Members," "protection of legitimate expectations, " and 
"creating security and predictability in the multilateral trading system." However, 
similar moral compass was not invoked to balance disparate interests when TRIPS 
116.See India Patent Controversy ibid. 
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was crafted. TRIPS that is tainted with bad faith, in intent and purpose as well as in 
form and substance, was dressed up in immaculate moralistic garb by the tribunal. 
Indeed, contrary to the tribunal's final judgment in the Indian Drug Patent Case, 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 65 upon which the tribunal purported to base its 
decision, clearly support India's position that India still had two more years in the 
grace period within which to alter its laws to conform to TRIPS. United States 
lacks the legal standing to dictate to India how to utilize the grace period 
prescribed by TRIPS. Article 65 relied upon by the United States, and upon which 
the tribunal based its decision, does not require that India or any other TRIPS 
member write the required laws in advance, nor take any particular steps in order 
to be in compliance immediately after the grace period. WTO tribunal's decision in 
favor of the United States, in the circumstances, is wrongful. The tribunal's 
decision was also reached per incuriam. This is because the tribunal unjustifiably 
based its decision on what it called" ... the jurisprudence established under GATT 
1947 in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement unless there is a 
contrary provision ... "117 Bottom is knocked off the tribunals' judgment because 
TRIPS indeed has contrary provisions that the tribunal ignored. TRIPS contrary 
provisions that the tribunal ignored include freedom of choice provisions contained 
in both Article 1, and Article 41, paragraph 5, which give discretion to TRIPS 
117. See; India Patent Controversy supra at page 68 
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members on matters of choice of appropriate domestic legal system. Article 65, 
read together with Article 1 and Article 41 paragraph 5, strongly supports India's 
case in the India Patent Controversy. 
2.6 Scholarly Angle to TRIPS Controversies. 
TRIPS post-adoption controversies transcends political rancor and judicial panels. 
Learned academics and authors also waded into TRIPS fray, some of them very 
forcefully. Scholarly spats over TRIPS also appear to run along the divide of 
developed versus developing nations. While most academic opinions from western 
nations extol TRIPS and even demand more coverage and stringency, voices from 
the other side of the divide rile at the Agreement in very strong terms. The 
following two examples paint vivid pictures of scholars' polarized positions over 
TRIPS, along the line of developed and developing nations. Views favorable to 
TRIPS are represented by this extolling passage. 
"The adoption, in April 1994, by over 118 countries of the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ranks as one of the most significant 
developments in international intellectual property law of the Twentieth Century. 
Indeed, there are many that rank TRIPS as the most important development. There 
is no question that the post TRIPS world is a different place. TRIPS provides a 
forum for continuing international attention to the issues of IPR. For the first time 
in the history of international intellectual property relations, TRIPS (administered 
by the WTO) has provided potentially powerfol international sanctioning tools for 
assuring compliance with TRIPS obligations. It has codified as an international 
standard, adoption of the rule of law for intellectual property legal regimes. It has 
served to fill many of the gaps in definition that previous multinational regimes left 
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vacant. And last, but by no means its least important achievement, TRIPS has 
established a minimum enforcement norm that requires countries to provide 
minimum procedural safeguards to assure enforceability of the minimum rights 
required under the treaty. These enforcement provisions, combined with the 
sanctioning power of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for treaty violation, 
promise to re-work the face of international intellectual property law. ,,118 
Above view is not clear on specifics of what it claims TRIPS got right. The 
opinion seems to have been expressed without sufficient study of TRIPS exact 
provisions. I vehemently disagree with the opinions expressed in the above article. 
My opposition to the article is predicated upon TRIPS shortfalls I already 
discussed earlier in my analysis of TRIPS, and upon my agreement with views 
opposed to TRIPS, represented by the opinion passionately expressed below. 
Views critical of TRIPS strongly condemn the Agreement as an imperialistic plot 
that imposed Western intellectual property laws on the rest of the world. Academic 
view opposed to TRIPS is represented by Marcia A. Hamilton's poignant article 
published soon after TRIPS adoption. This author's incisive criticism takes a 
~opyright perspective in vilifying TRIPS. According to Marcia A. Hamilton; 
118. See, Long and D' Amato (2000), 356, supra, at page 68. 
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"The WTO/GATT Agreement involving Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (Agreement or TRIPS) is a lot more than its moniker reveals. Far 
from being limited to trade relations, correcting the international balance of trade, 
or lowering customs trade barriers, TRIPS attempts to remake international 
copyright law in the image of Western copyright law. If TRIPS is successful across 
the breathtaking sweep of signatory countries, it will be one of the most effective 
vehicles of Western imperialism in history. Moreover, the Agreement will have 
achieved this goal under the heading "trade-related," which makes it appear as 
though it is simply business. To understand TRIPS, it is important to embrace an 
interdisciplinary approach, to widen the copyright lens to include culture, politics, 
and human rights. Despite its broad sweep and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS 
arrives on the scene already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at the same time 
that the online era became irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not even a nod, 
to the fact that a significant portion of the international intellectual property 
market will soon be conducted on line. This silence could transform a troubling 
treaty into a weapon of extortion by the publishing industry, which has already 
succeeded in crafting TRIPS as a blunt instrument for copyright protection. While 
the corporeal universe has permitted Western societies to receive and copy large 
numbers of copyrighted works for free-through libraries, commercial browsing, 
personal lending, and copyright doctrines such as the first sale doctrine, fair use, 
and the idea/expression dichotomy, the on-line era raises the possibility that the 
publishing industry can track every miniscule use of a work and thereby turn the 
free use zone into a new opportunity for profit. TRIPS' silence threatens to make it 
both outdated and overprotective. "119 
Marcia Hamilton's condemnation of TRIPS is insightful, apposite, and warranted. 
Such strong opposition appropriately arises from TRIPS decadent policy thrust. 
The author argued further below that the imposition of western intellectual 
property tradition on the rest of the world by TRIPS, without regard to differences 
119. See; Hamilton, Marcia A. (1996), 'The TRIPS Agreement: imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective. ' 29 Vand. 1. 
Transnat'l L. 613; See also Long and D' Amato (2000), 361 and 362, supra, at 68. 
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in culture, politics, and beliefs, truly amount to modem imperialism. Added to 
problems of TRIPS imperialistic gravitation, forcing nations to forsake their 
cultures, abandon their individualities, surrender their independence, undermine 
domestic laws, and enact mostly adversarial laws that reflect TRIPS' unfitting 
prescriptions constitute potent recipe for universal rhythm of cynicism against 
compliance and enforcement of TRIPS. Even with the best of intentions and 
efforts, nations will still lag in meeting TRIPS strange and unjust prescriptions for 
protecting intangible intellectual property rights. 
Describing a similar situation on China's nagging predicament in fulfilling her 
obligations under TRIPS-like intellectual property protection treaty China signed 
with the United States before the advent of TRIPS, Professor William Alford noted 
the implications of imposing own laws without regard to cultural differences, thus; 
" ... laws premised on the values and institutions of an economically advanced 
capitalist democracy will not generate identical results when transplanted to a 
different setting. Rules that presume an independent judiciary, a professionalized 
bar, powerful interest groups and a rights-conscious populace fall chiefly on deaf 
ears in contemporary China. ,,120 
120. See; William P. Alford, (1992),'Pressuring the Pirate', L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1992, at M5, cited in published article by 
Glenn Butterton, (1996), 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1081. 
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Professor Alford's description of China's compliance dilemma may be sprinkled 
with traditional American pride, but the learned professor made a great point that 
imposition of laws without regard to societal differences would always hit a brick 
wall. Amplifying the same subject, Glenn Butterton who concurred with Professor 
Alford to a large extent, more succinctly predicated China's compliance quandary 
with the same TRIPS-like treaty to cultural dissimilarities. He put his view thus; 
" .. .[iln its simplest terms, the chief thrust of the explanation from culture is that 
China has historic-cultural roots that are profoundly different from our own, and 
that, therefore, we cannot enter into agreements based almost exclusively on our 
own complex theories of property right, with all of the alien economic and 
cultural baggage they entail, with any reasonable expectation that they will 
succeed. "121 
Glen Butterton is absolutely correct. Butterton's educated view expressed prior to 
TRIPS negotiation, contain germane concerns that were regrettably overlooked 
when TRIPS was formulated. 
The profundity and scope of Marcia A. Hamilton's culture-based criticism of 
TRIPS compel the temptation to reproduce more of her erudite treatise. Continuing 
121.See; Glen Butterton atfootnote 120, supra at page 75. 
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with her blunt admonishment of TRIPS, the learned author argued that; 
(([tlhe cultural underpinnings of existing copyright law require a reevaluation to 
assess their appropriateness and usefulness in building a universal copyright 
scheme. The subject of the AALS Symposium, the TRIPS Agreement, is the first 
giant step towards globalization of intellectual property rights. Globalization 
introduces a new level of complexity into copyright law and creates a need for 
more creative ways of understanding and justifYing rights protected by copyright. 
The United States is no longer negotiating primarily with European countries that 
share a similar moral and religious heritage and economic understandings. Now, 
the United States is also dealing with the Eastern countries as well as with the 
world's developing countries. Therefore, focus on copyright must extend beyond 
markets and trade issues to interdisciplinary understandings. Cultural views on 
human efforts and reward are particularly important. With 117 signatory countries 
from around the world, TRIPS is ambitious to say the least. It is also old-
fashioned, Western-style imperialism. One commentator describes the TRIPS 
Agreement as ((impolite." This description is too polite. Despite its innocuous 
name, TRIPS does not merely further trade relations between these many 
countries. Rather, TRIPS imposes a western intellectual property system across-
the-board-which is to say that it imposes presuppositions about human value, 
effort, and reward. And it has appeared without serious public debate over its 
latent political mission. It is not surprising that there might be uneven compliance 
across the world even after so many countries signed the TRIPS Agreement. 
Intellectual property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set 
of fences and gates. People must believe in it to be effective. "122 
Hamilton's OpInIOn exemplifies the passionate scholarly VIews that stack-up 
against TRIPS. Though Hamilton's criticism focused primarily on copyright aspect 
of TRIPS' flaws, the criticism is equally true for all the other branches of 
122. See Hamilton, Marcia A. p. 362, supra at page 74. 
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intellectual property. Hamilton concluded her reprove this way; 
" .. . By strongly supporting the TRIPS Agreement, the United State-which is to say 
U.S. publishers-is exporting and imposing Protestant-based capitalism. The 
United States is also endorsing the imposition of a revolution-tending construct of 
the person. Individualism, as captured in the Western intellectual property system, 
is the sine qua non for a society to recognize and honor personal liberty. TRIPS is 
nothing less than freedom imperialism ... "123 
The renowned Nobel Prize laureate, and professor of Economics, Professor Joseph 
Stiglitz, also threw his eminent hat into the TRIPS ring, siding with truth as 
always. He singled out the Uruguay round of TRIPS negotiations as the focus of 
his concise view on TRIPS. Professor Stiglitz posited that; 
"[t]he Uruguay Round also strengthened intellectual property rights. America and 
other Western drug companies could now stop drug companies in India and Brazil 
from "stealing" their intellectual property. But these drug companies in the 
developing world were making life-saving drugs available to their citizens at a 
fraction of the price at which the drugs were sold by the Western drug companies. 
There were thus two sides to the decisions made in the Uruguay Round. Profits of 
the Western drug companies would go up. Advocates said this would provide them 
more incentive to innovate; but the increased profits from sales in the developing 
world were small, since few could afford the drugs, and hence the incentive effect, 
at best, might be limited. The other side was that thousands were effectively 
condemned to death, because governments and individuals in developing countries 
could no longer pay the high prices demanded. In the case of AIDS, the 
international outrage was so great that drug companies had to back down, 
eventually agreeing to lower their prices, to sell the drugs at cost in late 2001. But 
the underlying problem-the fact that the intellectual property regime established 
under the Uruguay Round was not balanced, that it overwhelmingly reflected the 
123. Hamilton, Marcia A., 363, ibid 
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, 
interests and perspectives of the producers, as opposed to the users, whether in 
developed or developing countries-remains. "124 
Evidently, TRIPS is an unfair Agreement. The driving force behind TRIPS is 
imposition of will and culture with the specific aim to redouble economic 
aggrandizement by TRIPS sponsors. In its totality, TRIPS eloquently exemplifies 
legislative infidelity and the use of law for instrumentality of furthering undue 
economic advantage and exploitation. 
Next, I will very briefly examine TRIPS failure to extend protection to long 
exploited intellectual property rights of the indigenous peoples and local 
communities of the world. 
2.7 TRIPS Neglect of the Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local 
Communities; Another Face of Legislative Infidelity. 
Continued neglect of intellectual property rights of the indigenous people and local 
communities vividly portrays partiality in the jurisprudence of international 
economic order. TRIPS squandered a rare opportunity to extend protection to the 
traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities which have been the 
target of wanton exploitations from time beyond memory. Protection of the 
124. See; Stiglitz, J.,(2002), Globalization and its Discontents, 7 and 8. 
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indigenous and local communities' rights to their natural resources and know-how 
suffers neglect under the western concept of property rights. International 
communities' constant equivocations on persistent infringements of indigenous 
peoples' property rights have spurred numerous agitations from the victims and 
their growing international army of sympathizers. For many years, the topic of 
protection and preservation of indigenous peoples' property rights remained fringe 
subjects that elicited mostly dubious empathy and unfulfilled international 
promises. But, indigenous people persevered in their campaigns. Despite all the 
indigenous peoples' familiar struggles, TRIPS yet neglected to provide protection 
to indigenous peoples' rights over their resources and know-how. International 
campaigns continued to demand recognition and protection for indigenous peoples 
and local communities' property rights. Some of the notable campaigns include the 
following, amongst others; 
2.7.1 The BeUagio Declaration. 
Bellagio declaration was made in a well attended Conference held in Bellagio, 
Italy, on March 11, 1993, demanding recognition of indigenous peoples' 
intellectual property rights.125 
125. See,Bellagio Declaration of March 1993, reproduced in Long and D'Amato (2000), 1025, supra, at page 68 
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The declaration was made over one year before TRIPS. The well attended 
Conference attracted a large group of people from many nations, professions and 
disciplines. The declarants included lawyers, literary critics, computer scientists 
and publishers, teachers and writers, environmentalists and scholars of cultural 
heritage who shared a common concern about the effects of international regime of 
intellectual property law on their communities, on scientific progress and 
international development, on environment, and on the culture of indigenous 
people.126 
Bellagio Declaration stated in its first three, and last, paragraphs as follows; 
"Ulirst, intellectual property laws have profound effects on issues as disparate as 
scientific and artistic progress, biodiversity, access to information, and the 
cultures of indigenous and tribal peoples. Yet all too often those laws are 
construed without taking such effects into account, constructed around a paradigm 
that is selectively blind to the scientific and artistic contributions of many of the 
world's cultures and constructed in fora where those who will be most directly 
affected have no representation ... "127 
" ... Second, many of these problems are built into the basic structure and 
assumptions of intellectual property. Contemporary intellectual property law is 
constructed around a notion of the author as an individual, solitary and original 
creator, and it is for this figure that its protections are reserved. Those who do not 
fit this mode-custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectively 
practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable 
seed varieties, for example-ar.e denied intellectual property protection ... "128 
126. See Bellagio Declaration, reproduced in Long and D' Amato (2000), 1025, supra, at 68 
127. Bellagia Declaration, 1025, ibid 
128. Bellagio Declaration, 1026, ibid 
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" ... Third, a system based on such premises has real negative consequences. 
Increasingly, traditional knowledge, folklore, genetic material and native medical 
knowledge flow out of their countries of origin unprotected by intellectual 
property, while works from developed countries flow in, well protected by 
international intellectual property agreements, backed by the threat of trade 
sanctions ... "129 
" .. . In conclusion, we declare that in an era in which information is among the 
most precious of all resources, intellectual property rights cannot be framed by the 
few to be applied to the many. They cannot be framed on assumptions that 
disproportionately exclude the contributions of important parts of the world's 
community. They can no longer be constructed without reference to their 
ecological, cultural and scientific effects. We must reimagine the international 
regime of intellectual property ... "130 
Regrettably, and totally ignoring the foregoing, TRIPS concluded on 15 April 1994 
- one year and one month after the well publicized Bellagio Declaration - persisted 
in neglecting the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples and local 
communities of the world. 
2.7.2 Scholarly Writings on the Neglect of Property Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities. 
Other noteworthy efforts made in the campaign for the recognition of intellectual 
property rights of the indigenous peoples come by way of numerous scholarly 
writings. An exemplary scholarly writing is titled "The Biotech Controversy of 
129. Bellagio Declaration, reproduced in Long and D'Amato (2000), 1026, supra at page 81. 
130. Bellagio Declaration, 1027, ibid 
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Seeds and Shamans; The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical 
Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities."l3lThe author vigorously 
canvassed the "inventions" of the indigenous people and local communities that 
have been exploited and denied recognition by western interests and western 
system of property right. She argued that patent rights over traditional know-how 
are often granted to western corporations and other entities who then tum around 
and exploit the original owners of such patentable inventions. The writer cited 
several life examples to substantiate the claims. According to this author, 
"[ilndigenous and local communities have a long history of using plants for almost 
all needs, including food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. Common remedies used 
today were often first developed by healers prior to contact with industrial 
societies. Yet, although many of today's drugs and cosmetics originated from the 
stewardship and knowledge of indigenous and local communities, that knowledge 
remains unrecognized and unvalued until appropriated from those communities by 
Western corporations or institutions. ,,132 
The author, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, went on to enumerate several cultural 
"inventions" of the indigenous societies that were "stolen" and patented by 
foreign corporations and entities, without compensating or acknowledging the 
131. See Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, (1996),'The Biotech Controversy o/Seeds and Shamans; The Appropriation o/the Scientific and 
Technical Knowledge 0/ Indigenous andLocal Communities.' 17 Mich. 1. Int'l L. 919. 
132. Roht-Arriaza ibid. 
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original "inventors". Some of Ms. Roht-Arriaza's examples include the well-
known cure for malaria, quinine, which she noted come from the bark of the 
Peruvian cinchona treeY3 According to the author, Andean indigenous groups 
long used quinine as a cure for fever, allegedly discovering the bark's powers after 
observing feverish jaguars eat them. 
Another example this author cited is the rosy periwinkle plant, unique to 
Madagascar, found to contain properties that combat certain cancersY4 
According to the author, anti-cancer drugs vincristine and vinblastine have been 
developed from the periwinkles, resulting in $100 million in annual sales for Eli 
Lilly and virtually nothing for Madagascar. 
Next is the Neem tree which indigenous farmers.in India have used the leaves 
and seeds for thousands of years as natural insecticide. 135 Juice from the tree has 
also been used to prevent scabies and other skin disorders. The villagers still scrub 
their teeth with neem twigs. The author argued that several patents have now been 
granted in the United States and other industrialized countries for products based 
133. Roht-Arriaza, supra at 83 
134. Roht-Arriaza, ibid 
135. Roht-Arriaza, ibid 
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on the neem plant. A U.S.-based big corporation, W.R. Grace, received a patent for 
insecticide based on active ingredient derived from neem, stating that it does not 
intend to compensate anyone. The corporation's V.P., Martin B. Sherwin 
dismissed Indian peoples' discovery and development of the plant uses as "folk 
medicine"136. 
Again, according to Ms. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, University of California and Lucky 
Biotech, a Japanese corporation, recently obtained a patent for a sweetening 
protein derived naturally from two African plants, katampfe and the serendipity 
berry.137These plants have long been used by African peoples for their sweetening 
properties. Thaumatin, the substance that makes katempfe sweet, is 2,000 times 
sweeter than sugar yet calorie-free. Although any transgenic plant containing the 
derived sweetening proteins would be covered by the patent, no arrangements have 
been made to return part of the benefits to the African communities, the author 
wrote. 
136. Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
137. Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
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The author's last two examples of indigenous peoples and local communities' 
knowledge unduly appropriated are barley gene and colored cotton. Ms. Roht-
Arriaza disclosed that the barley gene that confers resistance to the yellow-dwarf 
virus is the product of centuries of breeding and cultivation by Ethiopia farmers. 138 
That, U.S. farmers and scientists who patented this barley variety received 
substantial profits from its current cultivation in the U.S., but the Ethiopian 
farming communities that originally developed the variety received nothing. 
For the colored cotton, the author disclosed that in 1990, scientist Sally Fox of 
California received a U.S. patent for colored cotton.139 According to Ms. Roht-
Arriaza, the patent is economically significant because multinational corporations, 
such as Levi Struss and Espirit, want environmentally friendly materials like 
naturally colored cotton for their clothes. But, unfortunately, credit for the 
"invention" of colored cotton was denied its true developers. She revealed that the 
seed for Sally Fox's patented cotton came from a United States Department of 
Agriculture collection obtained by Dr. Gus Hyer during his travels in Latin 
America. That colored cotton resulted from centuries of breeding and cultivation 
by Latin American indigenous groups. She further stated that even now, 15,000 
138. Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
139. Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
86 
indigenous fanners grow colored cotton, and over 50,000 indigenous women still 
spin and weave it. But, that Fox's patent directs all profits to her, and nothing to 
these indigenous inventors and cultivators. 
Ms. Naomi Roht-Arriaza then explained that there is a systematic method used in 
exploiting the knowledge and resources of the indigenous peoples. She identified 
the methods and mechanisms used in appropriating indigenous knowledge and 
resources, and summed it up as " ... the construction of conceptual and legal 
categories of valuable knowledge and resources that systematically exclude the 
knowledge and resources of local communities, farmers, and indigenous 
peoples. ,,140 
The author further explained that the 'construction of exclusion' takes several 
fonns, and categorized it into three main forms. According to her, 
"[f]irst, Western science characterizes certain natural materials that indigenous 
and local communities have cared for, preserved, improved, and developed as 
mere "wild" species or, at the most, as "primitive species "(commonly known as 
"land races ''). Formal, scientific systems of innovation and research have therefore 
... denigrated and denied the value of indigenous and subsistent farmers' informal 
systems of knowledge-transmission and innovation. Second, while the products of 
140.Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
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formal knowledge systems have been protected as "property," those of informal, 
traditional systems have been tagged the freely available "common heritage of 
humanity. " In particular, patentability under current intellectual property law is 
systematically biased against the innovations and knowledge of indigenous and 
farmers' communities. Finally, the products of indigenous and local communities' 
knowledge have been detached from their ecological and sociocultural base 
through removal and preservation in Northern-dominated ex situ collections and 
projects, while the knowledge underlying the products attains merely 
anthropological interest. Thus Western science and industry treat the living 
knowledge of existing indigenous and local communities as "quaint," "quackery," 
" 'f " , ,141 or qUitS, ... 
Concluding, Ms. Naomi Roht-Arriaza argued that to a large extent these tangible 
resources exist in their current form thanks to the applied knowledge of indigenous 
and local communities, knowledge uniquely gained from conserving and often 
improving resources for specific purposes. That, for these communities, the 
differences between intellectual, cultural, and material property are artificial, that 
they are part of the communities' heritage. 
Numerous efforts invested in trying to end the unjust exploitation of indigenous 
and local communities' traditional property rights are well documented, and well 
known in the international arena. Both the unjust exploitations and the fights 
against them have been going on for a very long time that the international 
community is well aware of them. Yet, TRIPS spared not even a mere nod at the 
141. Roht-Arriaza, ibid. 
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indigenous and local communities' traditional property rights. Again, oversight 
cannot be the excuse here. If TRIPS intention was honest, examples cited by Ms. 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza's would have been enough to attract TRIPS attention, and 
compel TRIPS protection of the knowledge and common heritage of the 
indigenous peoples and local communities. TRIPS let down of the indigenous 
peoples and local communities is willful and inexcusable, and consistent with the 
regime of legislative infidelity and use of law for instrumentality of economic 
exploitation that prevail in intemationallaw. 
2.8 UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities; An Effort that was Aborted. 
Interestingly, on 26 August 1994, one year and five months after Bellagio 
Declaration, and four months after TRIPS was adopted in Marrakesh, United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, adopted a Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.142 
142. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2; e/cn.4/SUB.2/1994/56 (28 October 1994); reprinted in (1995) 34 I.L.M. 541 and 3 Weston 
and Carlson III.F.4; See also Weston, Falk, etal, (2006), Supplement of Basic Documents to International Law and World Order, 
4th 795, Doc. 3.43. 
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The draft declaration contain the first significant progress in the long journey to 
win due recognition to the neglected intellectual property rights of the Indigenous 
peoples and local communities. 
Text of the Draft Declaration affirmed that indigenous peoples are equal in dignity 
and rights to all other peoples.143 The Draft Declaration expressed concern that 
indigenous peoples have generally been mistreated resulting, inter alia, in their 
colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, and thereby 
prevented them from exercising their right to development in accordance with their 
own needs and interests.144 The Draft Declaration emphasized that the United 
Nations has an important and continuing role to play in promoting and protecting 
the rights of indigenous peoples.145 Paragraph (b), Article 7 of the Declaration 
provides that indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be 
subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide, including prevention of and redress 
for " ... raJny action which has the aim or effect 0/ dispossessing them o/their land, 
territories or resources ... ,,146 Indigenous peoples right to their traditional 
medicines and health practices, including the right to the protection of vital 
143. See first paragraph of preamble to Bellagio Declaration. 
144. See paragraph five ibid. 
145. See paragraph seventeen ibid. 
146. See Article 7 paragraph (b) of Draft Declaration, supra at page 89 
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medicinal plants, animals and minerals were recognized and preserved in Article 
23 of the Draft Declaration. Article 29 specifically provided for indigenous 
peoples entitlement to the recognition of the full ownership, control and protection 
of their cultural and intellectual property. The draft document also provided several 
other basket of civil, economic and human rights' privileges to the indigenous 
peoples. 
For all its fanciful provisions, however, the Draft Declaration remained just a 
symbolic draft that never had any practical beneficial impact on the rights of the 
indigenous people. The Draft Declaration, if it had become a binding authority in 
international law, would not have made much difference, anyway, since it will not 
govern intellectual property rights and obligations. TRIPS exclusively governs all 
international intellectual property rights, along with the Berne and the Paris 
Conventions. None of the rules and Conventions governing international 
intellectual property recognizes and protects property rights of the indigenous and 
local communities. TRIPS, for all its fanfare, also did not deem it necessary to 
recognize property rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. The UN 
Sub-Commission's Draft Declaration came late, was worth very little when it 
arrived, and for all intents and purposes, still remained meaningless to the 
economically plundered indigenous peoples and local communities of the world. 
91 
2.9 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 61/295; Real Solution that Fell Short. 
In a remarkable tum of events that has more political significance than actual 
tangible proprietary benefits to the indigenous peoples, UN General Assembly, in 
September 2007, passed Resolution 611295, a sweeping resolution.147Resolution 
611295 provides extensive protection to the rights of indigenous peoples, in 
tangible ways that have never been done before. The resolution resembles an 
improved version of the earlier Draft Declaration of the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, but also has the added 
benefit of being a UN General Assembly Resolution. 
Though Resolution 611295 has the potential to boost recognition of indigenous 
peoples' rights, it nevertheless appears to still amount to little, for two reasons. 
First, in reality, TRIPS regulates international intellectual property rights and, in 
the conflict that now appears to exist between TRIPS and Resolution 611295, 
TRIPS would likely trump General Assembly resolution. In the circumstances, the 
bouquet of rights and protections Resolution 611295 provided for the indigenous 
people still remain merely promissory. 
147. See U. N. (2007), 'Declaration on the Rights a/Indigenous People'; Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 611295 of 13 
September 2007, Official website of the UN at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html (0112011) 
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Second, unfortunately, UN General Assembly resolution, though momentous, does 
not possess binding force like Security Council Resolutions, and cannot be 
enforced. Nevertheless, Resolution 61/295 is a monumental achievement for the 
indigenous people in the tenacious quest for their many denied rights. The 
resolution, without doubt, has laid a path in international law that will eventually 
inch indigenous people closer to their promised land - and would one day end their 
long and torturous journey to economic liberty that has suffered series of setbacks. 
2.10 Conclusion. 
In final conclusion of my illustration of legislative infidelity in international 
economic order, I reiterate that IMF, World Bank, and their respective Articles of 
Agreements, as well as the World Bank Guidelines for Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment, ICSID Convention, ICSID Tribunals, and TRIPS, are all veritable 
instruments skillfully designed to effectuate targeted exploitations of poor and 
weak nations of the world. The disingenuous style used in designing these 
instruments is what I characterized as legislative infidelity and use of law for 
instrumentality of advancing undue economic advantage, exploitation, and fraud. It 
is also my contention that this international method of legislative infidelity has 
surreptitiously permeated the domestic jurisprudences of many developing nations, 
with dire economic, social, and political consequences. My ultimate argument is 
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that Nigeria is one of the developing nations suffering from pandemic of legislative 
infidelity. And, that Nigeria's chronic case of legislative infidelity is directly 
responsible for the 2008 crash of the Nigerian stock market. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Legislative Infidelity and N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market; 
Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. 
""Part 1"" 
3.1 Introduction. 
2008 cataclysmic implosion of Nigeria stock market is profoundly shocking. The 
amount of losses that resulted from the crash broke world record. And, actions of 
Nigerian market authorities and government, before, during, and after the crash, 
raise concerns. Circumstances of the Nigeria stock market crash suggest that the 
event was not a fortuitous tragedy, but a carefully planned and well executed 
securities scheme. Evidence point to the crash being Nigeria's version of the 'hot 
money cycle' scheme an eminent Columbia University Professor, World Bank 
former Chief Economist cum Senior Vice President, and two-time Nobel Prize 
laureate in Economics accused IMF, World Bank, and colluding local officials, of 
precipitating in developing countries. Reporting Professor Joseph Stiglitz's 
interview on a four-step method used by IMF and World Bank to destroy 
economies of developing countries, a London newspaper wrote that; 
H •• • After privatisation, Step Two is capital market liheralisation. In theory this 
allows investment capital to flow in and out. Unfortunately, as in Indonesia and 
Brazil, the money often simply flows out. Stiglitz calls this the 'hot money' cycle. 
Cash comes in for speculation in real estate and currency, then flees at the first 
whiff of trouble. A nation's reserves can drain in days . ... " 
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And when that happens, to seduce speculators into returning a nation's own capital 
funds, the IMF demands these nations raise interest rates to 30%,50% and 80%. 
'The result was predictable,' said Stiglitz. Higher interest rates demolish property 
values, savage industrial production and drain national treasuries ... "148 
As already notedl49, Nigeria stock market was proclaimed world best performing 
market in the last quarter of 2007.150 In March 2008 the total market capitalization 
peaked at N21.4tn ($150bn). l51The spectacular performance was neither supported 
by sound economic foundation nor by positive market fundamentals. The stellar 
performance was totally strange. In particular, Nigerian capital market's regulatory 
framework and structural arrangement display arrays of defects that the market's 
spectacular performance could not have been bona fide. Inadequacies that exist in 
the elemental framework of Nigeria stock market, and circumstance of the 
market's frenzied surge and precipitous crash, indicate that factors other than real 
market forces were at play. 
Eventually, the hands that created the surge in Nigeria stock market harvested their 
reward, and the market capitulated with astonishing vehemence, triggering an 
14S.See The London Observer, Sunday 29 April 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk./business/2001lapr/29/business.mbas 
(0112011) 
149. SeePage 1 of Chapter 1, supra. 
150. See Bloomberg official website at httpllwww.bloomberg.comiapps/news?pid=ewsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo (08/10) 
151. Bloomberg ibid. 
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avalanche of crashes. Stock prices tumbled down with bearish alacrity, resulting in 
cataclysmic implosion of Nigeria stock market. Just between March and May 
2008, Nigeria stock market lost 75% of its All Share Index (ASI) and total market 
capitalization?52 That translates to an initial loss of over N8 trillion (eight trillion 
Naira) ($60 billion), investors funds/53 in just three months. And, the debacle 
continued. The total market capitalization ultimately bottomed-out at N4.5tn 
($31.5bn) from the N21.4tn ($150bn) peak. Ostensibly, Nigeria stock market lost a 
total ofN16.9tn ($118.5bn) from the crash.Is4 
Nigeria's mostly smalltime investors were ravaged, and, suffered crushing 
financial losses. ISS It bears to repeat that most of the victims lost everything 
including family nest-eggs, personal savings, business capitals, retirement benefits 
and gratuities, borrowed funds, and anomalous margin loans brokerage firms and 
banks forced upon customers to purchase the banks' 
152. Note; All Share Index refers to the aggregate quantity a/shares traded in a stock market in a given period. Total market 
capitalization means the total value a/traded equities in a given periodic session .. 
153.See; Bloomberg's report republished in Nigeria's Punch Newspaper of 02/02/2009 titled 'Nigeria stock market losses, 
highest in the world'. - Nigeria's market capitalization peaked at Nl2.4tn in March 2008, but fell to N4.5tn by end of March 
2009. 
154.Bloomberg ibid. 
155. For Example; See newsreport that former Governor of Ogun State, Nigeria, Chief Shola Osoba, lost N500million 
($3.35million) in Nigeria market crash; @ http://odili.netlnews/service/2009/feb/14/505.html (12/09) 
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stockS.156 Many who sold landed properties and other earthly possessions, and 
invested the proceeds in the over-hyped stock market lost it all in the crash. It was 
a painful national calamity. Yet, in a strange twist, Nigerian government simply 
looked the other way, as the stock market hemorrhaged and the economy 
collapsed. No official investigation or inquiry was ordered on the crash, till date.157 
International financial news media158 rated the crash as the worst of its kind in the 
annals of financial market history.159 Global rating agencies downgraded Nigeria 
financial markets, and rated Nigeria stock market the worst performing market in 
the world. 160 The scenario played out like a theatrical paradox. Nigeria market rated 
the world's best performing stock market in late 2007, with N21.4tn ($150bn) 
market capitalization in March 2008, had by the first quarter of 2009 slumped to 
the world's worst performing market. The total market capitalization plunged 
down from N21.4tn ($150bn) to mere N4.5tn ($31.5bn). Beneficiaries of the 
Nigerian stock market disaster celebrated their success with upsurge of status 
contest. 161 
156. See news report that His Royal Highness, The Oba of Lagos, lost N8S0million ($S.66million) personal money in the crash; 
http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/apr/13/424.html (12/09) 
157. Note; Absence of official inquiry into the crash of Nigeria stock market means that greater reliance is placed on unofficial 
sources such as news reports, as resource materials, for facts of the crash. 
158. Note; Story of the crash was widely reported in Bloomberg, CNN Money, MSNBC Financial, Wall Street Journal, and 
many international and local newspapers. 
159. See Bloomberg Report @ http//:www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo (12/2009) 
160. Bloomberg, ibid. 
161. See News report, soon after the crash, titled- "Nigerian Bank executives intensifY status contest with Private Jets"; 
http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/feb/20/40S.htrnl (12/09) 
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Usually, when severe financial cnSlS occur, governments tackle the problem 
promptly to save their national economies and to protect investors. Governments 
strive to swiftly unravel underlying causes of financial crisis, and finding solutions. 
World-over, examples abound of radical financial market reforms that resulted 
from different governments prompt responses to serious financial crisis. Instances 
where drastic market crashes provoked dramatic responses from authorities and 
governments include -Britain 1840162, U.S. 1933, 1934, 2002, and 2010163, India 
1992164, Kenya 2007165, to name just a few. Following the 2008 Kenyan stock 
market crisis that resulted in total loss of Sh 1.9bn (Kenyan Shillings) (equivalence 
of $77 million) Kenyan government closed down the stock market, and hired 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to audit and investigate Kenyan stock market. 166 Shocking 
revelations from PricewaterhouseCoopers' audit and investigation formed the basis 
for subsequent reforms that were instituted in Kenyan financial markets. Nigeria is 
a different story. The world's worst securities scheme remained ignored, while 
many of those who would have been held accountable for the tragedy still hold 
sway. 
162.Note; After South Sea Corporation's scams, then British Parliament enacted the world's first comprehensive Financial 
Regulation Act, i.e., the English Company Act of 1840. However, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 applies now in UK. 
163.Note; After the Great Depression and 'Enron Scandal' U.S. Congress enacted the revolutionary 1933/34 and 2002 Securities 
Acts. Also, President Obama's extensive financial market reform of2010 was enacted after the recent global financial crisis. 
164.Note;India responded to its stock market crash of 1990 by enacting the SEBI Act of 1992 which totally transformed India's 
Stock Market regulation system. 
165.Note;Kenyan Govt shot down her stock market and hired PricewaterhouseCoopers to audit and investigate the cause of 
Kenya's 2008 $77 million stock market crash. Afterwards, changes were enacted in the nation's financial market regulation. 
166. Ditto. 
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3.2 What Caused Nigeria's N8.ltn ($60bn) Stock Market Crash; Fortuitous 
Tragedy or an Organized 'Hot Money Cycle' Scam Scheme? 
The circumstance of Nigeria stock market crash raises suspicion. A SuspIcIOn 
heightened by the strange nature of the market structure in place in Nigeria, the 
hype unleashed on investors that generated frenzied trading leading up to the crash, 
the drama of distraction that greeted the crisis, barefaced misinformation and 
blatant malpractices by market operators, mishandling of the crisis, and the official 
indifference that trailed the disaster. In many ways, Nigeria stock market crash fits 
a reenactment in Nigeria of IMF and World Bank's 'hot money cycle' scheme/67 
with a mix of the epic 1720-1825 crisis in the English 'share market' caused by 
South Sea Corporation's scams.168 1n many ways too, the Nigerian catastrophe also 
imitated some elements of events that preceded the 1929 U.S. stock market crash. 
Describing the impact of, and some of the reasons for, the 1929 U.S. stock market 
crash, three notable securities regulation professors jointly wrote that 
"[t}he decline in value of outstanding securities was dramatic and painful. For 
example, the total value of all New York Stock Exchange listed securities declined 
from apre-crash 1929 high of$89 billion to $15 billion in 1932 ... 
167.See Footnote 148, at page 96 supra. 
168.See Cowless, Virginia (1960), 'The Great Swindle: The Story o/the South Sea Bubble'. Cited in 1 Cox, Hazen, & O'Neal 
(2000), Corporation, s.2.2 
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.... The pre-crash market was driven not by fundamentals, but by speculative 
frenzy... A significant amount of all investment was on margin, in which an 
investor borrowed most of the stock's purchase price. There was no limit on the 
amount of credit that could be extended to an investor for margin trading. 
Typically, the lender was the brokerage firm, which in turn borrowed the funds 
from a bank ... 
Much of the hearings leading up to Congress' enactment of the securities laws was 
devoted to accounts of trading practices by unscrupulous market manipulators. 
The hearings produced reports that the bull market of the 1920s was the heyday of 
the crooked stock pools. These were devices used by brokers and dealers to create 
a false appearance of trading activity by simultaneously buying the same security 
they were selling. Innocent investors were attracted to the manipulated stock by its 
price and volume changes. Eventually, unwitting investors' orders provided all the 
upward momentum to the stock's price. And, as the price rose, the brokers and 
dealers behind the scheme dumped their holdings at the higher price created by the 
unwitting investors' interest ... 
There also was plenty of evidence that stock prices were adversely affected by false 
and misleading information and that corporate insiders took advantage of their 
access to confidential inside information to further their own trading profits. 
Related to this was the absence of legal compulsion for publicly traded firms to 
make timely disclosures of material information or to publish even annual 
financial reports. A further problem was the belief that public corporations were 
not sufficiently responsive to their owners due to weakness in the proxy solicitation 
process. "169 
Above scenario describes events that precipitated the 1929 crash of U.S. stock 
market. In all material particulars, the above setting depicts some of what 
transpired in Nigeria stock market leading up to the 2008 crash. Except that in 
Nigeria, worse things actually happened. 
170. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, (2006), Securities Regulation Cases and Materials, 5th Ed. 5 and 6. 
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An attempt to determine the proximate cause of Nigeria stock market crash will 
begin with the conducts of Nigerian officials, before, during, and after the stock 
market crash. Thereafter, brief review of few provisions of Nigeria's Investments 
and Securities Acts (ISA) of 1999 (repealed) and 2007, analysis of Nigeria's 
abnormal legal framework, and a study of the aberrant structural arrangement 
foisted on Nigeria capital market, will follow. In the next chapter (Chapter 3, Part 
2), the analysis will continue with a review of anomalous power arrangement in 
Nigeria's securities statutes which allowed Nigerian Investment and Securities 
Tribunal (,1ST' or 'the tribunal') to topple Nigeria'S Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). I will also review in the next chapter a few 1ST judgments and 
the complicit role the tribunal plays in Nigeria stock market fraudulent scheme. If 
time and space permit, I will also review therein subsidiary legislations and rules 
market operators enacted, purportedly, pursuant to Nigeria'S principal securities 
Acts. Otherwise, those matters will be examined later in chapter five (part 3). 
3.3 Events Associated with the Crash: Beginning with events that occurred 
during and immediately after the Nigerian market crash, spurious excuses were 
initially given for the stock market protracted crisis, and the eventual crash.171 The 
excuses ranged from bogus global food crisis,l72to profit-taking by investors and 
I71.Example - news report that 'Dr. Akingbola, CEO Intercontinental Bank blame market crash on careless statements@ 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200902180188.html(06/20 I 0) 
I72.See Nigerian Vanguard Newspaper of January 13,2009; Also reported at http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/janl13/305.html 
(04/2009). 
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self-correction by the market. Also, divestments and decoupling from Nigeria by 
undisclosed foreign investors whose unidentified home economies were allegedly 
hit by the then emerging global financial crisis.173Not the global financial crisis 
itself. And, at last, the global financial meltdown itself became the choice excuse 
for the crash.174Each false excuse was accompanied with reassurances that the 
market would tum around for the better, and that all investments were safe. 
Equivocation by Nigerian financial market operators and regulators, on the cause 
of the crash was strange, and sufficient to have attracted government intervention. 
Oddly too, no attempt was made to temporarily halt trading in the sinking market 
so as to minimize damages to investors. These odd omissions point to culpability. 
Actions of financial market authorities prior to the market crash also raIse 
concerns. Again, as already noted,175just before the market crash, then Governor of 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), a Harvard trained economist and World Bank 
protege, publicly announced that he had devised and put in place sure measures 
173. See footnote 21, page 7 of chapter I, supra. 
174. See 'Yar'Adua admits impact of financial meltdown on Nigeria' http://odili.netinews/source/2009/janiIS/413.htmI(l2/09) 
175. See page 7, chapter 1, supra. 
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that would totally insulate Nigeria's economy from impacts of the then burgeoning 
global financial crisis. 176Nigeria's apex bank chief publicly assured the people of 
Nigeria that, under his watch, global financial crisis would never impact Nigeria's 
economy.177 To buttress his claims, the CBN Governor claimed that eleven nations 
had approached him asking to be taught the iron-clad, global financial crisis-proof 
measures he invented. 
The CBN Governor did not name any of the nations that approached him. When 
Nigeria stock market eventually crashed, the Governor made an about-tum and 
denied ever promising the nation any insulation from the global meltdown.178 He 
contended that he was misunderstood (not that he was misquoted). He was neither 
misunderstood nor misquoted. Global financial crisis eventually became the 
preferred reason for Nigeria stock market crash.179 
Global financial crisis had nothing to do with the crash of Nigeria stock market.180 
There was no nexus between Nigeria stock market and the epicenter of the global 
176. See news report 'Global Financial Meltdown: 11 Countries seek Nigeria's safety model, Says Soludo '. In ThisDay Newspaper of Sunday, 
October 12,2008. 
177. See news report 'Global Financial Meltdown, ibid 
178.Note; CBN Governor made the surprising denial while explaining a $13.9bn capital flight from Nigeria. See news report in 
http://odili.net/news/source/2008/dec/S/306.html (12/2009) 
179.See President' Yar 'Adua admits impact of financial meltdown on Nigeria' 
http://odili.net/news/source/2009/janiIS/413 .htmlC 12/2009) 
180.Note; Global financial crisis began in U.S. Capital market and spread to other western financial markets that have links with 
the U.S. market. Most developing markets without such linkages escaped direct hit from the global meltdown. For example see 
performance of Iraqi stock market (lSX) during the global financial crisis, supra, at pages 10 and II. 
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financial crisis for Nigeria market to be so brutally impacted by global financial 
crisis. No Nigerian company traded in the U.S. or any other major world markets at 
the time of the global crisis, and vice versa. lSI 
At the time Nigeria stock market crashed precipitously, and global financial crisis 
was wrongly blamed for it, many similarly situated emerging stock markets 
performed spectacularly well. Is2 The contrarian performance was squarely 
attributed to absence of linkages between the emerging markets and capital 
markets of U.S. and other major economies which were the origins and ground-
zeros of the global financial crisis.Is3 
War-tom, rag-tag, Iraqi stock market (ISX), and other similarly insulated emerging 
stock markets, proved that global financial crisis had nothing to do with the crash 
of Nigeria stock market.Is4 
181. See news report; 'Why Foreign Investors Shun Nigeria', By Nigerian SEC @ 
http://odili.net/news/source/2009/aprI12/200.html(II/2009 } 
182. Note; Iraqi stock market (lSX) became world's most famous contrarian performer amongst markets not linked to U.S. and 
other major economies. 
183. See AP News of 10/12/2008 "1 don't think that the current financial crisis will hurt our economy and especially this market 
because we are not connected to any of the global markets and we have very few foreign investors, " by Omar Mouwaffak -
ISX Market Operator. Syndicated in World Business news on MSNBC.Com (12/2010), See also pp. 10 and II supra. 
184. See Associated Press report of 10112/2008 that while the rest of the world faced financial meltdown, Iraq Stock Exchange 
boomed. That the ISX index soared nearly 40 percent during September. The ISX is only open two hours a day, three days a 
week and brokers track trading activity on the floor with colored markers and white bulletin boards instead of computers. 
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3.4 SEC Board's Trips to U.S.: Nigerian SEC board's meaningless trips to NYSE 
and Columbia University, U.S.A., to seek solution to Nigeria's protracted stock 
market crisis, and their boast on return that they had found the solutions to Nigeria 
market crisis,185 also deserve a passing mention. 
Careful study revealed convmcmg evidence that Nigerian stock market crash 
resulted from meticulously planned and assiduously executed securities scheme, 
and not from global financial crisis as alleged. Top Nigerian financial market 
operators, including principal securities market operators, leading bankers, and 
financial market regulators have questions to answer for the crash. 186 
Nigeria's financial-sector leaders brought home the decadent jurisprudential norm 
of the international economic order. Like in history's biggest financial swindles, 
Nigeria stock market crash resulted from legislative infidelity and the use of law 
for instrumentality of undue economic advantage, exploitation and fraud. 
I8S.See 'SEC meets u.s. Counterpart, Others over market recovery'; http://odilLnet/news/source/2008/nov/26/300.html(6/2010) 
I86.See news report of 10/8/2010; "CEO of Oceanic Bank convicted of bank and securities frauds -- Dr. Cecilia Ibru to forfeit 
N150bn ($1bn), and go to prison for 18 months" - @ http://www.saharareporters.comlnews-page/former-md-oceanic-bank-
cecilia-ibru-convicted-bank-fraud. (10/2010). 
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Legislative infidelity is the practice of usmg law to advance economIC 
exploitations and fraudulent agenda. Nigerian securities law was purposely 
manipulated to f~cilitate an organized securities scheme. I will show the plots. 
Similar scheme is currently going on in Nigeria's bond market, without let. The 
same scheme is being replicated in Nigeria's other financial sectors, and staggering 
amount of money is being funneled offshore in plain sight, under questionable 
circumstances, and yet Nigerian authorities act in tacit consensus of silence. 187 
3.5 'Legislative Infidelity' Designed into Nigerian Securities Acts and 
Subsidiary Legislations. 
Evidence of legislative infidelity in the crash of Nigeria stock market is splashed 
allover in the precision distortions of the legal, structural, and infrastructural 
framework of Nigeria capital market. Critical safety-nets and vital anti-fraud 
mechanics of Nigeria's securities market were meticulously expunged in the 
principal securities statutes. Regulatory structures were artfully disarranged and 
damaging loopholes skillfully designed into the laws. Lacunas were craftily created 
and exploited in a coordinated way that point unequivocally to existence of 
preconceived plan to execute securities fraud. 
187.CBN Governor admitted funneling billions of dollars overseas, after the crash, and claimed the money belonged to foreigners 
divesting from Nigeria. See also 'Huge capital flight hits Nigerian economy. SJ3.9bn repatriated in 8 weeks-CBN' at 
http://odili.netlnews/source/2008/doc/5/306.html (06/2010) 
107 
Loopholes, distortions, and flaws crafted into the laws, structural imbalance, and 
the odd supervisory arrangement of the Nigerian market stand as eloquent 
testimony to existence of prior dishonest intentions. Tested and proven safety-nets, 
key anti-fraud provisions, and settled principles recognized by international best 
practices, and used universally to guarantee market integrity, transparency, 
orderliness, investor protection, and fair and equitable principles of trade, are 
conveniently left out in Nigeria capital market arrangement. The result is that 
Nigeria stock market is stripped bare of all the essential checks and balances, vital 
internal control and immunity mechanics, tested in-house codes of ethics and 
discipline, and self sustenance tools, in a coordinated fashion that point to the 
existence of legislative infidelity. 
United States introduced SEC system of capital market regulation to the world. I88 
Under the SEC system invented under U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934/89 
SEC sits firmly as the apex regulatory and supervisory authority of the Capital 
Market, but works in joint cooperative regulatory efforts with industry-sponsored 
groups called self-regulatory organizations (SROS).I9°It is this apex SEC regulatory 
system that Nigeria borrowed, for regulation of Nigeria capital market. However, 
188. Note; SEC as apex regulator of capital market was invented by U.S. Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
189. See s.4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C Ss 78d, 1934. 
190. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, (2006), SECURITIES REGULATION Cases and Materials, 5th Ed., 16 
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in Nigeria's arrangement, provisions of the principal securities Act are completely 
turned against the SEC, rendering Nigeria SEC totally powerless. Nigerian SEC is 
statutorily shackled, circumscribed, and officially incapacitated. 
Title to Nigeria's principal securities law explicitly proclaims that its purpose is to 
make SEC the apex regulatory authority of Nigerian capital market. The supreme 
regulatory authority of the SEC is also reinforced by substantive provisions of the 
law. Yet, the same principal law contains many adverse provisions that profoundly 
undermined SEC's powers, and the agency's capacity to regulate Nigeria capital 
market. Analysis of SEC arrangement under ISA 2007 will hereby follow. 
3.6 Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission; Capital Market Regulator 
Officially Sabotaged in the Securities Act. 
In its opening section, Nigerian Investments and Securities Act 2007('ISA' or 
'2007 Act') display a glitzy headline proclaiming that the Act is; 
"faJn Act ••• to Establish the Securities and Exchange Commission 
as the Apex Regulatory Authority for the Nigerian Capital Market as 
well as Regulation of the Market to ensure the Protection of Investors, 
Maintain Fair, Efficient, and Transparent Market, (andfor the) 
{Reduction of Systemic Risk', and related Matters. "191 
191. See Explanatory Note to Nigeria's Investments and Securities Act, 2007, Act No.29 
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The above headline creates an immediate impression that Nigerian Investments 
and Securities Act 2007 is designed to put Nigeria Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) securely in charge of regulating Nigeria capital market. 
Repealed 1999 ISA failed to firmly put Nigerian SEC in charge of regulating the 
capital market. Regulatory vacuum occasioned by the 1999 blunder created the 
opportunity that allowed market operators to engage in frauds and abuses in 
Nigeria capital market.192 
Market abuse was at its worst when the new 2007 Act was promulgated. 
Expectations were high that the new law would remedy the known short-comings 
in the market's regulatory system. 
Rather than introduce the needed changes in the new statute, the repealed 1999 
Investments and Securities Act (ISA) was reenacted verbatim as the 2007 Act, with 
minor modifications that involved merely rephrasing provisions relating to 
mergers, acquisitions, take-overs, and collective investment scheme.193Nothing 
192. Examples; 'AP shares manipulated 30 times in two weeks', at http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/aprI71707.html (05/2010) 
See also' SEC Director-General blames stock crisis on graft' at http://odili.net/news/source/2008/nov/28/17 .html (05/2010). 
193. See ISA (2007), Explanatory Memorandum of. 
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significant in the 1999 Act was altered in the new 2007 Act. Entirety of the chaotic 
regulatory baggage that existed in the 1999 Act was carried over to the 2007 Act. 
Yet, the 2007 Act proclaimed conspicuously in its heading that it is enacted to 
establish SEC as the apex regulator, to ensure protection of investors, maintain fair, 
efficient, and transparent market, and to reduce systemic risk. That is far from true. 
Many features in Nigeria's securities laws indicate the presence of premeditated 
plots against Nigerian capital market. However, the torrent of attacks mounted on 
Nigerian SEC in both the repealed 1999 Act and the 2007 Act stands out the most 
as evidence that Nigeria capital market is set up with sinister motive. 
S.l (1) of the 2007 ISA established SEC for Nigeria.194 Besides the Act's 
superficial proclamations that SEC is the apex regulatory authority, S.13 of the Act 
expressly designated SEC the apex regulatory organization for the Nigerian 
capital market.195 Paragraphs (a) to (z), and z(aa) to z(dd) of section 13 (a total of 
thirty paragraphs) enumerated SEC's powers andfunctions.196 S.3 (1) of the Act 
194.See s.1 (1) ,( 2007), Investments and Securities Act,. 
19S.See s.13 ibid 
196.See paragraphs (a) to (z), and z(aa) to z(dd) ofs.13 
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established a Board of Commission for the SEC.197 Both the composition and the 
tenure of office of the Board of Commission is laid-out in paragraphs (a) - (f) of 
subsection (1) of s.3 .198 
3.6.1 Part-Time, None-Executive SEC Chairman: In a surpnsmg move that 
defies logic, offends universal norm, and harms special need of securities markets, 
Nigeria's SEC board is headed by a part-time non-executive Chairman.199 Instead, 
a lower office of Director-General is statutorily designated the Chief Executive 
and Accounting Officer of Nigeria's SEC.200 Other members of the nine member 
SEC Board are three full time commissioners, a representative of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Central Bank of Nigeria, and two 
part-time commissioners. Position of the Chairman of Nigerian SEC, the capital 
market's designated apex regulatory authority, is a part-time position, so also the 
positions of two other SEC Commissioners. The SEC Chairman is also neither the 
Chief Executive nor Accounting Officer of SEC. A Director General is given those 
two powerful responsibilities. No reason was given for this anomalous 
arrangement enshrined in the 2007 Act. 
197. See Paragraphs (a)-(t), subsection (1) ofs.3 
198. See paragraphs (a) - (t), subsection (1), s.3 
199. Ibid. 
200. See paragraph (b), subsection (1), s.3 
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The part-time arrangement does not help the capacity, competence, or efficiency of 
the SEC. The situation rather weakens the SEC by segregating the ranks of the 
Commissioners along the lines of fulltime and part-time tenures, and executive and 
non-executive classifications, thereby setting up the SEC for power struggle and 
discord. SEC's structural deformity inexorably spilled over to the Nigerian stock 
market. This is one sign of legislative infidelity under Nigerian securities laws. 
Ramification of Nigerian SEC Chairman's part-time position becomes clearer 
when s.3 (1) part-time prescription is read together with s.lO (2) and (4) of ISA 
2007. S.lO (2) provides that the SEC Chairman shall preside at every meeting of 
the Commission, except when he is absent.2OIAlso, s.lO (4) provides that SEC 
Chairman's vote shall break the tie in cases of equality of votes in SEC board 
decisions.202 SEC's important regulatory and enforcement functions listed both in 
the thirty paragraphs of s.13, and the other six paragraphs of subsection (1) of s.4 203 
are to be deliberated upon, decided, and approved, during SEC meetings presided 
over by this part-time, non-executive SEC Chairman. The Director-General whom 
the Act designated Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of Nigerian SEC board 
201. See subsection (2) of s.l O. 
202. See subsection (4) ofs.lO 
203. See paragraphs (a) to (f), subsection (1) of sA 
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has no powers under any circumstances to preside over SEC meetings, even in the 
Chairman's absence. These are flaws that do not just occur, if all things are equal. 
3.6.2 Sabotage of SEC on Appointment: To further weaken Nigeria's SEC, 
another blunder was committed in ISA 2007 on appointment of members of the 
board of the SEC Commission. S.5 of the Act provides for appointment of 
members of the SEC board, in a way that ridicules the office of the SEC Chairman. 
Subsection (1) of s.5 provides that the Director-General and the three full-time 
commissioners shall be appointed by the President, upon the recommendation of 
the Minister, and confirmed by the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.204 
But, appointments of the SEC Chairman and the two part-time Commissioners are 
excluded from these regal treatments. 
Indeed, I did not find any provision in the entire 2007 Act, or in any other law, 
prescribing whose responsibility it is to appoint Nigeria's SEC Chairman, nor 
how the appointment shall be carried out. Searches for appointment provision of 
SEC Chairman, in both the repealed 1999 ISA and the extant 2007 Act, did not 
yield any result. If nobody is authorized under Nigerian law to appoint the 
204. See subsection (1) ofs.5 
114 
Chairman of Nigeria's SEC, it will amount to an unmitigated absurdity that 
confirms the existence of dishonest intentions. This bizarre 'loophole' would only 
escape detection in a situation of tacit pact for foul play, on many fronts. The 
situation may be laughable, but the setting is a disingenuous act of coordinated 
scheme skillfully designed to prevent Nigeria SEC from performing. Yet, again, 
the 2007 Act that created this conundrum boldly proclaims in its preamble that it's 
'purpose is to make Nigerian SEC the apex regulatory authority for Nigeria Capital 
market', to 'ensure the protection of investors', 'maintain fair, efficient, and 
transparent market, (and for the) 'reduction of systemic risk'. Match Nigerian 
appointment provisions against the U.S. SEC's where the Chairman and all the 
Commissioners are appointed by the President.20s 
{{The US. SEC is an independent, nonpartisan agency created by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 ... The Commission is composed of jive commissioners 
appointed by the President to jive-year terms. The terms are staggered so that one 
expires each June, and not more than three commissioners may be of the same 
party as the President. One of the commissioners is designated by the President to 
serve as the chairman of the Commission. "206 
Nigeria's SEC Commissioners and other board members are appointed by Nigerian 
President, and approved by the Senate, but not the Nigerian SEC Chairman and 
two part-time Commissioners. Yet, all the Commissioners have equal votes, and 
205. See footnote 190 supra. See also footnote 207 infra. 
206. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, (2006), Securities Regulation Cases and Materials, 5Ed. 11 
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the part-time Chairman presides over all the SEC meetings where all the important 
supervisory and regulatory policies are formulated, and decisions made. The 
Nigerian setting is inexcusable under any circumstances. The setting focuses 
singularly on diminishing the capacity of Nigeria's SEC to regulate the capital 
market. On the contrary, the conscientious design of the U.S. SEC came with many 
benefits including superior SEC efficacy and enhanced reputation described below; 
"[ t] he SEC has long held a reputation for quality and vigor that sets it apart from 
many of its regulatory peers. This reputation is of considerable importance: It aids 
in the recruitment of new personnel and serves as a form of psychic compensation 
to the staff to help offset some of the financial sacrifices of government service. It 
also gives to the Commission a considerable level of public support from which to 
draw when it takes action. "207 
3.6.3 Tenure and Devotion: Nigeria's 2007 ISA continued its needless offensive 
against the SEC in its provision on tenure of office for members of the SEC board. 
Subsection (2) of s. 5 provides that the Director-General shall hold office for five 
years, in the first instance, and may be reappointed for a second five year term. 20S 
Conversely, both subsections (3) and (4) of s.5 lumped together the tenures of 
office of SEC Chairman and all the other Commissioners, and provided in sum 
that the part-time Chairman, the three full time Commissioners, and the part-
time Commissioners, shall each hold office for only four year single term.209 
207. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoorte, 13, supra at page 115 
208. See subsection (2) of s.5 
209. See subsections (3) and (4) of s.5 
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As a corollary to the tenure arrangement, s.6 commands that the Director-General 
and the three fulltime Commissioners devote full time to the service of the' 
Commission.210 The SEC Chairman is not required to devote full time to service. 
Notably too, s.6 also banned the full time Commissioners from holding any other 
office or employment.211 This important ethics rule does not bound the SEC 
Chairman, and the part-time Commissioners. Nigerian SEC Chairman and the two 
part-time Commissioners are free to hold other paid positions without regard to 
conflict of interest violations in their duties as regulators. This is another loophole. 
S.6 loophole brought many problems for Nigeria capital market, but s.6 most 
famous skirmish arose from the many conflicting jobs SEC Chairman holds in 
public companies he regulates. The incumbent Nigerian SEC Chairman is as well a 
salaried executive of Unilever Nigeria PLC, Vice Chairman of Linkage Assurance 
PLC, and a fulltime board Chairman ofUACN PLC, all listed blue-chip companies 
whose shares are publicly traded in the Nigerian capital market. The three 
companies are under the direct regulatory supervision of the SEC Chairman who 
also doubles as a paid senior employee in each of the companies. SEC Chairman's 
entrenched economic interests in the companies conflict with his official duties. 
210. See; s.6 ISA 2007 
211.lbid 
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The SEC Chairman's conflicted positions stirred up public uproar that made 
Nigerian Senate Committee Chairman on Capital Market, to write a strong petition 
to Nigeria's Minister of Finance complaining against SEC Chairman's engagement 
in conflict-of-interest dealings.212Despite all the furors, nothing came out of the 
Senator's complaint. An Act the distinguished Senator voted to help pass into law 
on the floor of Nigerian Senate gave the SEC Chairman the free pass. 
3.6.4 Sabotage of SEC on Salary: The harshest line of statutory assault on 
Nigerian SEC is on salary, remuneration, and allowances as provided in s.9 of the 
2007 ISA.213 The SEC board's salary disparity replicated the absurdities that exist 
in the power, control, appointment, and tenure structures. Subsection (1) of s.9 
awards open-ended salary munificence to the Director-General and the three 
fulltime Commissioners. S.9 gives the full time board members freedom to pay 
themselves any salary, perquisites, and perks they wished.214 SEC board has a total 
of nine members.215 The Director-General and the three fulltime Commissioners 
are already empowered by other perquisites of office to become advantaged bloc 
within the SEC rank. Special salary largesse is further added to the privileged 
212.See 'Senate Petitions Finance Ministry Over Udoma's 'conflict of interst' III 
http://odili.net/news/source/201O/feb/ll/81O.html (06/2010) 
213. See s.9 2007 ISA. 
214. Ibid 
215. See s.3 (1) (a)-(t). 
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clique's bloated fortunes. The elite clique is SEC'S real power brokers. Likely, this 
group of generously remunerated, well treated, fulltime Commissioners easily 
sways the representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Nigeria 
in decision-making. Possibly too, the clique also influences the low morale, poorly 
paid, part-time Commissioners. Within the SEC board, the part-time, poorly paid 
SEC Chairman and the two part-time poorly paid Commissioners are statutorily 
marginalized and kept in permanent discomfiture. Nigeria's SEC house is 
pragmatically divided against itself in a crafty way that left the Director-General 
and the three fulltime Commissioners holding all the aces. And, their bloc loyalty 
belongs to where their 'manna fell down' from; the market operators. 
The positions of SEC Chairman and his two part-time, brethren Commissioners, 
are, again, statutorily humiliated by the 2007 Act's salary provisions. Subsection 
(2) of s.9 awards mere "allowance" to the SEC Chairman and part-time 
Commissioners.216The Act stipulates clearly that the measure of their allowance 
shall be in accordance with the prevailing guidelines on remuneration for part-
time members ofpublic bodies, as issued by the appropriate agency of the Federal 
Govemment.217 This salary provision means that Nigeria's SEC Chairman and the 
216. See subsection (2) ofs.9 
217. Ibid 
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two part-time Commissioners are statutorily ranked and paid below the lowest 
government workers in Nigeria (at par with part-time workers of public bodies), 
are paid pittance as remunerations. Comparatively, they belong to the cadre of 
temp workers and part-time employees in the U.S. public service. Worst still, the 
Chairman and the two part-time Commissioners' respective salaries are in reality 
far less than the least paid U.S. temporary workers. Yet their job descriptions 
boldly specify that they are the apex regulators of Nigeria capital market. 
Nigeria's SEC salary arrangement is manifestly bad. The salary arrangement is 
grossly disproportionate and demoralizing, creates division in SEC board, and 
aligns the loyalties of the well paid, fulltime, SEC Commissioners with their 
market operator benefactors. The arrangement also places the livelihood of the 
poorly paid SEC Chairman and part-time Commissioners in the hands of market 
operators. Add the bad salary situation to the fact that SEC Chairman and the two 
part-time Commissioners are excluded from the statutory prohibition on holding 
other jobs, it becomes obvious that the flood-gate is indirectly left open for easy 
subornment of the SEC Chairman and Commissioners. This is yet another 
legislative infidelity trickery that drastically weakened Nigerian SEC, polluted the 
market place, and ultimately paved the way for Nigeria's edition of 'hot money 
cycle' fraudulent scheme. 
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Consequences of Nigeria SEC disarrangement are many. SEC's ability to regulate 
Nigerian capital market is severely undermined, statutorily. The statutory disarray 
left Nigerian investors without any protector, hence, gravely vulnerable, and open 
to exploitation. The foul situation sent open invitations to worst financial market 
vultures (foreign and domestic) to descend on Nigeria capital market for a rare 
feast. The invitees responded overwhelmingly, plundered unwary Nigerian 
investors/Is and drained Nigerian national economy. 
Ramifications of Nigeria arrangement to SEC competence, independence, and 
effectiveness are profound. Considering the enormity of the job statutorily 
assigned to the Nigerian SEC, and which SEC traditionally performs, the massive 
amount of capital and wealth SEC regulates, the caliber of financial institutions 
and personalities under its supervision, and the eternal prevalence of temptation 
and corruption in the capital market, Nigeria SEC is ab initio condemned to failure. 
The SEC charade did enormous damage to Nigeria capital market. The only reason 
why Nigeria's SEC would be placed in tragic situations like the above is 
apparently to make way for the sinister plots in the capital market. No other reason. 
Only a nefarious motive would prompt this elaborate sabotage of Nigeria's SEC. 
218. See for example; 'SEC Director-General blames stock crisis on graft', at http://odili.net/source/2008/nov/28/17.html 
(06/2010). See also 'AP shares manipulated 30 times in two weeks'; at http://odili.net/news/source/2009/apr!7!707.html 
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Crash of Nigeria stock market is a well planned and perfectly executed securities' 
fraud. The $116bn aggregate loss in the market crash is probably the targeted 
bounty. Nigerian stock market crash is a classic case of the IMF, World Bank, and 
local underlings 'hot money cycle' scheme Professor Stiglitz described in his 
interview in London Observer newspaper.219 
Granted, that Nigeria has the right to adapt the borrowed u.S. SEC framework to 
suit its domestic situation. But, the adaptation ought to be reasonable, sensible, 
constructive, and beneficial to the Nigeria capital market, to investors, and 
consistent with market integrity, not undermine the market. There is no redeeming 
ground upon which to predicate even a tenuous defense of the blatant travesties 
that inundate Nigeria capital market. 
3.7 India Stands as a Reproach to Nigeria: India is a classic example of 
everything Nigeria got wrong in her adaptation of SEC regulatory system. India 
copied the SEC system, but altered the system in ingenuous ways that empowers 
India's apex market regulator, ensures integrity and transparency in India's capital 
219. See The Observer, Sunday 29 April 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk.lbusiness/2001lapr/29lbusiness.mbas (0112011) 
122 
market, and yet, serves India's peculiar needs. After a 1990 massive stock market 
crisis, India radically overhauled her market regulatory system.220 
India's 1990 market crash was precipitated by financial scam perpetrated by one 
Mr. Harshad Mehta, a man also called "big bull" of India stock market.221Indian 
investing public became aware that Mr. Mehta diverted large sums of money from 
Indian banks through fraudulent means.222 Millions of small-time investors lost lots 
of money in Mr. Mehta's fraud as the Indian Sensex plummeted 570 points.223 
Indian government instantly recognized the inadequacy of India's securities market 
regulatory method, and the urgent need to overhaul the system. Indian government 
swiftly rose to the occasion, forsook her old regulatory style, chose SEC core 
principles, passed an Act of Parliament that established SEBI (Securities and 
Exchange Board of India) as India's224 apex securities market regulator. 225 





224. See S.3 (1), The Securities and Exchange Board ofIndia Act No. 15 of 1992. The Act came into force on 4th April, 1992. 
225. See s.l1 (1) ibid. 
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Overhaul of India's securities market regulatory system was articulated in the 
SEBI Act of 1992. SEBI Act introduced bona fide and effective innovations into 
India's capital market supervision. Besides instituting a centralized apex regulatory 
method, India's SEBI Act also introduced a trend-setting Securities Appeal 
Tribunal (SAT).226 Presiding Officers of India's SAT is statutorily limited to only 
sitting or retired Supreme Court Judges and sitting or retired Chief Justice of a 
High Court.227 That is a novelty. The caliber of personnel that sits in India's SAT 
as Presiding Officers guarantees integrity in justice dispensation over securities 
disputes. Appeals going from SEBI decisions to a tribunal presided by such proven 
judicial talents would not put Indian SEBI's apex regulatory authority in the kind 
of jeopardy that Nigeria's SEC is maneuvered into. 
India's SEBI arrangement has an added benefit of sending clear message to local 
and international venture capitalists and portfolio investors that India is serious 
about market integrity. India's SEBI Act stands as a reproach to Nigeria's ISA 
2007. Compared to India's SEBI, Nigeria's SEC arrangement does not pass 
muster. Nigeria's SEC is designed for the pursuit of a common intention to 
prosecute unlawful purpose; to commit organized fraud in Nigeria capital market. 
226. See S.15K, India SEBI Act 1992, footnote 224, supra at page 123, 
227.See S.15M, ibid. 
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3.7.1 Nigeria Arrangement is unlike no Other: No justification or alibi can 
excuse the chaos that exists in the design of Nigeria's SEC, a fortiori, the entire 
1999 and 2007 ISA. Nigeria's flawed SEC arrangement mirrors the more sinister 
provisions cleverly crafted into Nigeria's 1999 and 2007 ISA. The faulty SEC 
charade reflects the bigger toxic setting in Nigeria capital market. Clamping down 
the SEC is a willful plot used to facilitate the abysmal crash of the stock market. 
3.7.2 Nigeria Arrangement is not Like the British System: Many flaws that exist 
in Nigeria's SEC arrangement cannot be justified on the basis that the flaws, 
somehow, may resemble some elements of British financial market regulatory 
system. Nigeria operates an SEC system which the British system is not. Indeed, 
the British financial market regulatory system, though also a centralized regulatory 
system, is everything SEC system is not. British financial market is regulated by 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), deriving its powers from the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.228According to FSA "[wJe are a company limited 
by guarantee and financed by the financial services industry.,,229 British FSA 
proudly owns up to being financed entirely by the very industry it regulates, i.e., 
the financial market operators. That is exactly what SEC system is not. 
228. See 'GIM3050 - Regulatory framework: the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000)' at 
http://www.hmre.gov.ukimanuals/gimanuallgim3050.htm (12/2010)81. 
229. See FSA. Who are we' at http://fsa.gov.ukIPages/AboutlWho/index.shtml (1212010 
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Independence is a pivotal feature of an SEC system. A regulatory agency that 
receives money for its survival, solely or at all, from the entities it regulates can 
neither be independent nor effective. Such regulatory agency is a pretender that is 
preprogrammed to fail. Mutually beneficial economic interdependence between a 
regulator and the regulated renders the regulator susceptible to corruption. British 
FSA is antithetical to the philosophy of integrity and sacredness a genuine SEC 
system represents. Any attempt to predicate a defense of the Nigeria SEC system 
on its slight resemblance to the British FSA will fall flat. Two diametrically 
opposed systems cannot pragmatically be muddled up into one enactment. 
Another prominent factor that distinguishes British FSA from SEC system is that 
while SEC focuses all its regulatory energy on the securities market, British FSA 
regulates the gamut of entire British financial markets including the banks, 
insurance business, capital market, mortgages, and more. According to FSA's 
description of its regulatory reach, 
"[t]he FSA has been the single regulator for financial services in the UK since 
December 2001, when we were given our statutory powers by the Financial 
Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA). ,,230 
230. See 'FSA Regulatory Approach' at http://fsa.gov.uklpages/AboutlWhatiApproachiindex.shtml (05/2010) 
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Explaining further the scope of its regulatory authority, the British FSA stated that 
" ... Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) created a single 
statutory regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) for regulating all 
deposit taking, insurance and investment business in the UK ... FSMA 2000 
therefore provides the framework in which all forms of financial services business, 
including insurance companies, Lloyd's, banks, building societies, friendly and 
mutual societies, credit unions, investment and pensions advisers, stockbrokers; 
investment services firms, fund managers, derivative traders, and so on, are 
authorized and regulated. ,,231 
FSA regulates all UK financial industry, and entities. And, also earns its 
operational funds from the many financial-sector operators which it regulates. 
Nigeria SEC on the other hand, has powers to regulate only the Nigerian securities 
industry.232Similarly, the U.S. SEC is restricted to regulating only the U.S. capital 
market233 and the Indian SEBI regulates only the Indian Capital Market. 234 So it is 
in all SEC systems including Japan, Ghana, Kenya, Vietnam, etc. 
The narrow focus of SEC's regulatory scope boosts SEC's efficacy, and constitutes 
one major attribute of the SEC system. Like the other SEC systems, Nigerian SEC 
shares no commonalities with the FSA, and cannot pretend to have borrowed any 
of FSA features. 
231.See GIM3050 - Regulatory framework: the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uklmanuals/gimanual/gim3050.htm 
232.See s.l3 ISA 
233.See s.4, (1934), Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C Ss 78d. 
234.See s.I1.(1) (1992), SEBI Act oflndia. 
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The last reason Nigerian SEC could not have borrowed from the British FSA is 
that Nigerian ISA 1999 that reintroduced SEC in Nigeria came into existence one 
year before the British FSMA 2000. Nigerian statute that is earlier in time cannot 
possibly borrow from a later British Act. Nigeria's SEC arrangement is simply an 
awkward design that squandered vital nuances and substances that make SEC 
system special, and market regulation successful. Nigeria SEC arrangement is an 
incomparable tragedy that is unlike no other. 
Nigeria SEC arrangement did incalculable damage to integrity, transparency, and 
orderliness in Nigeria capital market. Nigeria SEC situation turned Nigeria capital 
market into one giant crime scene. The scenario is part of many programmed 
intrigues that resulted in the eventual crash of Nigeria stock market. Contributions 
Nigeria's SEC arrangement made to the crash of Nigeria stock market will become 
clearer after a brief analysis of securities is done; securities peculiarities, 
uniqueness, sensitivity, and vulnerability, all of which themselves constitute the 
reasons securities market demand special regulation, attention, and protection. 
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3.8 Nature of Securities and the Implication to Securities Regulation. 
According to Professor Bloomenthal, story of securities regulation is about the 
cupidity of market operators and the gullibility of investors.235 Professor Thomas 
Hazen went further to explore the intricacies of the United States securities laws, 
and the complexity of securities transactions. He concluded that; 
"[s] ecurities regulation is an extremely complicated field. At the federal level, it is 
implemented by a myriad of statutes and regulatory rules. The statutes and rules 
are extremely complex and detailed. The case law is particularly perplexing 
because of the degree of detail and complexity the law imposes. However, it is not 
only the law that is difficult and elaborate. The transactions that implicate the 
securities laws are extremely intricate as well. "236 
Both Professors Bloomenthal and Hazen are arguing in effect that securities market 
is laden with hazards. That, the perils mostly arise from human greed - the 
cupidity of unscrupulous market operators and complicit regulators -- and, the 
vulnerability of unwary investors, exacerbated by gullibility. And, that, other 
threats arise from inherent nature of securities, from the complexity of securities 
transactions, and from the intricate details of securities rules. 
235.See Bloomenthal,(2008), Securities Law Handbook (2008-2009 ed.), Vol. 1,7. 
236.See Hazen, Thomas L. (2005), Treatise On The Law of Securities Regulation, 5th Ed., VoU, 3. 
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Illustrating the functional importance of securities, in another of his many books, 
Professor Hazen argues that; 
"[sJ ecurities occupy a unique and important place in American life. Securities are 
the instruments which evidence the financial rights, and in some instances, the 
power to control, the corporations which own the great majority of our nation's 
and the world's productive facilities. Securities are the instruments through which 
business enterprises and governmental entities raise substantial portions of the 
funds that are used to finance new capital. Securities are the instruments in which 
many millions of American (and investors all over the world) invest their savings 
in order to provide for their retirement income, education for their children, or in 
the hopes of achieving a higher standard of living for themselves and their family. 
And, invariably, securities are the instruments by which unscrupulous promoters 
and sales people prey on those hopes and desires by selling overvalued (or even 
worthless) paper to many thousands oJpeople every year. "237 
3.8.1 Distinguishing Feature of Securities. 
Professor Hazen distinguishes securities from other goods and commodities, and 
attributes securities special regulatory needs to securities uniqueness. He also 
described the distinctive feature of securities. According to the professor, the 
unique feature which distinguishes securities from most other commodities in 
which people deal is that securities have no intrinsic value in themselves -
securities represent rights in something else.238 
237. See Hazen, Thomas L.(2006) The Law of Securities Regulation, Revised 5th Ed., 9. 
238. See Hazen, Thomas L. (2006) ibid. 
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Professor Hazen argues that the value of a bond, note, or other promise to pay 
depends upon the financial position of the promisor. That the value of a share of 
stock depends on the profitability or future prospects of the corporation or other 
entity which issued it. And, that, the market price of stock depends on how much 
other people are willing to pay for the stock, based on their evaluation of the 
company's prospects.239 
Continuing, Professor Hazen, argues also that the foregoing features of securities 
give a distinctive coloration to the regulation of transactions in securities, in 
contrast to the regulation of transactions in goods or commodities. 24°That most 
goods are produced, distributed, and used or consumed. And, that, governmental 
regulation of goods generally focuses on protecting the ultimate consumer against 
dangerous articles, misleading advertising, and unfair or non-competitive pricing 
practices.241He concluded that Securities are different in four ways. He listed the 
four ways in which securities are different, and articulated their corresponding 
implications to regulation of securities, as follows; 
239. Hazen, (2006), 36, supra at page 130 
240. Hazen, (2006) Ibid 
241. Haze, (2006) Ibid 
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3.8.1.a). Securities are Created, not Produced: Securities first difference from 
other goods and commodities is that securities are created rather than 
produced.242 Securities can be issued in unlimited amounts and virtually without 
any costs since securities are nothing in themselves but rather represent only an 
interest in something else.243 Therefore, an important focus of securities 
regulation is assuring that when securities are created and offered to the public, 
investors have an accurate idea of what that "something else" is and how much 
of an interest in that "something else" the security in question represent.244 
Professor Hazen's point here is that a good securities regulatory mechanism must 
contain provisions specifically tailored to compel creators and offerors of securities 
to completely, truthfully, accurately, and timely, disclose all facts and information 
(good and bad) that will give all investors (not just a privileged few) accurate idea, 
at all times, what that security actually is. And, the true value of the corporation 
each tranche of the security represents. Hence, full disclosure is of paramount 
importance to every security market. Disclosure rules have to be elaborate and 
mandatory, and not be left to the whimsical discretion of market operators. 
242. See Hazen, Thomas L. (2006), 38, supra at page 130 
243. Hazen (2006) Ibid 
244. Hazen (2006) Ibid 
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Failure to make disclosure-needs of the market a regulatory priority in Nigeria 
capital market left openings for creators and offerors of securities to routinely 
cheat investors. 
3.8.l.b). Securities are not used or Consumed: Securities second difference is 
that unlike goods, securities are not used or consumed by their purchasers.245 
Securities become a kind of currency, traded in the secondary markets at 
fluctuating prices. 246The secondary transactions far outweigh, in number and 
volume, the offerings of newly created securities (IPOs). Prof. Hazen argues that a 
second important focus of securities regulation, therefore, is to ensure that there 
is a continuous flow of information about the corporation or other entities that is 
represented by the securities being actively traded in the secondary markets. 247 
The eminent professor is emphasizing here that the special information need of the 
secondary market necessitates that every securities law must ensure that there is a 
continuous flow of accurate, honest, unscripted, non-sifted, and timely information, 
to all investors, on the condition of all traded corporations. In effect, Professor 
245. Hazen, Thomas L (2006), 38, supra, at page 130. 
246. Hazen (2006) Ibid. 
247. Ibid 
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Hazen reiterates a common understanding that security trading is, in principle, the 
buying and selling of information. That honest information is paramount, and 
occupies a special place in the securities market. Information management is very 
crucial to every capital market. Market regulation and regulators ceaselessly strive 
to curb information abuse and manipulation, and yet maintain enough balance to 
allow traded companies put out adequate information to the investing public. 
Management of information symmetry is a hot issue in the regulation of the capital 
market. Scrupulous array of rigorous rules are traditionally put in place to guard 
against abuse or mismanagement of information by publicly traded corporations, 
investment analysts, investment advisers, and sundry invested interests. 
Information is so crucial to securities transactions that a special theory evolved 
under the capital market jurisprudence on relationship between price of security 
and information. The theory is called "Efficient Market Hypothesis". 
3.8.l.b.i) Efficient Market Hypothesis: This is the groundwork upon which 
disclosure policies are formulated. 248 It espouses the relationship between price and 
information, and posits that an efficient market is the best measure ofvalue.249 
248. Simon, Timothy A. (2008), Classroom lecture in Securities Regulation at Golden Gate University, Spring Semester. 
249. Simon, Ibid 
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Information is a major Issue in the terminal conflict between management and 
shareholders in every public corporation.250 
Efficient market hypothesis, in brief, espouses categories of capital markets, 
predicated exclusively on the synergy of price and information flow. 251 "The 
efficient market hypothesis is a powerful descriptive theory of the relationship 
between the disclosure of financially significant information and changes in 
securities market prices. "252 According to Kraakman, " ... in discerning ex ante the 
intrinsic value of a security, the conventional view simply argues that the 
consensus of an efficient market will be the best possible measure of value at the 
moment, usually falling somewhere in the middle between extreme optimism and 
pessimism. "253 
Traditionally, market efficiency is believed to occur in three different levels; the 
weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong form of market efficiency.254 The 
weak form of market efficiency exists when security prices reflect all the 
information embodied in the past prices of that security.255 That is, if securities 
250. Simon,(2008), supra, at 134 
251. See Beaver, (1981) Market Efficiency, Acct. Rev. 23 
252. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort (2006) Securities Regulation Cases and Materials, 5th Ed., 105 
253. See Kraakman, (1988), 'Taking Discounts Seriously; The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition 
Motive'. 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891,898-901. 
254. See Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, 106, supra at footnote 252. 
255. Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, 106 ibid. 
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markets are efficient in the weak form, investors cannot extrapolate a security's 
future price from a series of past prices.256The semi-strong form of market 
efficiency exists if security prices reflect all publicly available information.257 A 
logical explanation of why stock prices follow a random walk is that stock prices 
quickly reflect successive pieces of new information as that information becomes 
available.258 The strong form of market efficiency occurs when security prices 
reflect all information, whether that information is publicly available or not.259 
The strong market form is the ideal market. Securities regulatory policies are 
formulated to achieve the market category where security prices reflect all 
information about every listed company, whether the information is publicly 
available or not. This category means a market where information flow is at 
equilibrium, and insiders, for instance, are pragmatically precluded from using 
inside, non-public information, to trade. Only quality and proper statutory, 
structural, and regulatory frameworks, matched with independent and effective 
enforcement capability can succeed in establishing the appropriate information 
management standard in a capital market. Unfortunately, Nigerian arrangement 
falls abysmally short of this important threshold of information management. 





3.8.l.c) Intangible and Complex Nature of Securities: Continuing with his 
illustration of the four ways securities are different, Professor Hazen argues that 
the third difference between securities and goods involves the intangible and 
complex nature of securities.260 That, since the complexity of securities invite 
unscrupulous people to attempt to cheat or mislead investors and traders, the 
securities laws contain provisions prohibiting a wide variety of fraudulent, 
manipulative, or deceptive practices. 261 
Intangible and complex nature of securities demands regulatory provisions that 
must scrupulously mirror securities peculiar nature. Such provisions must address 
wide range of activities including trading on inside information (insider-trading), 
misleading corporate publicity, improper dealings by corporate management, 
mandatory compliance with disclosure rules, etc. Securities regulation is a complex 
business that requires special rules. In sum, good securities regimen must reflect 
the philosophy embodied in Justice Brandeis' famous quote that "[sJunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. "262 Again, 
Nigerian securities laws drastically deviated from this important requirement. 
260. See Hazen, Thomas L (2006), 1O,supra, at page 130. 
261. See Hazen, (2006), ibid 
262. See Brandeis L.D. (1914), Other People's Money, 16. 
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3.8.1.d). Higher Regulatory Standard: Professor Hazen's fourth, and final 
difference between regulation of securities and the other goods and commodities is 
that, since a large industry has grown up to buy and sell securities for investors 
and traders, securities regulation is concerned with the regulation of people and 
firms engaged in the business, in order to assure that they do not take advantage 
of their superior experience and access to overreach their nonprofessional 
customers.263 
Challenge posed by Professor Hazen in his final argument is that securities law 
must seek to address in ample details, the intricate activities of each of the 
numerous categories of participants in the large securities industry, both in their 
many complicated buying and selling transactions, and in their entire conducts and 
activities that occur in the market place, or otherwise influence the market. 
Security market operators are professionals and experts. Majority of investors are 
non-professionals, unwary, and vulnerable individuals and entities that rely on 
advice and expertise of the professional market operators. Securities investment 
stake is high for investors hence they deserve protection at all times. Securities 
regulations, therefore, aim to superintend professional traders, protect investors, 
263. See Hazen, Thomas L (2006), 1O,supra, at page 130 
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establish order in the market, and instill integrity, efficiency, transparency, fair and 
equitable principles of trade. Market regulation is a solemn task the successful 
execution of which produces a strong capital market. Nigeria securities regulatory 
and structural frameworks are intentionally distorted, with dire consequences. 
Sabotage of Nigeria's SEC does not end with statutory incapacitation of the 
agency. The siege on Nigeria's SEC gets worse with the tactical positioning of 
Investments and Securities Tribunal, and, aggravated by statutory provisions that 
forced SEC to surrender its statutory apex authority to the tribunal. 
3.9 Nigerian Investments and Securities Tribunal (1ST); a Strategic 
Impediment to Nigeria's SEC. 
Assault on Nigerian SEC continues with statutorily situating Nigeria's Investments 
and Securities Tribunal (,1ST' or 'the tribunal') in a tactical position that allowed 
the tribunal to successfully wrestle SEC's apex authority. 
Nigeria's Investments and Securities Tribunal was first created under the repealed 
1999 Investments and Securities Act, and subsequently under the extant 2007 
Act.264As already noted,265 both the preamble to ISA 2007 and the explanatory 
264. See s.274 (2007), Investments and Securities Act. 
265. See Pages 109 and 111, supra. 
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note thereto makes SEC Nigeria's capital market apex regulator. S.13 of the 2007 
Investments and Securities Act also stamped Nigeria's SEC regulatory primacy.266 
In effect, Nigerian law clearly declared SEC the designated supreme regulatory 
authority over Nigerian capital market, but unfortunately, also sabotaged the SEC. 
S.274 of the 2007 Act established an Investments and Securities Tribunal (IST) for 
Nigeria.267 However, against the structure that exists in the U.S. and many other 
SEC systems, Nigeria opted for an unusual tribunal format that is adversarial to 
Nigeria's SEC. S.284 (1) ISA 2007 conferred Nigeria's 1ST with exclusive 
jurisdiction, over all securities matters in Nigeria, without any preconditions.268 
The exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by s.284 (1) provided the 
ground for the tribunal to engage in needless power tussle with Nigeria's SEC. The 
exclusive jurisdiction also resulted in the 2007 Act being in conflict with the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of Nigerian Federal High Courts269 
(equivalence of U.S. District Courts). 
In addition to s.284 (1) which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal, s.289 
(1) specifically gives the tribunal ad nauseam 'right afjudicial review and 
266. See s.13 ISA. 
267. See s.274 (1) ISA 
268. See s. 284 (1) (a)-(t) 
269. See s.251 (1), (1999), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree. 
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appeal over decisions of the SEC.,270 The tribunal's jurisdiction under s.289 (1) 
includes both original and appellate powers. The plain meaning of s.289 (1) is that 
any decision made or any sanction imposed by SEC in the discharge of its apex 
regulatory authority, is subject to capricious review, or reversal, by the Investments 
and Securities Tribunal. The tribunal's review and reversal powers over SEC 
decisions amount to indirectly placing the tribunal above the SEC in the hierarchy 
of regulatory authorities over Nigeria capital market. Provision of s.289 (1) also 
means that market operators can circumvent or frustrate Nigerian SEC by taking 
prospective or pending SEC investigations or proceedings direct to the more 
favorable tribunal venue. This is a clever roundabout way of using s.289 (1) to 
topple the apex regulatory status conferred on SEC by s.l3 ISA - a legislative 
infidelity hallmark that strikingly resembles the kind of legislative intrigues found 
in TRIPS Agreement, IMF and World Bank's respective Articles of Agreements. 
Nigerian 1ST makes the most of s.289 (1), and routinely overturns disciplinary 
actions SEC meted out to high profile market operators found guilty of securities 
infractions, malpractices, and frauds. This point will be elaborated in the next 
chapter when some questionable 1ST judgments will be examined. 
270. See s.289 (1) ISA 
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Further on 1ST's usurpation of SEC apex authority, Nigeria's tribunal arrangement 
drastically departed from the borrowed u.S. system. Under U.S. capital market 
adjudicatory system, independent Administrative Law Judges have non-exclusive 
original jurisdictions over certain category of securities disputes.271 More 
importantly, appeals and reviews of final judgments of Administrative Law Judges 
go to the U.S. SEC, and not vice versa.272 U.S. SEC has powers to affirm or reverse 
decisions of the Administrative Law Judges, unlike in Nigeria where the tribunal 
has absolute powers to affirm or reverse SEC decisions. 273 Yet, unlike the Indian 
tribunal where quest for integrity led to an innovative prescription that only 
Supreme Court judges and High Court Chief Justices preside in India's appellate 
tribunal. Nigerian lax tribunal arrangement allows market operators to recruit and 
recommend cronies and allied neophytes to serve as Nigerian tribunal judges. Also, 
India's SAT sits only on appeals over SEBI's decisions, but Nigerian tribunal 
exercises both appellate and original jurisdictions, thus tussling with Nigeria's 
SEC. That appeals and reviews under the U.S. system lie from judgments of 
Administrative Courts to SEC Commissioners is a vital element of the apex 
authority of U.S. SEC in the U.S. capital market. This key element of SEC system 
was skillfully upturned in the Nigerian SEC arrangement. 
271. Administrative Law Judges exercise jurisdiction over cases SEC brings against entities SEC regulates. 
272.See Office of Administrative Law Judges; Administrative action. At http://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (0312011) 
273.lbid 
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Finally on Nigerian tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction, s.294 of the 2007 Act 
repeated, rather superciliously, the provisions of s.284 (1) that the tribunal shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters specified in the Act.274 
3.10 Conclusion. 
The 2007 Act's barrage of attacks on SEC, and the adversative positioning of the 
Investments and Securities Tribunal atop the SEC, in Nigeria's regulatory format, 
constitutes the most damaging plots that coalesced with other intrigues to wreck 
Nigeria capital market. The Nigerian SEC arrangement is an essential component 
of a definitive scheme that involves legislative infidelity and use of law for 
instrumentality of undue advantage, fraud, corruption, and exploitation in Nigeria 
capital market. 
My next chapter will focus on Nigerian Investment and Securities Tribunal's 
judgments. Especially, the tribunal's zealous attacks on Nigeria SEC and its 
obsessive inclination to reversing SEC sanctions against market operators, in ways 
that demonstrate the tribunal's complicity in the capital market scheme. The style 
of the tribunal leaves no doubt that the tribunal is intent on hurting the SEC. 
274.See 8.294, ISA. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Legislative Infidelity and the N8.ltn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market: 
Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. 
,...,Part 2,..., 
Complicity of Nigeria's Investments and Securities Tribunal (1ST) in the 
Securities Fraud that Crashed Nigeria Stock Market. 
4.1 Introduction. 
The sudden rise of Nigeria stock market to become world's highest performing 
market in the last quarter of 2007 was astounding.275Neither the Nigerian national 
economy nor any sound economic or market fundamentals supported the market's 
outlandish performance.276The feat defied logic and reason. But, the precipitous 
crash of the market in early 2008, soon after reaching a record high,277 became even 
more perplexing than the meteoric rise. Protraction of Nigeria market's bullishness 
and the swiftness of the cataclysmic crash raise suspicion that the market was 
manipulated.278 The odd framework of Nigeria capital market,279 synchronization in 
timing of the crash, and conducts of Nigerian government and market officials 
before, during, and after the crash280 show that the market's mishap was induced. 
275. See Official website at http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo (visited 08/10) 
276. Note; Nigerian economy continued in steady decline even when the stock market soared to be the highest in the world. 
277.See; Bloomberg's report republished in Punch Newspaper of 02/02/2009 titled 'Nigeria stock market losses, highest in the 
world'. - Nigeria's market capitalization peaked at N12.4tn in March 2008, but fell to N4.5tn by end of March 2009. 
278. Bloomberg, ibid. Note also; The market surged steadily to its highest peak, and immediately declined swiftly to the bottom. 
279. Note; For details of the odd frameworks of Nigeria capital market, go to pp. 109 to 121, etal, chapter 3 of dissertation, supra. 
280. For summary of conducts that occurred before, during, and immediately after the crash, see pp. 102-106, Chap.3, supra. 
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Nigeria stock market crash strikingly resembles 'hot money cycle' scheme which 
an eminent Columbian University professor of Economics, and two-time Nobel 
Prize laureate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz/81 accused IMF and World Bank of 
precipitating in developing countries.282 Details of Nigeria market crash283 support a 
conclusion that the crash is Nigeria's own 'hot money cycle' scheme. Careful 
scrutiny of Nigeria market's legal framework reveals that the market was 
intentionally designed to fail,284 ostensibly, as part of the 'hot money cycle' 
scheme. In addition to the design flaws that abound in Nigeria capital market, 
Nigeria's SEC is acutely incapacitated in unusual ways by Nigeria's principal 
securities statutes.285The legal and structural arrangements of Nigeria capital 
market are utterly chaotic, and the market is left in a state of contrived dysfunction. 
Hostility mounted against Nigeria's SEC in the principal securities statutes grossly 
weakened the regulatory agency, and created predictable harms that wrecked 
Nigeria capital market. In addition to Nigeria market's countless ills, Nigerian 
Investments and Securities Act 2007 ('ISA' or 'the 2007 Act') also established an 
281. Note; Prof. Stiglitz was also Chairman of President Clinton's Economic Advisers, World Bank's Chief Economist and V.P. 
282. See The Observer, Sunday 29 April 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk.lbusiness/2001lapr/29Ibusiness.mbas (0112011) 
283. Note; For details of Nigeria stock market crash, go to pp. 1-9, Chapter 1 of dissertation, supra. 
284.Note; The design flaw in Nigeria capital market's legal and structural frameworks is skillful, very profound, and elaborate. 
285.Note; For details of SEC incapacitation by the securities Act, see pp.109-121, Chapter 3 of dissertation, supra. 
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Investments and Securities Tribunae86 ('1ST' or 'the tribunal') and positioned the 
tribunal to dominate and further impede Nigeria's SEC.287The tribunal lives up to 
its assignment, perhaps too much.288 
Nigerian Investments and Securities Tribunal uses its enormous powers and 
strategic advantage to frustrate the SEC, and to routinely overturn SEC penal 
actions against fraudulent market operators.289 Brief analysis of few of the 
tribunal's appellate judgments that overturned disciplinary sanctions imposed by 
SEC's Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC), will show the tribunal's 
persistent hostility towards SEC. But, analysis of SEC's powers over market 
infractions, exercise of which powers led to appeals to the tribunal, will come first. 
4.2 Powers of Nigeria's SEC (through APC) to Investigate and Punish 
Securities Malpractices, Under ISA 2007. 
Nigerian Investments and Securities Act 2007 expressly designated Nigeria's SEC 
the apex regulator of Nigerian capital market.290 The 2007 Act also assigned thirty 
different duties and responsibilities to the SEC as the apex market regulator. 291 
286. See; S.274, (2007), Investments and Securities Act. (ISA). 
287. See; S. 284, (1) (a)-(f) and s.289 (1), ibid. 
288. Note; For full analysis of the Investments and Securities Tribunal's hostilities towards Nigeria's SEC see pp.147-l85, infra. 
289. See; ibid. 
290. See; S.13, ISA, supra. 
291. See; Paragraphs (a) - (z) and z (aa) - z (dd), s.13 ibid. 
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S.303(2) and (3) of the 2007 Act gives SEC the power to impose penalty on 
violators of the Act, and to make order for compensation of victims of market 
infractions, as well as to order forfeiture in appropriate cases.292 In particular, s.305 
(1) provides that where an offence has been committed by a company, every 
person in charge of the company, every person responsible for the conduct of 
business of the company, as well as the company itself, shall be deemed to be 
gUilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against.293 Additionally, 
subsection (2) of s.305 provides that where an offence has been proved to be 
committed by a company with the consent or connivance of or attributable to any 
neglect on the part of any officer of the company, such officer shall also be 
deemed to be gUilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against.294 
Explicit in the clear wordings of subsections (1) and (2) of s.305 is that where a 
company commits securities offence, both the company and its officers shall be 
deemed guilty of the offence, and shall be liable to be proceeded against. 
Furthermore, paragraphs (a) and (b), subsection (3) of s.305 accentuates SEC's 
penal powers. 295F or its relevance, provisions of subsection (3) ( a) and (b) of 
292. See; 8.303 (2) and (3), I8A 2007, supra. 
293. See; 8.305 (1), I8A, ibid. 
294. See; 8.305 (2), ibid. 
295. See; 8.305 (3), (a), and. (b), ibid. 
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s.305 merit full reproduction. Subsection (3) and its two paragraphs provide that; 
"[iJf the Commission is satisfied that a person (corporate or 
individual): (a) is engaged or has engaged in any form of market 
abuse or other violations under this Act; or (b) by taking or refraining 
from taking any action, has required or encouraged another person or 
persons to engage in behaviour which if engaged in by a market 
participant or company would amount to market abuse or violation 
under this Act, it may impose on the person a penalty of such 
amount or of such nature as it considers appropriate ... ,,296 
The foregoing are some of the statutory powers under which the Administrative 
Proceedings Committee (APC), a staff-division of the SEC, imposed many of its 
sanctions that went on appeal to the Investments and Securities Tribunal. The 
tribunal upheld some APC sanctions relying on SEC's statutory penal powers. But 
the tribunal invented unsound logics, arbitrarily excuses and faulty reasoning to 
quash many APC sanctions, and free proven securities fraudsters - mostly rich 
market operators who committed very serious securities and accounting frauds. 
4.3 Nigerian 1ST through the Cases: 1ST's Judicial Hostility towards SEC; 
Happenstance or Evidence of Complicity in Securities Fraud? 
Nigeria's SEC is severely weakened in the Investments and Securities Act 2007.297 
Position of the Chairman of SEC is statutorily non- executive and part-time.298 
Positions of two SEC Commissioners are part-time and non-executive also.299 
296. See; 8.305, (3), (a), and (b), 18A 2007 
297.See; Footnote 285, p.145, supra. 
298. See; Paragraphs (a)-(t), subsection (1), s.3, 2007 ISA, supra. 
299. Ibid. 
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But, positions of the other three SEC Commissioners are both executive and 
fulltime. 30o Rather than the SEC Chairman, a lower office of Director-General is 
designated both the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the SEC.3ot Other 
areas Nigeria's SEC is statutorily sabotaged include salary and remunerations/02 
appointment,303 tenure,304 devotion to duty,305 and prohibition from violation of 
ethics rules .306 In each of these vital matters, SEC board is statutorily split into two 
unequal parts, yet, all the SEC board members hold equal votes and perform the 
same functions. The part-time, non-executive, poorly paid Chairman heads all SEC 
meetings,307 and is additionally reposed with powers to cast the tie breaker in SEC 
votes.308 The abnormal statutory arrangement of Nigeria's SEC board is evidently 
calculated to divide the board, create internal power struggle, and render SEC 
board susceptible and beholden to market operators. 
The awkward SEC arrangement left an acutely weak SEC to regulate and supervise 
Nigeria capital market. SEC weakness is exacerbated by 1ST's propensity to 
overturn SEC sanctions on flimsy excuses. Whether 1ST's persistent overturn of 
300. See; Paragraphs (a) - (t), subsection (1), s.3, ISA, supra. 
301. See; Paragraph (b), subsection (1), s.3, ibid. 
302. See Subsections (1) and (2), s.9, ISA, supra. 
303. See; Subsection (1) of s.5, ISA, supra. 
304. See; Subsections (2), (3), and (4), s.5 ISA, ibid. 
305. See; S.6, ibid. 
306. Thid. 
307. See; Subsection (2), s.10, ISA, ibid. 
308. See; Subsection (4), s.10, ibid. 
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SEC sanctions against big securities fraudsters is isolated inadvertence, or evidence 
of complicity in the larger securities scheme in Nigeria capital market, is open to 
debate. But, consistency of occurrence of the reversals, flimsiness of the tribunal's 
excuses for the reversals, statutory provisions that empower the tribunal to freely 
accept monetary grants and donations, and the aberrant positioning of the tribunal 
with mandate that allows it to usurp SEC apex authority, point to the tribunal's 
complicit alliance in the securities scheme that reign in Nigeria capital market. 
4.3.1 Examples of the Tribunal's Judgments that Freed Securities Fraudsters. 
The following are few of the tribunal's questionable appellate judgments that 
overturned SEC (APC) sanctions. But first, here is one appellate judgment in 
which the tribunal said and did all the right things. 
4.3. 1.i). Union Bank of Nigeria (UBN) PLCv. SEC; 309 
paragraph B, the tribunal held that 
" ... we are inclined to hold that the Respondent (SEC) is empowered 
by s.8 of ISA (the 1999 Act), to act in the interest of the public as the 
apex regulatory agency supervising the capital market. Inaction on 
the part of the Respondent (SEC) in respect of a scam of this 
magnitude could be regarded as breach of statutory obligations. It 
would definitely be inimical to the overall development of the capital 
market, if fraud of this nature goes unpunished, whether there are 
ascertainable investors or not .... ,.'310 
309. See; (2004), 1 (Nigerian Investments and Securities Law Report) NISLR 115. 
310. Ibid, page 161,paragraph B of law report. 
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The tribunal held in the above appeal that paramount interests of the public and the 
capital market, not some fanciful legal technicalities, should guide SEC's 
disciplinary actions against entities that commit securities frauds. SEC and the 
tribunal are of the same opinion that the appellant's infractions in the above case 
are minor, and did not involve any " ... manipulative and deceptive contrivances ... " 
but merely that the appellant company and its CEO 
" .. failed to exercise due care and supervision over the activities and 
staff of the company when it failed to ... re-verify the diskette 
forwarded to it by the CSCS (Central Securities and Clearing 
Systems) ... "311 
And, that the appellant " ... also failed in its duty to notify the Commission of the 
suspected breach or non compliance with any of the regulations of SEC ... " Yet, 
the tribunal held that; 
"... the above actions/omissions of UBN Registrars (appellant) 
constituted acts capable of adversely affecting the investing public's 
image of and confidence in the Capital Market ... "312 
In that appeal, the tribunal upheld the appellant counsel's submission that the 
restitution order made by APC was wrongful and posed risk of multiplicity and 
double compensation. Nevertheless, the tribunal relied strongly on the 'image of 
and confidence in the capital market' doctrine to refuse the appellant counsel's 
311. See; Page 161, supra at page 150. 
312. Ibid. 
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forceful plea to void the restitution order. Instead, the tribunal made an order 
remanding the case to APC, only for a proper apportionment of the restitution. 
The premise and reasoning of the tribunal's affirmation of APC sanction in the 
Union Bank Case, above, is sound and representative of the higher disciplinary 
benchmark needed in Nigeria capital market. If the tribunal had maintained that 
threshold of discipline, Nigeria capital market would have benefitted immensely. 
Higher regulatory and adjudicatory standard is one feasible way to instill integrity, 
transparency, orderliness, fair and equitable principles of trade, and enhance 
investor protection, in the capital market. 
However, problem arises when in very serious securities fraud cases, the tribunal 
arbitrarily veers off the sound criterion it laid down in the Union Bank of Nigeria 
Case, and rely heavily on tenuous logics and flawed reasoning to routinely quash 
SEC sanctions. See for example the case of 
4.3.l.ii). Molten Trust Ltd & Another v. SEC;313 The 2nd appellant is the Managing 
Director of the 1 st appellant company. 1 st and 2nd appellants were summonedjointly 
by APC for investigation over allegation of serious securities frauds. As MD of the 
313. See; (2007)2 NISLR 137 at 170-171, paras F-A. 
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company, 2nd appellant appeared for and represented the company throughout the 
proceedings. 2nd appellant filed defense, testified under oath, and was cross-
examined. In the end, 1 st appellant (the company) was found liable and sanctioned. 
1 st appellant's punishments included an order not to operate in the capital market 
for three months. Because of his personal role in the proven fraud, 2nd appellant 
(MD of the company) was also barred from participating in the market for 12 
months. 2nd appellant appealed to the tribunal against his 12 months suspension. 2nd 
appellant's argument in the tribunal was that he did not have a fair chance to 
defend himself before the SEC, that, he defended only the r t appellant. The 
tribunal upheld 2nd appellant's specious argument holding that 
U[ aJpart from bringing violations of the market rules against 
corporate bodies, the employee of the corporate body/company that 
is involved in the case should also have his separate and specific 
violations pressed against him according to his level of involvement. 
In this way the principle of fair hearing would be fully enforced and 
observed. ,,314 
Based on the above reasoning, the tribunal set aside the twelve months suspension 
APe imposed on the 2nd appellant. The tribunal did not show concern for the 
serious securities frauds the 2nd appellant committed. The tribunal did not even 
314. See; Molten Trust Ltd, and Anor. v. SEC, paragraphs F-A., 170-171,supra at p.152. 
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order a retrial of the 2nd appellant. The tribunal simply let off the 2nd appellant, but 
upheld the sanction imposed on the company (i.e. 1st appellant) for the same 
frauds. The company acted through the 2nd appellant in committing the frauds. 
The flaws in the tribunal's decision in Molten Trust Case are many. But due to 
constraints in time and space, I will limit my analysis of the case. First, as noted 
earlier,315 s.305 (1) provides that where a company commits an offence, every 
officer in charge of the company is deemed equally guilty and liable to be 
proceeded against.316 S.305 (l) is directly on point in the Molten Trust case. S.305 
(l) is one of the few bona fide provisions that exist in Nigerian ISA 2007, but the 
tribunal appears determined to frustrate the beneficial operation of the section. The 
section is a special anti-fraud provision in recognition that corporations commit 
frauds only through human beings, i.e., their officers. By the operation of s.305 (l), 
the 2nd appellant who is the M.D. of 1 st appellant is, on that basis alone, adjudged 
guilty and liable to be proceeded against for the 1st appellant's securities offence. 
That is the explicit provision of s.305 (l). Since APC concluded that the company 
committed the offence, APC need not do more to sanction the M.D. i.e. 2nd 
appellant. That the tribunal upheld the company's guilt automatically settles the 2nd 
315. See; Footnote 293, , supra, at page 147. 
316. See; S.305 (1), ISA 
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appellant's guilt also. The l8t appellant's guilt ropes in the 2nd appellant, without 
more, according to the plain wordings of s.305 (1). Subsection (2) of s.305 re-
enforces the provision of subsection (1). 
Nonetheless, SEC gave the 2nd Appellant notice and the opportunity to participate 
in the investigation and administrative proceeding, before finding him and the 
company liable. The tribunal's reversal of the 2nd appellant's punishment based on 
the ground that APC ought to have, in the invitation, separated the employee from 
the company, and have the employee's separate and specific violations pressed 
against him, is frivolous, flawed, and unrepresentative of the law. 
Second, in the Molten Trust Case, the tribunal abandoned the 'overall interest of 
the market', and the 'possibility of wrong perception by the public in the event of 
failure of SEC to punish identified culprits' doctrines it espoused earlier in the 
Union Bank Case, above. Rather, the tribunal made an about turn, and relied on an 
inapplicable excuse of 'breach of fair hearing' to absolve the 2nd appellant, and 
annul his 12 months suspension. The facts of Molten Trust Case do not support 2nd 
appellant's claim of breach of fair hearing. 
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More so, Nigeria's SEC does not conduct criminal proceedings. SEC only carries 
out civil investigations and administrative proceedings. Nigeria SEC is by law 
bound to channel all criminal cases to the 
" ... appropriate criminal prosecuting authorities, such as, the office of 
the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Attorney-General of a 
state, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. "317 
By operation of law therefore, SEC does not undertake criminal prosecutions to 
necessitate the kind of separate invitations with distinct charges the tribunal 
wrongly demanded for 2nd appellant in the Molten Trust case. 
Another of the tribunal's decisions of interest is an appeal over APC sanctions 
against appellants who committed horrible securities fraud; 
4.3.l.iii).Nova Finance & Securities Ltd and Mr. Eugene Anenih v. SEC;318 
Summary of the facts of the case is that SEC investigated appellants (stock 
brokers), and found them guilty of brazenly manipulating African Petroleum PIc 
(AP PIc) shares in the stock market. SEC investigations found that appellants 
manipulated AP PIc's shares thirty-two (32) times within a period of two weeks. 
317. See; S.304, ISA, supra. 
318. See; (Unreported) (2009), Case No. IST/APP/02/09. Judgment delivered on Wednesday, 9th September, 2009. 
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Losses inflicted on AP PIc by the appellants' misconducts totaled N117.2 billion 
($820.4 million). It is pertinent to observe that prior to SEC's action against the 
appellants, Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) had carried out similar investigations 
over the same allegations of serious frauds, found appellants liable for 
manipulating AP PIc's shares as alleged, and punished them accordingly. 
Appellants accepted the punishment imposed by the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
without complaint. However, when SEC found appellants liable and imposed 
sanction on them, appellants appealed against SEC's sanctions. In its judgment, the 
tribunal embarked on a voyage of pure speculations and conjectures to hold that 
{c ... at the rate the AP Pic shares fell between Jan. 16th to Feb. loth 
when the Appellants had not come to the picture, the price would 
have gone down in 6 weeks by N155.70, and in eight weeks could 
have gone down by N207. 60. The inference/conclusion from the facts 
is that factors other than the transactions by the Appellants 
contributed to the steady decline in the share price of AP Pic from 
Jan. to March, 2009 without going further. "319 
{C ... [aJdditionally, as at the time of these transactions, we note that 
the share prices of other petroleum companies were also on the 
decline like that of the AP Pic. There was also global financial crisis, 
the price of crude oil was going down and the debate on the effect of 
these events on the Nigerian economy was widespread at this 
time. ,,320 
319. See; Nova Securities & Finance Case, page 15 of 'certified true copy' of judgment, supra at page 156 
320. See; page 16, Ibid 
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The tribunal concluded that H[mJuch as we want to agree with the Respondent 
that any transaction of 50,000 units in the stock of a listed company 
could move the price either upwards or downwards within the 5% 
margin, we are not convinced that the Appellants' transactions 
caused the decline in price of AP Pic shares ... "321 
The tribunal also invoked its ultimate 'weapon against SEC', i.e., breach of fair 
hearing excuse, and surmised in page 18 that 
H ••• it is clear that only one letter of invitation was extended to both 
Appellants. No other evidence was submitted to show that any 
invitation was sent to the 2nd Appellant personally. The question is 
whether the notice is adequate for both Appellants and whether less 
than 24 hours notice is sufficient for the Appellants. The answer is in 
the negative. ,,322 
Continuing at page 19, the tribunal derided the content of SEC's notice of 
invitation to Appellants, and held further that 
H[iJf the hearing was meant. to be an adjudicatory type, the party 
invited should know what specific act or conduct of his gave rise to 
the alleged violation. He should also know that he is invited to defend 
himself and show why disciplinary action should not be taken against 
him. In this case, the vague general wording of the letter of invitation 
fails in all regards except as notice to Appellants to assist the 
respondent in the course of its investigation. ,,]23 
In the end, the tribunal overturned all SEC sanctions against the appellants. The 
tribunal totally absolved the appellants and sent them back into the stock market. 
321. See; Nova Securities & Finance Case, page 16 of 'certified true copy' of judgment, supra at page 156 
322. page 18, ibid 
323. page 19, ibid 
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Appellants whom SEC and NSE found liable for manipulating AP PIc stocks 32 
times in two weeks, and caused Nl17.2bn ($820.4 million) in losses went scot free. 
Many vexing issues are raised by the tribunal's judgment in Nova Securities 
Case.324 First issue raised in the judgment is the tribunal's conclusion that; 
H ... [aJdditionally, as at the time of these transactions, we note that 
the share prices of other petroleum companies were also on the 
decline like that of the AP PIc. There was also global financial crisis, 
the price of crude oil was going down and the debate on the effect of 
these events on the Nigerian economy was widespread at this 
time. ,,325 
The above quoted portion of the tribunal's judgment is not supported by any iota of 
evidence on record. The conclusion was based entirely on the tribunal's own 
imagination and conjecture. If the tribunal considered those matters important to 
the appeal before it, the tribunal would have called for fresh viva-voce evidence on 
the matters rather than resort to speculations. The tribunal was not as appropriately 
situated as the SEC and NSE to fathom the cause of the decline in value of the 
shares in question. Securities and finance professionals working in both the SEC 
and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) already determined that appellants' 
fraudulent activities caused the drastic losses in AP PIc's shares. The appellants 
324. See; Page 156. 
325. Ibid. 
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agreed to those findings and abided by the sanctions NSE imposed. The expert 
finding trumps the tribunal's uneducated guesswork, and was enough to establish 
the facts of the fraud, unless the tribunal saw reason to impugn the credibility of 
the expert findings. No such reason was raised in the tribunal's judgment. 
Second issue that arose from Nova Securities Case relates to confusion of legal 
issues. There is a confusion that manifests repeatedly in the tribunal's "special" 
judgments. The tribunal appears in Nova Securities Case (as in many similar 
cases) to struggle with the proper characterization of APC disciplinary functions. 
The tribunal's judgment in Nova Securities Case and similar class of cases 
erroneously assume APe investigation and enforcement actions to be court trials. 
This mistaken assumption led the tribunal to wrongfully invoke higher benchmark 
of fair hearing to strike down many APC sanctions. SEC is a statutory 
administrative agency with mandate to regulate the capital market, investigate 
infractions, inspect books and records, and where appropriate, to impose sanctions 
after hearing the parties.326 SEC is the capital market police, constantly in hot 
pursuit of securities fraudsters, and not a trial court. 
326. See; S.l3 paragraphs (r) and (t), and s.304 of the 2007 Act. 
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A combined reading ofs.l3 (r) and (t), and s.304 of the 2007 Act, shows that SEC 
merely carries out investigations, not trials, for the purpose of supervising and 
regulating Nigeria capital market. There is a world of difference between SEC's 
administrative proceedings, and criminal trials. In Molten Trust Case,327 supra, the 
tribunal acknowledged the investigative nature of SEC functions, but inexplicably 
missed the relevance of that vital point in choosing the appropriate criterion for fair 
hearing for SEC enforcement actions. The tribunal's understanding of the functions 
of the SEC led it to rightly make the point in Molten Trust Case that 
" ... [tJ he Act also empowers the Respondent (SEC) in the public 
interest, having regard to the protection of investors and maintenance 
of fair and orderly market, to investigate, prevent fraudulent and 
unfair trade practices relating to the securities industry. ,,328 
The 2007 Act does not require SEC to conduct court-like elaborate trials as a 
necessary process for determining infractions committed in the capital market, or 
for purposes of ascertaining the degree of culpability of any individual or entity. 
SEC, through APC, merely carries out inves'tigations and administrative 
proceedings to determine whether violations occurred, who committed the 
violations, and to impose appropriate sanctions. Measure of fair hearing for SEC 
investigations, therefore, ought to recognize SEC's duties. Though s.303 (5) 
327. Moilten Trust Case, supra at page 152 
328. Ibid. 
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provides that SEC shall accord fair hearing to a person in violation, in the exercise 
of its enforcement powers, but, fair hearing under s.303 (5) must be interpreted in 
harmony with s.305 (l) and (2), and must be in consonance with SEC arduous 
duties, such that every suspect must be fully heard before condemnation. Right of 
fair hearing under the type of proceedings Nigeria SEC is saddled with does not 
mean that Nigeria's Criminal Procedure Law book will be thrown at the culprit. 
SEC does not conduct criminal trials to warrant such exceptional measures. 
SEC duties in the capital market would not accommodate the lUxury of procedural 
extravagance, for obvious reasons. At the stage APC sends out invitations, 
culpability of individuals or entities may not have been determined yet. 
Specificities of individual violations and exact culprits may not yet be discernible. 
So, SEC will not be in a position, while sending out invitations, to separately 
charge each invitee, as demanded by the tribunal. Above all, the statutory mandate 
and purely civil and administrative nature of SEC proceedings make strict 
adherence to criminal trial benchmark for fair hearing unnecessary, impossible, 
and counter-productive. Demand for fair hearing must take into consideration the 
totality of all the circumstances of SEC situation, so as to avoid undue narrow and 
technical assessment of SEC disciplinary sanctions. The tribunal understands 
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this, and stated so in Molten Trust Case.329 The tribunal also confirmed its 
understanding of SEC unique situation in its judgment in another appeal -
Cadbury Nigeria PIc vs. SEC & Anothe~3°(2008), where Appellant's Counsel 
vigorously canvassed breach of fair hearing principles of audi alteram partem and 
nemo judex incausa sua. The tribunal vehemently rejected both arguments on that 
occasion, and eloquently framed SEC's distinctive role vis-a-vis rights to fair 
hearing. The tribunal held in that case that; 
"[tlhe r t Respondent (i.e. SEC) is the Apex regulatory authority in the 
Nigerian capital market. Its functions include overseeing the 
operations, transactions and overall development of the capital 
market. Under section 8 of the Investments and Securities Act 1999 
(now repealed) the r t Respondent (SEC) has powers to regulate, 
control, monitor, investigate, and prevent fraudulent and unfair trade 
practices in the market. Inherent in its powers is the power of sanction 
where there are established cases of infraction of the law and the 
rules made pursuant to the law by capital market operators. "331 
Continuing, the tribunal asserted that 
"[iJt is pertinent to state that carrying out investigation and 
subsequently proceeding against any party at the APC itself does not 
constitute a violation of the Appellant's right to fair hearing ... "332 
The tribunal showed an understanding of SEC job in the above quotes. But, the 
tribunal expediently forgets SEC duties when certain appellants appear before it. 
329. P.169, paragraph E, supra at page 152. 




Again, although the tribunal reached a wrong decision in the Molten Trust Case,333 
the tribunal made two significant restatements of the law that suggests the tribunal, 
when it chooses, has a clear understanding of the appropriate threshold of fair 
hearing required of SEC. The tribunal in Molten Trust case first stated that; 
H .. .[s}.3 6 (1) (Nigeria's constitutional guarantee of right to fair 
hearing) is also modified where the determination of the 
administering authority is not final and conclusive such as a 
situation where APC's decisions are not final but have to be referred 
to the board of SEC for final decision. "334 
Continuing at page 169, the tribunal stated that 
"mair hearing is not to be assessed from a narrow and technical 
perspective but in substance,,335 
It is beyond question that, on a 'good day', the tribunal clearly understands the law 
on right to fair hearing, and correctly restates the principles. However, consistency 
appears to be a virtue the tribunal struggles with. The tribunal needs to show 
uniformity in its good understanding of fair hearing principles, in all its judgments, 
not just in some, if the tribunal is sincere in its pursuit of justice. 
333. Supra, at page 152. 
334. See; Paragraph B, page 167, ibid. 
335. See; Page 169, ibid. 
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Moreover, S.36(l) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which guarantees to 
Nigerians the right to fair hearing, limits fair hearing rights only to proceedings 
conducted by " ... a court or other tribunal .... "336 The Administrative Proceedings 
Committee (APC) of the SEC is neither a court nor a tribunal, but a statutory 
administrative investigative body. APC falls within the class of authorities for 
which subsections (2) (a) and (b) of s.36 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution toned 
down the threshold of fair hearing because their decisions are not fina1.337 All APC 
decisions are subject to SEC approval. 
Contrary to the tribunal's decisions, APC' s joint invitation to a corporation and its 
staff does not amount to breach of fair hearing. Notice of pendency of APC's 
investigation and administrative proceedings is a matter of procedural due process. 
Due process rights and principles are notorious and settled area of the law. 
Adequacy of notice of proceedings is not chiseled in stone but depends on the 
circumstances of each case. Purpose of notice is to officially make all the affected 
parties aware of the pendency of a proceeding, and to formally give them the 
opportunity to attend and participate, if they wish. APC joint letter to a company 
and its staff are sufficient notice for APC administrative proceedings. 
336. See; S.36 (1), (1999), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
337. See; Subsection (2), (a), and (b), ofs.36, ibid. 
165 
Notice to defendant in APC proceedings is very important. Nevertheless, it is trite 
law that inadequacy of notice is a procedural defect that can be waived by the 
affected party. Where the appellants fully participated in SEC proceedings as in the 
Molten Trust Case, Nova Securities & Finance Case, Olisaemeka Case, Akintola 
Williams Deloitte Case, etc., and did not complain about inadequacy of notice, at 
all, throughout the APC administrative proceedings, they are deemed to have 
waived any breach of notice. Breach of notice does not amount to breach of fair 
hearing if the affected parties waived the breach. The matter is foreclosed, and 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and cannot sustain a reversal of SEC 
just sanctions. The foregoing is a notorious principle of law that does not require 
citation of legal authorities. The tribunal chose to reverse APC sanctions contrary 
to the basic principles of law. The tribunal is utterly wrong, and insincere on the 
use of breach of fair hearing excuses. 
Furthermore, the tribunal's unrelenting eXCUlpation of proven securities fraudsters 
on frivolous excuses has profound implications. The tribunal sends confirmed 
securities fraudsters back into the market. Invariably, they become more confident 
and hardened, and assured that they can commit any frauds and infractions and get 
away with it. The tribunal's incessant discharge of proven securities fraudsters 
sends wrong message to other market participants, and to the market place. The act 
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is injurious to market integrity, transparency, and orderliness, and imperils investor 
protection. Another implication of the tribunal's action is that the tribunal is 
intentionally aiding and abetting securities fraud. The action makes the tribunal 
accessory after the facts to securities crimes. The tribunal's brazen recklessness 
confirms that the tribunal is eagerly complicit in the organized securities scheme 
that crashed Nigeria stock market, and continues unabated. 
Third issue raised by Nova Securities Case is the need to identify and address the 
root causes of the tribunal's continuing misbehavior. The tribunal's appalling 
misconducts traces back to contrived dysfunction of the regulatory framework of 
Nigeria capital market, and the excision of safety features of the borrowed u.s. 
SEC system. If Nigeria's Investments and Securities Tribunal is subordinated to 
Nigeria's SEC, as Administrative Law Judges are to the U.S. SEC,338 Nigeria's 
tribunal will be the securities 'court' ofjirst instance. Appeals would go from the 
tribunal's judgments to Nigeria's SEC board, rather than the current vice versa. 
The tribunal's tactical advantage over SEC would not exist, and the tribunal's 
frequent collusions to free high-profile securities fraudsters, and unleash them back 
into Nigeria capital market and on innocent investors, would probably not occur. 
338. See; Office of Administrative Law Judges; Administrative action. At http://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (0312011) 
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Moreover, if the Nigerian system had adhered to the U.S. system, Nigeria's SEC 
(or its alter ego, APC) would focus on investigating securities frauds and 
violations, and not be also mired in administrative proceedings. In U.S., it is the 
independent Administrative Law Judges under the auspices of the SEC that 
conduct securities administrative proceedings.339 Enforcement Division of the SEC 
conducts investigations, gathers evidence of securities frauds and relational 
infractions, and sends the case to the Administrative Law Judge in civil 
proceedings (or to U.S. Attorney's Office for criminal prosecutions).34o The parties 
vent their issues before professional judges who understand all the legal intricacies 
and nuances involved, including fundamental right issues. The Judge renders a 
verdict. Dissatisfied parties appeal to the full board of U.S. SEC.341 The U.S. SEC 
system epitomizes the apex authority of SEC. The U.S. arrangement is an 
important SEC internal adjudicatory structure that is distorted in Nigeria's SEC. 
Fallout from the Nigerian muddle is that Nigerian APC, manned mostly by non-
lawyers, is wrongly sUbjected to the difficult task of conducting administrative 
proceedings. Nigerian tribunal judges see a loophole in the faulty Nigeria's SEC 
adjudicatory arrangement and ill-use the opportunity to indulge in self fulfillment. 
339. See; Footnote 338, supra at page 167. Note that it is only from ALJs' civil proceedings that appeals go to the SEC board. 
340. See; Footnote 338, ibid. See also, Cox, Hillman, Langevoort, (2006), Securities Regulation; Cases and Materials, II. 
341. Footnote 338, ibid. 
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The tribunal capriciously raises the bar for APC sanctions, and demand from non-
lawyers to conduct proceedings like professional trial judges. Why Nigeria SEC is 
boxed into the awkward position remains unclear, but the model is demoralizing to 
SEC staffs, and dovetails into the securities scheme that crashed the stock market. 
4.3.l.iv) Again in the case of Olisaemeka v. SEC;342 breach of right to fair hearing 
was used to pardon an Appellant who admitted that he attended the APC 
proceedings, but; 
" ... was only asked questions about himself and his involvement in 
the UAC share scam as well as the alleged falsification of the 
signature of the Managing Director of the firm. ,,343 
The U.A.C. share scam in the capital market and forgery of the MD's signature 
were the key issues in the case. Appellant admitted that he was asked questions on 
those issues. APC eventually found appellant liable for complicity in fraudulent 
dealings involving UAC shares and falsification of signature of MD of the firm. 
Appellant was banned from doing business in the capital market by SEC and 
handed over to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for criminal 
investigation and possible prosecution. In the light of the those facts, the 
342. See; (2007) NISLR 175. 
343. Ibid. 
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tribunal still held that the Appellant's right to fair hearing was breached because 
"[tJhe Appellant was not invited as a separate party to the 
proceedings at APe nor was he informed of the issue in dispute at 
the proceedings. "344 
If the tribunal's 'breach of fair hearing excuses' amounted to bad justice in the 
above three cases, things got even worse. In another high-profile, serious securities 
fraud matter that went on appeal to the tribunal, the tribun~l took misuse of judicial 
authority to a new high and invented new inane reason to quashed APC sanctions; 
4.3.l.v). Akintola Williams Deloitte v. SEC and 20 others;345 
This case reenacted in Nigeria the infamous Arthur Anderson, Inc., and Enron 
Corporation's accounting scams that occurred in the United States. The facts of 
the case are that SEC discovered multiple irregularities in Cadbury Nigeria PIc's 
(Cadbury) Annual Reports and Accounts. SEC found overstatements in Cadbury's 
2002-2006 annual reports. SEC also noticed drastic deteriorating financial 
condition of the company, declining profitability, worsening leverage ratio, and 
deteriorating cash flow. Cadbury was also implicated in inadequate disclosure, 
non-compliance with Corporate Governance Code, and obtaining loans for the 
payment of dividends to shareholders contrary to SEC regulations. SEC queried 
344. See; Olisaemeka v. SEC, supra at page 169. 
345. See; (Unreported) Appeal No. IST/LAIAPP/Oll08, judgment delivered on Tuesday, 10th February, 2009. 
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Cadbury. In answer to SEC query, Cadbury "cooked" its financial books and 
annual reports to cover those irregularities. The financial books, annual reports, 
and accounts were prepared for Cadbury by the Appellant (Akintola Williams 
Deloitte), Nigeria's topmost accounting firm that serves as external auditors to 
Cadbury. The appellant was found complicit in "cooking" Cadbury's financial 
books. Appellant was the 20th party APC invited for investigation. Upon 
conclusion of proceedings, Appellant and many other invitees were found liable 
and fined. Appellant was ordered to pay a relatively paltry N20 million 
($140,000.00) fine. Most of the sanctioned culprits, including Cadbury Nigeria PIc, 
appealed to the tribunal on grounds of breach of right to fair hearing, amongst 
other grounds, but lost. Appellant also appealed against APC sanctions, to the 
tribunal. Out of appellant's nine hotly contested grounds of appeal, the tribunal 
latched onto two trivial issues to totally free yet another high-profile (accounting) 
fraudster. 
In the appeal, the tribunal hinged its quashing of APC sanction on two issues; 
First, the tribunal held that SEC failed to prove that it complied with s.310 (3) of 
the [SA 2007, and Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of SEC Administrative 
Proceedings Committee contained in Schedule VII of the Rules and Regulations of 
SEC. S.310 (3) and Rule 12 both require that a decision of any committee of the 
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Commission shall not be of any effect until it is confirmed by the Commission. 
Rule 12 additionally stipulates that the Commission's confirmation shall be made 
within 14 days after the decision, and that the Secretary of the Commission shall 
communicate in writing to the affected parties within 5 days of the confirmation of 
the decision by the full board of the Commission. 
SEC board's confirmation of APC decisions is SEC's internal procedural matter 
meant only for administrative convenience. Non-confinnation of APC decision 
does not strike at the root of APC's enforcement actions. The tribunal itself has 
held on many occasions that APC and SEC are one and the same. Hence 
confirmation of decision of APC by SEC is a mere internal formality, and failure to 
abide by the directive, if proved, should not be a ground for the tribunal to reverse 
a just decision of the APC. The reversal amounted to undue reliance on fanciful 
technicalities to undermine SEC in the discharge of its duties. The tribunal's unjust 
decisions will, and certainly do, have a chilling effect on Nigeria capital market. 
Second, the other excuses upon which the tribunal quashed sanction APC imposed 
on the top accounting firm, proven to be guilty of serious accounting and securities 
frauds, are (i) that the APC (of SEC) did not properly evaluate the evidence before 
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reaching its decision, (ii) that APe gave no reasons for its decision, and (iii) APe 
did not indicate the evidence upon which it came to its conclusion, hence APe 
sanction was quashed and the appellant was set free, to go 'sin some more'. 
The premises of the tribunal's second reasoning in Akintola Williams' Deloitte 
Case are abysmally flawed, and the tribunal's conclusions manifestly wrong. The 
flaws poke into the eyes, and beckon for analysis. The second reasoning in 
Akintola Williams Deloitte Case will be briefly analyzed, in two parts, as follows; 
The first part of the second ground the tribunal based its reversal of SEe decision 
in Akintola Williams Deloitte Case is that APe did not properly evaluate the 
evidence before reaching its decision. The tribunal's heavy reliance on improper 
evaluation of evidence appeared in the following passages of its judgment; 
"[tJhe Court of Appeal had, on how a trial court should evaluate 
evidence, held in Glaleye vs Adejumo ... thus: A trial court before 
which evidence is adduced by the parties in a civil case should first 
put the totality of the evidence of both parties on an imaginary scale 
and then see which is heavier ... In determining which is heavier, the 
trial court should have regard to the admissibility, relevance, 
credibility and conclusiveness of the evidence adduced by the 
parties. "346 
346 .See; Akinto1a Williams De10itte v. SEC and Ors, p. 16, supra at page 170 
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Continuing, the tribunal stated that; 
"In the instant appeal, we may not need to repeat all the submissions 
on improper evaluation of evidence. We have looked at the Record of 
Proceedings andjind the oral evidence of the Appellant's witnesses 
h d "347 were parap rase .... 
In conclusion, the tribunal rendered its decision on the issue of 'evaluation of 
evidence' thus; 
"In the instant appeal, we find that APC did not do a proper 
evaluation of all the evidence that were placed before it. This 
invariably impacted on the decision reached thereby. In view of the 
foregoing, we have no hesitation in resolving this issue in favour of 
the Appellant. ,,348 
The tribunal expended much of its valuable judicial energy espousing the well 
known rule on a trial court's proper evaluation of evidence. The law guiding a trial 
court's evaluation of evidence is trite and settled. If the appeal under consideration 
originated from a trial court's decision, the tribunal would have done a good job. 
However, the tribunal shot far off mark. The appeal in Akintola Williams Deloitte 
Case arose, not from a considered judgment of a trial court, but from an 
administrative proceeding conducted by an administrative agency, charged with 
the responsibility of policing the Nigeria capital market. APC of SEC is not a trial 
court. APC need not, and does not, deliver well considered judgments like regular 
347.See; Akintola Williams Deloitte Case, supra at page 170. 
348. Ibid. 
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courts and judicial tribunals, and therefore cannot evaluate evidence like trial 
courts. Policing the market, investigating frauds and malpractices, inspecting 
books and records, and sanctioning market violators, do not tum APC into a trial 
court. The authorities cited by the tribunal accurately represent the law on proper 
evaluation of evidence, but are totally irrelevant to Akintola Williams Deloitte 
appeal. To rely on trivial and inapplicable issue of improper evaluation of evidence 
to reverse APC sanction for Akintola Williams Deloitte's heinous accounting 
frauds is the closest thing to the tribunal's public confession of corruption. 
For the tribunal to so casually set free an appellant who committed for Cadbury PIc 
(in Nigeria) the same heinous accounting and securities frauds Arthur Anderson, 
Inc. committed for Enron Corporation in U.S. and lost its occupationallicense,349 is 
wrongful. To base the judicial bravado on unseemly reasoning that APC " ... 
paraphrased ... " the testimony it obtained during investigation, and that 'APC 
failed to properly evaluate evidence', amounts to extreme judicial immoderation. 
Nothing generates more public opprobrium and oils the current rhythm of national 
cynicism against Nigeria capital market than the unremitting orgies of frauds that 
349. Note; The former global accounting finn, Arthur Anderson, fraud with Enron Corporation led to the demise of both firms. 
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drown the market. Regrettably, the situation is exacerbated by the tribunal's 
abnormal justice policy. Arbitrariness displayed in the tribunal's many judgments 
take toll on the level of confidence it commands from the public, and may have 
been the reason many victims of Nigeria market swindles chose to bear their losses 
with equanimity rather than gamble their fate in the tribunal, and lose twice. 
A retired Nigerian Supreme Court Justice fittingly restated what judges need to do 
to kindle public confidence. He spoke like he was directly addressing the Nigerian 
tribunal, and concluded with the timeless dictum of an eminent English Master of 
Rolls, Lord Alfred Thompson Denning (as he was). According to the retired 
Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court; 
"To inspire public confidence in the judicial process, judges should 
not only be transparently impartial but also should be seen to be 
accentuated only by the principles of justice and fair play. The judge 
should therefore scrupulously eschew bias in any shape or form. It is 
not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental importance, that 
justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly 
be seen to be done. Justice must be rooted in confidence and 
confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking -
"the judge was biased. "350 
350. See; Oputa, Chukwudifu (2002), 'Judicial Ethics and Cannons of Judicial Conduct', published in 'JUSTICE IN THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUSTICE EUGENE UBAEZUONU,' 193, 201 (C.C. Nweze ed.). 
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The zeal with which the Nigerian tribunal sets aside APC sanctions, and reinstate 
big-time securities fraudsters back to the stock market, speaks volume. The 
tribunal's actions speak not only to the porosity and debility of Nigerian securities 
laws, but also reflect on the character and integrity of Nigeria's tribunal judges. A 
vivid image of a corrupt judge is aptly painted by Justice Niki Tobi of Nigerian 
Supreme Court. According to the eminent Justice; 
UfaJ judge who is corrupt is the greatest enemy of the judicial 
process. A corrupt judge is blind to the truth. He is incapable of 
searching for the truth in the judicial process. His mind is diseased 
and he is incapable of doing justice in the matter before him. He likes 
the party who has given him the bribe. He hates the party who has not 
given him the bribe. He therefore, gives judgment to the party he likes 
and gives judgment against the party he hates. "351 
One way to change the current 'wheeler-dealer' mentality that pervades the 
Nigerian securities tribunal is to devise sure means to determine the moral worth of 
persons appointed to serve in the tribunal. Morally upright judges dispense justice 
without fear or favor. A morally upright judge called upon to administer justice 
would resist temptation and do justice even if the law is facially unjust, and even 
when injustice solicits. The desirability for quality individuals to serve as jurists is 
captured in this apposite opinion; 
351. See; Tobi, Niki (2004), 'Code of Conduct and Professional Ethics for Judicial Officers in Nigeria', published in 'JUDICIAL 
EXCELLENCE: ESSA YS IN HONOR OF HON. JUSTICE ANTHONY l. IGUH,' 37, 82-83 (J .0. Irukwu and A.1. Umezulike eds.). 
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"The types of jurists who serve on the bench have a significant impact 
on whether a 'feeling of injustice' exists among the people. 
Regardless of the substantive law applied throughout history, all 
peoples 'seem to have been unanimous in the desire for judges who 
could be trusted to judge justly and without fear or favor.' This is 
because the 'quality of justice ' is more dependent on the quality of the 
individuals administering the law rather than on the 'content of the 
law they administer '. "352 
The second part of the second ground the tribunal based its quashing of APC 
sanction in Akintola Williams Deloitte Case is that APC did not give reason for its 
decision. The tribunal adamantly persisted in the same wrong of misclassifying 
APC of SEC as a trial court. The tribunal's reasons for reversing APC sanction in 
Akintola Williams Deloitte appeal is represented in the following passage; 
"In the instant appeal, the Appellant has argued that APC did not 
consider the sworn declarations made by witnesses for the 
prosecution and defense. Going through the records, this Tribunal 
cannot find that the APC considered and gave reasons for their 
findings and decisions particularly as it relates to the Appellant. This 
issue is therefore resolved in the favor of the Appellant. ,,353 
The tribunal went on a frolic in this part of the judgment. The tribunal made a 
mountain out of improper consideration and evaluation of evidence by an 
352. See; Smith, Lavenski R. (2008), 'Judicial Selection: Its' More About the Choices than Who Does the Chosing'. 30 U.Ark. 
LITTLE ROCK L. Rev. 799, 801. Cited in Oko, Okechukwu (2009) 'Lawyers in Fragile Democracies and the Challenges of 
Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Experience '. Fordham Law Review, vol.77, footnote 39, 1304. 
353. See; Akinto1a Williams De10itte Case, supra at page 170. 
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administrative agency, and, in consequence, upturned APC disciplinary sanction 
against Akintola Williams Deloitte. The decision is contrary to the demand of 
justice. The tribunal, in general, displays arbitrariness in its conception of justice. 
The fact that the tribunal bent backwards in Molten Trust, Nova Securities, 
Olisaemeka, and Akintola Williams Deloitte cases, amongst others, to absolve 
market operators SEC punished for committing worst forms of frauds, without 
minding the seriousness of their offences, and the impact their unmerited release 
would have on sensitivity of Nigeria stock market, point conclusively to the 
tribunal's active ties to the web of frauds that run in Nigeria capital market. 
To use sacred privileges of judicial authority to routinely absolve crooked market 
operators penalized by SEC amount to impartiality, and, is a form of judicial 
corruption. The tribunal's conduct stains the purity of justice, and pollutes the 
integrity and transparency of Nigeria capital market. According to the eloquent 
statement of an eminent Nigerian Supreme Court Justice, 
"[tJhe purity of administration (of justice) is so jealously guarded that 
if there are any circumstances so affecting a person or a body of 
persons called upon to determine the right of fellow human being, as 
to be calculated to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion 
of those person impartiality; those circumstances in themselves and 
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by themselves alone are sufficient to disqualify the person or persons 
from adjudicating. "354 
A tribunal that has held on occasions that the capital market is a very sensitive 
market,355 and emphasized that justice must not be sacrificed for technicality,356 to 
repeatedly invoke shallow technicalities to exonerate the worst securities swindlers 
and return them to the sensitive market, constitutes circumstances that creates in 
the mind of a reasonable man or woman a suspicion of the tribunal's impartiality. 
Nigerian securities tribunal has become a formidable sanctuary for injustice. 
Another area the tribunal spats with Nigeria's SEC, besides the frequent reversal of 
APC sanctions, is on the petty matter of award of costs. The tribunal redoubled its 
assault on SEC by quashing every cost APC awards to SEC to recoup investigation 
and proceedings expenses. Recovering investigations and administrative 
proceedings expenses is one major source of revenue to SEC. The law was hazy 
under the erstwhile 1999 ISA, and the tribunal quashed every cost APC awarded to 
SEC. But later on, under the extant 2007 ISA, SEC became specifically 
empowered to levy costs to cover expenses for administrative proceedings. 
354. See; Oputa JSC (Justice ofthe Supreme Court), (1985), LPDC v. Fawehinmi, 2 NWLR (Pt.?) 300. 
355. See; Union Bank of Nigeria Case, supra at page 150. 
356. Ibid. 
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4.4 Award of Costs to SEC; Nigerian Tribunal's Rivalry with APC and SEC. 
In most appeals lodged in the tribunal against APC sanctions, award of cost to SEC 
formed grounds of appeal. In addition to imposing sanctions against culprits, APC 
also awarded reasonable costs to SEC to defray expenses for investigations and for 
the proceedings. The tribunal reversed every cost APC awarded to SEC in all the 
appeals, as if the tribunal's agenda is to bankrupt SEC. See the following cases; 
4.4.1). Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS) v. SEC;357(2004), the tribunal 
held that; 
"[w]e therefore hold that the order as to cost be set aside. The 
Respondent (SEC) is hereby directed to refund to the Appellant the 
sum of two hundred andfifty thousand naira (N25 0, 000. 00) only paid 
by the Appellant as cost of APC proceedings. The tribunal hereby 
holds that the Respondent is not entitled to award cost to itself, 
accordingly the money paid to it as cost by the Appellant shall be 
refunded to the Appellant within thirty days from the date of this 
judgment. "358 
4.4.2). In Lighthouse Assets Management Company Ltd v. SEC;359 the tribunal 
held that; 
"[h] aving considered the evidence, the points canvassed by counsel 
on both sides and the guiding principles on the award of costs, we 
hold that cost is not for the adjudicating body but the parties. We have 
not only searched through the judicial authorities in Nigeria but also 
the jurisprudence of other Securities Law with similar jurisdiction and 
357. See; (2004) 1 NISLR 41. 
358. Ibid, at 78. 
359. See; (2004) 1 NISLR 81, at 110 
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there is no record where an administrative body performing quasi-
judicial function like SEC awards costs to itself. .. " 
... "The Respondent's counsel submitted that Section 8 (s) of ISA 
empowers SEC to "levy fees or other charges on any person for 
carrying out investments and securities business in Nigeria" and 
argued that this power also includes awarding of cost as a regulatory 
body. It would appear that the drafters of ISA did not intend that the 
award of cost be connoted as "other charges". In the absence of a 
clear provision to this effect this Tribunal is reluctant to import such 
meaning into section 8 (s) of ISA. "360 
4.4.3). Also in FIS Securities Ltd v. SEC;361 (2004), the tribunal held that 
"[hJaving considered the evidence and the points canvassed by 
counsels, costs are not for the adjudicating body but the parties. By 
the provision of ISA of penalty to be awarded by the Commission for 
contravention or violation of the Act, it was not the intent of the Act 
that costs be awarded to the SEC as the Commission is a statutory 
body carrying out its statutory functions. We therefore hold that the 
APC Order awarding costs to SEC be and is hereby set aside. ,,362 
Under the 1999 ISA, APC based award of cost to SEC on the notion that cost 
follows event. On appeals lodged against costs, SEC relied on the tribunal's 
discretion to defend the costs. As the tribunal reversed every cost APC awarded to 
360. See; Lighthouse Assets Management Company Ltd v. SEC, page 110, supra at page 181. 
361. See; (2004) 1 NISLR 165. 
362. Ibid, at p.204, paragraph E, 
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SEC, Counsel to SEC changed tactics in one of the appeals, and urged the tribunal 
to rely on s.8 (s) 1999 ISA to exercise discretion in favor of allowing cost. S.8 (s) 
empowers SEC to "levy fees or other charges on any person for carrying out 
investments and securities business in Nigeria". 363S.8 (s) did not specifically 
authorize SEC to levy cost. No law prohibits APC from awarding cost to SEC. The 
tribunal did not base its rejection of costs on any legal authority. 
However, it may be argued in favor of the tribunal, for rejecting costs, that the 
word "cost" was not specifically used in the provisions of s.8 (s), and therefore the 
tribunal was right in holding that the drafters of the 1999 ISA did not intend the 
Commission to recover costs and expenses. The tribunal stated in Lighthouse 
Assets Management Company Case that "{iJn the absence of a clear provision 
to this effect this Tribunal is reluctant to import such meaning into section 8 (s) 
of ISA. 364 Under the 1999 ISA regime, therefore, the tribunal cannot justifiably be 
vilified for rejecting costs APC awarded to SEC. At that earlier time, too, the 
tribunal could not rightly be accused of hostility towards SEC for rejecting costs. 
363. See; Repealed (1999) ISA, s. 8 (s) .. 
364. See; Lighthouse Assets Management Case, supra at page 181. 
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However, upon coming into force, the 2007 ISA changed the law on SEC powers 
to levy cost. Paragraph (u) 0/ s.13, 2007 ISA,365 vests SEC with powers to; 
H ••• levy fees, penalties and administrative costs 0/ proceedings or 
other charges on any person in relation to investments and securities 
business in Nigeria in accordance with the provisions of this Act. "366 
The ordinary meaning of s.l3 (r) is that from the day the 2007 ISA came into 
force, SEC has powers to levy" ... administrative costs of proceedings .. . "The 
expectation was that thenceforth, the tribunal would uphold any costs APC award 
to SEC. But that is not to be. The tribunal refused to let SEC recoup any cost, even 
in the face of a clear statutory mandate. This is when the tribunal began its hostility 
over cost. The tribunal remained adamant, in defiance of the express provision in 
the 2007 Act which authorizes SEC to levy costs for administrative proceedings. 
As if determined to thwartmg. SEC by all means, the tribunal began inventing 
~ 
reasons to quash costs APC awarded to SEC. In its first ~er cost under the 
provisions of the 2007 ISA, the tribunal abandoned its previous reasons for 
rejecting cost, and, instead, ruled for the first time that cost is 'a special damages 
claim that must be specifically pleaded and proved'. In that decision under the 
new law, the tribunal ruled that; 
365. See; Paragraph (u) ofs.13, 2007 ISA 
366. Ibid. 
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HfaJt any rate, the Tribunal has overruled APC on the issue of cost 
and asked SEC to refund same." H ••• relating to the sum ofN6 million 
being costs and expenses incurred at APC and 1ST for representation. 
This type of claim falls under the category of special damages which 
must be specifically proved ... " HThe Ft Applicant (SEC) has failed to 
comply with this requirement of law. The leg of the claim fails. "367 
The tribunal's decision that a claim for cost" .. .falls under the category of special 
damages which must be specifically pleaded and proved' is a misstatement of the 
law on cost. While the tribunal is right on the law that special damages must be 
specifically pleaded and proved, the tribunal is wrong to hold that cost must be 
specifically pleaded and proved. Cost is not special damages, and is not required to 
be pleaded and proved, like special damages. Costs and special damages are 
different legal concepts, and their rules are entirely different. 
The tribunal's decision denying cost to SEC, in Central Securities Clearing Ltd v. 
Bonkolans Investment Ltd, was reached per incuriam because the tribunal ignored 
provisions of s.13 (u) of ISA 2007 which expressly empowers Nigeria SEC to levy 
fees, penalties, and administrative costs for proceedings . .. ,,368 
367. See; Central Securities Clearing Ltd and Anor v. Bonkolans Investment Ltd and 5 Ors, (2007) 2 NISLR 95, at page 135 
368. See; S.13 (u), ISA2007. 
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The tribunal is primed to seize every opportunity to attack SEC. On occasions, the 
tribunal invents implausible principles of law and flimsy excuses to punish the 
agency. A tribunal which openly sabotages Nigeria's SEC does not mean well for 
Nigeria capital market. Whatever is the tribunal's intention for antagonizing SEC, 
the tribunal's open hostility tarnishes its reputation, undermines SEC, and destroys 
Nigeria capital market. As it stands, it is a no win situation for the trio. 
If there is one provision in the Investments and Securities Act 2007 to which the 
tribunal's unsettling behaviors could mostly be attributed, it is the tribunal's odd 
power to accept money grants and donations from the pUblic. 
4.5 1ST Power to Accept Monetary Gifts and Donations: Affront to Justice. 
S.286, ISA 2007, gives Nigerian securities tribunal a strange power to accept 
monetary grants and contributions from the public. According to s.286; 
H[tlhe Tribunal may accept any grant of money or contributions on 
such terms and conditions if any, as may be specified by the person or 
organization making such grant or contribution provided that the 
terms and conditions are consistent with the functions and objectives 
of the Tribunal. "369 
369. See; S.286, ISA 2007. 
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The reason for vesting the tribunal with powers to accept money and gifts is 
unclear. The 2007 Act is silent on why it is necessary to invest the tribunal, a 
"court of justice", with statutory powers to "accept any grant of money or 
contributions" from any ''person or organization". Worse still, the right to set 
'terms' and 'conditions' of the monetary grants and donations is statutorily vested 
in the persons or organization making the monetary grant or donation. 
How the gift powers would enhance the tribunal's capacity to dispense justice 
fairly and justly is not disclosed. Certainly no benefit can accrue from giving a 
court of justice the authority to accept money from the pUblic. On the contrary, the 
gift mandate renders the tribunal accessible to bribery and corruption. Money 
grants and donations mandates to a tribunal that has exclusive jurisdiction over all 
Nigeria capital market disputes, that sits on appeal over SEC sanctions and 
decisions, and dispenses justice to individuals and entities who commit assorted 
securities violations, exposes the tribunal to infinite tempting by market operators 
entangled with the law. This is an open solicitation for bribery and subornation. 
Mischief inherent in the tribunal's gift powers is heightened by absence of 
guidelines on how the power is to be exercised. No rule is prescribed for exercise 
187 
of the gift powers. Also, no limitations on the amount, or the purpose, and no 
control are placed on the power. In the absence of guidelines, the door is open for 
anybody to freely, and 'legitimately', offer any amount of money or gifts to the 
tribunal, for any reason, as long as the grant and donation meets the imprecise 
requirement that" ... the terms and conditions are consistent with the functions and 
objectives of the tribunal." Nobody or entity is assigned the duty to watch for 
when the term and condition of any gift or donation conforms with the 
H •• .functions and objectives of the tribunal". It does not matter that a donor is 
under SEC investigation, a prospective party to, or an existing party in, a case 
pending before the tribunal. There is no directive whether the gift shall be 
channeled officially through the tribunal's registry, or delivered personally to the 
judges, probably, in their respective homes, or worst, paid into the judges' bank 
accounts - domestic or foreign. There is no requirement to keep record of the gifts 
and donations, or for audit to determine whether there are abuses. The gift power is 
a huge mandate with great ramifications, yet without any modicum of control. 
The gift power opens a floodgate for bribing the tribunal judges. The gift power 
may be responsible for the tribunal's reversal of many sanctions SEC imposed on 
deep-pocket securities fraudsters. Desperate market operators faced with the 
prospect of paying huge fines imposed by APe, suspension or banning from 
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trading, stigma of tarnished image, and possible criminal prosecution and jail time, 
because of securities frauds they committed, would eagerly exploit the gift power 
loophole to pay their way out of trouble with the law. 
In particular, the money and donation mandate could hold the clue to the tribunal's 
routine absolutions of appellants in Akintola Williams Deloitte Case (appellant 
'cooked' accounting books for Cadbury PIc), Nova Securities and Finance Case 
(appellants manipulated AP PIc shares 32 times in two weeks causing $820.4 
million in losses), Olisaemeka Case, Molten Trust Case, and many similar large-
scale fraud cases. In each of the appeals, the tribunal behaved as if it was under 
duress to free the Appellants, and desperate to act to fulfill an obligation. 
4.5.1 Gift Powers not Based on Economic Need: The tribunal's power to accept 
monetary grants and donations is not dictated by economic exigency. 2007 ISA 
made ample provisions for government to fund the tribunal, and also gives the 
tribunal the power to internally generate additional revenues. S.285 (1) of ISA 
2007 provides that; H[t]he Tribunal shall establish and maintain a fund, which 
shall be applied towards the discharge of its functions under this Act. ,,370 
370. See; S.285 (1) ISA 2007. 
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Subsection (2) of s.285 provides further that; 
"[tJhere shall be paid and credited to the fund established under 
subsection (1) of this section (a) annual subventions from the 
Federal Government with respect to recurrent and capital 
expenditure; (b) fees collected for the services rendered by the 
Tribunal under this Act; and (c) such other sums of money as may be 
provided by the Federal Government for the Tribunal. ,,371 
It is clear from s.285 that the tribunal is adequately funded. There is no compelling 
need to vest the tribunal with additional powers to receive money and donations 
from 'persons' and 'organizations', in total disregard to the sensitive nature of the 
tribunal's responsibilities. The tribunal is not starved of funds to warrant 
squandering its prized dignity, integrity, and honor, going 'cap-in-hand' amassing 
gifts and monetary donations from the public. The money gifts under s.286 does 
not forin part of the money the tribunal is required by s.285 (2) to pay and credit 
into the fund for its upkeep pursuant to subsection s.285 (l). Therefore, the gifts 
and donations probably go into private pockets of the tribunal judges. 
The tribunal's issues with money and 'monetized' justice appears to get a boost 
with the bequest of an 'overriding objective' that centers on the 'resources of 
parties' that come before the tribunal. 
371. See; Subsection (2) ofs.285 ISA. 
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4.6 Rule 2(2),(c), 1ST (Procedure) Rules 2003; Money Boost in the Tribunal. 
There is a phrase the tribunal cites with callous relish in many of its judgments. 
The phrase is incorporated into the tribunal's procedure rule, and encapsulates 
what constitutes the overriding objective of the tribunal in dealing with cases 
''fairly and justly". According to Rule 2, (2), (c), of the 1ST (Procedure) Rules, 
2003, dealing with cases fairly and justly, means "dealing with cases in ways 
which are "proportionate to ... the resources of the parties."372The tribunal's 
procedure rule defines the tribunal's overriding objective in dealing with cases 
fairly and justly to mean dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate 
to ... the resources of the parties. This procedure rule constitutes the tribunal's 
mission statement, and the tribunal apparently misconstrues the statement. 
The tribunal had an opportunity to interpret Rule 2, (2) of 1ST (Procedure) Rules 
2003, and regaled in the subjective meaning of the provision.373 The tribunal 
behaves as if its official mission in dispensing justice "fairly and justly" is to 
dispense justice 'in proportion' "to the resources of the parties." Thus, it became 
the tribunal's official policy to dispense justice according to the 'weight of each 
party's pocket '. In effect, the party who offers more money to the tribunal wins. 
Hence, the many arbitrary decisions reversing APe just sanctions. 
372. See; Rule 2, (2), (c) ofInvestments and Securities Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2003. 
373. See; Samuel Osigwe v. Bureau of Public Enterprises, (2004), 1 NISLR 
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4.7 Conclusion. 
The dangers in misinterpreting Rule 2, (2) of 1ST (Procedure Rules) 2003 deepen 
when the rule is read together with the tribunal's power to accept monetary grants. 
Conclusion from a combined reading of the phrase "dealing with cases in ways 
which are proportionate to ... the resources of the parties" and the tribunal's 
unlimited powers to accept money grants and donations under s.286, became that 
the party that offers more money or makes more donation, wins both the tribunal's 
favor and judgment. It does not matter if the money or donation is a bribe. Also, 
joint reading of both provisions lays bare the fallacy that favoring a generous 
benefactor amounts to fair justice, and satisfies the need to deal with cases "fairly 
and justly". Therein lay the reasons for the tribunal's baffling behaviors. 
Misinterpretation of the rule is improper, and contradicts the universal notion of 
justice. The misreading led to boldly offering justice for sale to market operators 
entangled with the law. It breeds fraud and pollutes Nigeria capital market. Justice 
dispensed according to the size of litigants' pockets is jungle justice. True justice is 
predicated entirely on law and on the merit of the facts. Unfortunately, Nigerian 
securities tribunal seizes every chance to trample upon justice. The tribunal's 
behavior is a reflection of the critical policy thrust of Nigerian Investments and 
Securities Acts 1999 and 2007. The Acts are designed solely for fraud. The 
tribunal is merely a macabre contrivance tactically positioned to expedite the well 
planned elaborate fraud. 
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CHAPTERS 
Legislative Infidelity and the N8.ltn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market: 
Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. 
-Part 3-
More Evidence of Contrived Dysfunction: Other Plots that Abet Fraud in 
Nigeria Capital Market. 
5.1 Introduction. 
The basic structure, elemental framework, and the critical strategic policy thrust of 
Nigeria capital market are erected on a foundation of elaborate deceit.374 Nigeria's 
Investments and Securities Act 2007 ('ISA' or '2007 Act') is drenched in 
egregious defects375 that range from surgical expunction of vital antifraud and 
safety-net provisions, detailed incapacitation of SEC, anomalous positioning and 
empowering of Investments and Securities Tribunal (IST), to downright overall 
distortion of Nigeria capital market. The faulty design of Nigeria capital market 
turned the market into an abnormal securities market. Nigeria capital market is 
mired in contrived dysfunction. The deviant arrangement is an offshoot, and a vital 
piece, of the plots of an elaborate securities scheme.376The statutory damage done 
to Nigeria capital market is profound. The damage heralded an elaborate securities 




scheme that was set in motion by the 2005 forced mergers and consolidations of 
Nigerian banks,377 and ultimately led to the 2008 crash of Nigeria stock market. 
The wheels of Nigeria's securities racket still grinds steadily, and surely unabated. 
Besides the plots designed into Nigeria's (repealed 1999 and the) extant, 2007 ISA, 
the weakening of Nigeria's SEC,378 tactical positioning of the securities tribunal,379 
the tribunal's odd power to accept monetary gifts and donations from the public,380 
and the tribunal's complicitous acquittal of deep-pocket securities fraudsters,381 
other smaller but potent plots also exist and abet the massive fraud that thrives in 
Nigeria capital market. Those diverse smaller plots facilitated the N8.1 tn ($60bn) 
'hot money cycle' fraudulent scheme382 which crashed Nigeria stock market. The 
array of smaller plots also bolsters the pattern of incorrigibility and sense of 
invincibility that reign amongst fraudulent operators in Nigeria capital market. 
Most of the smaller plots in Nigeria capital market are designed into the provisions 
of Nigerian securities statutes. Many are delicately built into the structure of the 
377.Note;Nigerian banks were forced into hasty mergers and consolidations in 2005. Many were closed for missing the deadline. 
378. See; S. 1, s.3,(1),(a)-(f),s.5(1),(2),(3)and(4), s.6, and s.9(1) and (2) ISA 2007. See also; Chapter 3, pp. 109-121 of this paper. 
379. See; S.284,(1),(a)-(f), s.289,(1), ISA, supra at footnote 5. See also Chapter 4, pp. 145 & 146 of this paper for a full analysis. 
380. See; S.286, ISA, supra. See also Chapter 4, pp. 186-189 for a full discussion. 
381. See; Chapter 3, pp.147-185 of this paper for a full discussion. 
382. See; In general chapters 1,2,3, and 4 of this paper for full discussion. 
194 
securities tribunal. Other plots exist in the form of self-serving, cartel-interest, 
rules and subsidiary legislations. While the rest manifest in contemptible conducts 
of securities market agencies and complicit officials. A common feature to all the 
smaller plots is that, with skillful accuracy, each of the small plots surgically 
targets and disables particular vital safety-net and anti-fraud devices needed in 
Nigeria capital market. Origin and consequences of the smaller plots are in some 
instances distinct and circumscribed. In other instances, they interlace the entire 
spectrum of Nigeria capital market. Analysis of few of the supplementary plots 
will show their individual links to the larger securities racket that runs in Nigeria 
capital market. The additional plots include; 
5.2 Size of the Investments and Securities Tribunal; A Means of Obstructing 
Access to Justice. 
Size of Nigerian securities tribunal is one innocent-looking plot that defeats the end 
of justice. The tribunal judges are few in number. And, the limited number of the 
tribunal judges impedes access to justice. S.275 (1), and s.276 (1) and (2), of the 
2007 Act, deal with composition and constitution of Nigerian securities tribunal.383 
S.275 (1) provides that the tribunal shall consist of ten persons,384 while s.276 (1) 
stipulates that for the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the tribunal shall be 
383. See; S.275,(1), and 8.276, (1) and (2), ISA. 
384. S.276,(1), ibid. 
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duly constituted if it consists of not less than three (3) members.385The joint 
meaning of sections 275(1) and 276(1) is that the total number of judges in the 
tribunal is ten (10), while each duly constituted panel of the tribunal shall comprise 
of three judges or more. The highest number of panels of judges the tribunal can 
constitute is three (3), since the judges are statutorily limited to ten. The three-
panels tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over all securities disputes and matters in 
the entire Nigeria.386 Market participants and corporations solicit and draw large 
customer pool from far-flung nooks and comers of Nigeria through branch offices, 
agents, surrogates, internet, print and electronic media. Smaller stock-trading 
exchanges named 'Capital Trading Points' also exist all over the nation. Securities 
disputes arise from all across Nigeria. Only the three panels of the tribunal exist to 
adjudicate over all the disputes that occur in the big Lagos stock exchange and in 
the numerous capital trading points, and stock brokerage firms that operate all 
across Nigeria. With the best of intentions and effort, it is pragmatically impossible 
for only three panels of the tribunal to adjudicate over all the numerous securities 
disputes that arise in Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa's largest country with a population 
of over 150 million.387 Add Nigeria's vast population to the unguarded infomercials 
ferociously mounted in the hay-days of the stock-trading frenzy, which misled 
385.See; S.276,(1), ISA 2007 
386.See; S.284,(1),(a)-(t), and s.289(1), ISA 2007 
387. See; U.S. State Dpt. 2010 Country Report on Investment Climate; http://www.state.gov/e/eeblrls/othr/ics/2010/138123.htm 
(03/2011) 
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many Nigerians to believe that the stage-managed and over-hyped stock market 
was the definitive thicket to achieving their economic hopes and dreams. Nigerians 
wagered all their life savings, nest-eggs, business capitals, retirement benefits, 
borrowed funds, margin loans and more, without restraint. Many sold landed 
properties and other earthly possessions and hurled the proceeds into the pit of the 
speculative frenzy. Diaspora Nigerians funneled tons of money from all over the 
world into the raging stock market. They were all callously swindled. Considering 
the countless frauds, violations, and grievances that occur in Nigeria capital 
market, three-panel tribunal is grossly inadequate. Many grievances are, inevitably, 
sacrificed for expediency. Too many abuses and complaints would fall through the 
cracks, and never see the light of day. The fact that the tribunal occasionally sits on 
rotational assizes between Abuja and Lagos does not touch the tip of the iceberg. 
The scanty panel arrangement appeared first in the 1999 Act. It is obviously a key 
component of the bigger securities scheme-legislative infidelity par excellence. 
The tribunal arrangement would not elude detection if it was unintentional. If the 
size of the tribunal was an oversight in the repealed 1999 Act, the mistake would 
have been discovered and corrected in the subsequent 2007 Act. On the contrary, 
the arrangement was deliberately put in place to serve as solid impediment to 
access to justice for the numerous aggrieved investors and to protect market 
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operators in Nigeria capital market. The insufficient tribunal left most investors 
without legal recourse. The limit in the number of the judges squandered the 
tribunal's usefulness, and created opportunity that allowed many dishonest market 
operators to escape justice. Lawyers would have kicked against the insufficient 
judges of the tribunal if not that lawyers themselves were cleverly shortchanged. 
5.3 Constraining Lawyers and Clients; Further Obstruction of Access to 
Justice. 
One bold demonstration of problems that arose from mismanagement of Nigeria 
capital market is the blanket prohibition of lawyers from appearing in the securities 
tribunal, and from practicing law in the securities sector.388The only exception is 
for lawyers who are specially permitted by the capital market authority.389 S.313 
(1) of the Investments and Securities Act 2007 empowers SEC to " ... make rules 
and regulations for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the 
Act ... ,,390There is nothing in s.313 nor in any other section of Nigeria's securities 
statute that require lawyers to get permission before dealing in securities matters. 
388. See; Rule 39, SEC Rules and Regulations Pursuant to Investments and Securities Act 1999. 
389.lbid. 
390. See; S.313,(I), ISA. 
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S.313 (1) is in pari materia with similar provisions in ss. 29 (1) and 30 of the 
repealed 1999 ISA. Pursuant to the provisions of the repealed ISA now reenacted 
in the 2007 ISA as s.313 (1), SEC promulgated "Security and Exchange 
Commission Rules and Regulations Pursuant to Investments and Securities Act 
1999. ,,]91 Rule 39 of the SEC Rules and Regulations prescribes that only lawyers 
interviewed, selected, and registered with the SEC would be allowed to represent 
clients in securities matters.392 All other lawyers are precluded from practicing in 
securities related matters. 
Rule 39, in effect, requires all lawyers in Nigeria to first apply, be interviewed, and 
be selected by SEC or its designated agents, before they can practice law in 
securities related matters. However, Rule 39 fails to lay down any criterion for the 
interview. The interviewers are not required to be law professionals, or to assign 
reasons for their decisions accepting or rejecting a lawyer. The interviewers are 
market operators, their agents, and surrogates. The interview is based entirely on 
arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. The requirement is draconian 
unlawful, and absolutely of no benefit to Nigeria capital market and investors. 
391. See; SEC Rules and Regulations, supra at page 198. 
392. See; Rule 39, SEC Rules and Regulations, ibid. 
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Lawyers traditionally detest unwarranted interference with their noble profession. 
Predictably, most Nigerian lawyers avoided the whimsical interview, preferring to 
stay away from the securities sector. All carders of Nigerian lawyers became 
discouraged and deterred by the unusual screening requirement. The plot to divert 
lawyers away from the surreptitious securities scheme, from Nigeria capital 
market, and from the securities tribunal was accomplished in one clean sweep. 
A lawyer's right to practice law in Nigeria is governed by the Legal Practitioners' 
Act, 1962.393 The Legal Practitioners' Act 1962 and the Legal Practitioners Council 
established under the Act regulates the practice of law in Nigeria. The Act 
empowers Nigerians duly trained in law in Nigerian Universities and in recognized 
foreign universities to practice law in Nigeria. The only conditions are that each 
lawyer must first train in, and pass the compulsory Nigerian Law School's 
administered bar examination, be duly called to Nigerian Bar, be enrolled in the 
Supreme Court, and remain in good standing.394 Nigerian securities Act does not 
contain any provision pertaining to law practice in the securities sector, or 
mandating the interview of Nigerian lawyers. Reason for excluding lawyers could 
be to hide the securities frauds from prying eyes of lawyers. 
393. See; Council of Legal Education; the Legal Practitioners' Act, 1962. 
394. Ibid. 
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Collaterally, the interview prerequisite that impedes lawyers also impacts clients' 
rights to hire lawyers of their own choice. Lawyer of the clients' choice may be 
amongst the many lawyers that preferred not to subject themselves to the 
interview. Or, who may have attended and unjustifiably failed the interview. An 
aggrieved client will, in that circumstance, be left with the only option of hiring 
strange lawyers who passed the interview, an option that is fraught with many 
problems for the client. Hence, the odd interview and pre-approval requirement 
also constitute impermissible constraint on clients' access to justice, and an 
inexcusable breach of the clients' constitutional due process rights. The interview 
requirement represents additional method of ensuring that aggrieved investors are 
left with little opportunities to have their day in court, albeit, in the tribunal. 
But, a prominent Nigerian lawyer and retired law professor would not endure a 
personal humiliation that arose from SEC's draconian interview rule. The eminent 
lawyer, and seasoned law professor, did not apply for the SEC interview. SEC 
denied him an opportunity to represent a bank which hired his law firm to assist 
and advise the bank in the process of listing in the capital market. The senior 
lawyer challenged SEC's action in the Federal High Court (equivalence of U.S. 
District Court), claiming declaratory reliefs and anticipatory damages. He roundly 
won the case both in the court of first instance and on appeal in the Nigerian Court 
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of Appeal. (SEC v. Prof A.B. Kasunmu, SAN (Practicing under the name and style 
of Prof A.B. Kasunmu's Chambers) and Attorney-General of the Federation).395 
SEC appealed further to the Nigerian Supreme Court. SEC's appeal against the 
Court of Appeal judgment is still hanging precariously in Nigerian Supreme Court. 
In the above suit, the Federal High Court's judgment that "Rule 39 of the SEC 
Rules requiring registration of solicitors (with SEC prior to practicing law in 
securities sector) is ultra vires the SEC, and therefore void because there is no 
enabling power to regulate solicitors under the substantive provisions of section 29 
of the ISA " was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 396 SEC appealed against the High 
Court judgment to the Court of Appeal, and lost, hence, SEC's further appeal to the 
Nigerian Supreme Court. Rule 39 of the SEC Rules have not yet been amended or 
repealed. SEC is probably waiting to exhaust its rights of appeal, before bringing 
the rule in conformity with the courts judgments, if at all. Meanwhile obstruction 
of lawyers continues. 




5.4 Stifling Robust Shareholders Activism; Repressing 'Citizen Police'. 
Shareholder activism is an unofficial but powerful anti-fraud and safety-assurance 
measure that coexists with other regulatory procedures in the capital market. 
Vigilant shareholders constitute a veritable source through which regulatory 
authorities become aware of numerous infractions that would have otherwise 
evaded detection in the market place, and inside the inner confines of public 
companies. Shareholders are known to be whistleblowers, 'citizen' police', and 
'private attorney-generals', for promptly detecting and challenging improper 
conducts of corporate executives and market operators. Robust and independent 
shareholder activism is popular, and deliberately encouraged as an important 
component of market regulatory arrangement. Traditionally, there is no love lost 
between shareholders associations and corporate executives, and market operators. 
In general, dishonest market operators and unscrupulous corporate executives 
resent shareholder activists, and would go to any length to stifle shareholder 
activism, if they found the opportunity. 
S.310 (1) of the Investments and Securities Act 2007 empowers SEC to appoint 
Committees for its operations.397 Paragraph 2 (1) of the First Schedule to the 
397. See; S.310,(1), ISA 
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2007 Act also made similar provision.398 Pursuant to powers granted by the Act in 
the two provisions, SEC set up the Committee of Regulatory Agencies in the 
financial sector, an ad-hoc committee. The Committee comprises of the SEC, 
Central bank of Nigeria (CBN), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) , Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) , and the 
Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE).399 Neither Nigerian shareholders association 
nor their representatives were included in the Committee's deliberations, nor 
invited to participate. Members of the Committee are principally professional 
investment bankers, market operators, and corporate executives with invested 
interests that are adversarial to the interests of shareholders. Composition of the 
committee was not counterbalanced by inclusion of representatives of shareholders 
associations or other independent interests. 
The Committee of Regulatory Agencies was given six terms of reference which 
are; "(a) [t]o review the relevance of Shareholders' Associations vis-a-vis the 
original objectives of establishing them. (b) To identify the challenges posed by 
the activities of Shareholders' Associations in the Nigerian Capital Market. (c) 
To make recommendationsfor appropriate regulatory oversight (scope and type) 
398. See; Paragraph 2 (1) of the First Schedule to ISA 2007. 
399. See; (Unpublished) Report of the Committee of Regulatory Agencies in financial sector. 
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on their activities. (d) To formulate workable guidelines for the Associations' 
registrations and operations. ( e) To examine the funding arrangements for their 
activities, and (t) To make recommendations on the modalities for 
sponsoring/implementing enlightenment and other educational programmes on 
their rights and responsibilities as well as their role on Corporate Governance 
implementation.,,40o 
Key phrases in each of the above six terms of reference conceal self-serving 
agenda. To understand the motive behind embarking on its mission, composition of 
the Committee of Regulatory Agencies must be put in proper perspective. The 
Committee comprises almost entirely of accomplices and the same entrenched 
interests that designed the chaotic Nigeria's SEC system, set up the odd Investment 
and Securities Tribunal, crafted the distorted market regulatory frameworks, and 
foisted the dysfunctional capital market arrangement on Nigeria. Their intentions 
towards the shareholders associations cannot be any different. The committee 
membership constitutes top echelon of the cabal that controls and profits from the 
malfunctioning Nigerian financial sectors. They defend entrenched interests that 
diametrically conflict with the general interests of ordinary Nigerian shareholders 
and citizens. Shareholders associations arose out of the fierce urgency to redress 
400. See; Unpublished Commjttee Report, supra at page 204. 
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wanton excesses of the Nigerian financial-sector cabal. Nigerian shareholders 
associations organized themselves in lawful ways that make them strong, and best 
advance their common interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ways that 
maximally protect shareholders associations do not suit the adversarial interests of 
the Nigerian financial market operators and corporate executives. Setting up a 
committee comprising solely of financial market operators to design binding code 
of conducts for Nigerian shareholders associations is inherently dishonest. 
"Activities of shareholders associations" in the Nigeria capital market consist 
mainly of vigilance in detecting fraudulent and relational infractions by corporate 
executives and market operators. Shareholders associations comprise merely of an 
ensemble of minority shareholders led by individuals who understand the intrigues 
of corporate management, and the need to work together as a group to protect their 
combined little investments. The protection of common interest is the gravamen of 
" ... the challenges posed by the activities of Shareholders' Associations ... " which 
the Committee of Regulatory Agencies is set up to " .. .identify ... ", and to stop. As 
a collection of small shareholders, shareholders associations do not shape corporate 
policies nor pose any threat to the capital market, to deserve such negative official 
attention. The committee eventually enacted a draconian code of conduct that 
literally' killed' the traditional shareholders usefulness in Nigeria. 
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5.4.1 Code of Conduct for Shareholders Associations in Nigeria. 
The Code of Conduct for Shareholders' Associations401 ('Code of Conduct'), 
promulgated by the Committee of Market Regulators, satiated the cabal's wish to 
stifle Nigerian shareholders associations. The promulgated Code of Conduct is 
designed in three parts. Part 1 covers 'Establishment and Membership of 
Shareholder Associations ',402 and consists of twelve paragraphs. Five-paragraph 
part 2 is titled 'Attendance of Annual or Extra-Ordinary General Meetings of 
Public Companies '.403 Finally, 'Membership of Audit Committee' is the title of the 
three paragraphs part 3.404 A stand alone section 4 completes the document.4os The 
document gags shareholders associations and struck them where it hurt most. 
5.4.2 S.40 1999 Nigerian Constitution: Before summarizing the provisions of the 
Code of Conduct, let me first mention s.40 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
which guarantees H[rJight to peaceful assembly and association" to all Nigerians. 
SAO provides that "[eJvery person shall be entitled to assemble freely and 
401. See; Unpublished Code of Conduct for Shareholders Associations promulgated by Committee of Market Regulators. 
402. See; Part I, ibid. 
403. See; Part 2, ibid. 
404. See; Part 3, ibid. 
405. See; S.4, ibid. 
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associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any 
political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his 
interests. ,,406 It is in exercise of the constitutionally protected rights under sAO that 
Nigerian investors organized themselves into shareholders associations and 
registered with the appropriate government agencies as required by law. It is the 
enjoyment of this constitutional right that the Committee of Regulatory Agencies 
set out to extinguish, through formulation of the harsh Code of Conduct. 
5.4.3 Analysis of the Code of Conduct for Shareholders: Part 1 of the Code of 
Conduct titled 'Establishment and Membership of Shareholders Associations' 
stipulates in relevant parts that " ... not less than 50 shareholders of public 
companies ... " shall be the minimum number of persons that can form a 
shareholders association.407 This provision connotes that 49 or less number of 
Nigerian citizens are forbidden from organizing themselves into shareholders 
associations for the protection of their common interests guaranteed under sAO of 
the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. A minimum of 5 persons shall be the Trustees.408 
406. See; S.40, (1999) Nigerian Constitution Promulgation Decree, 1999 Laws of Nigeria. 
407. See; Part 1, Code of Conduct for Shareholders Associations, supra at page 207. 
408. Ibid. 
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The Executive Committee shall be 10 or less officers constituted through an 
electoral process.409 Tenure of office of officers of the association shall be limited to 
" ... two terms of 3 years and such a shareholder shall not be eligible for election 
until the expiration of 3 years after his six year term. "410 The association shall 
maintain books of accounts which shall be subject to annual audit by a qualified 
auditor.411The association shall file annual returns like incorporated trustees.412 It 
shall also file annual reports of its activities with the SEC.413 The association must 
meet at least twice a year.414 These are scare tactics intended to intimidate citizens. 
Part 2 titled Attendance of Annual or Extra-Ordinary General Meetings of Public 
Companies provides that members and officers of shareholders' associations 
should conduct themselves with decorum during AGM or EGM of their 
companies.415Provisions of the shareholders Code of Conduct show that Nigerian 
shareholders are by far more stringently regulated than corporate executives, 
market operators, and SEC board combined. 






415. See; Part II, Code of Conduct, supra, footnote 402. 
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Part 3 titled Membership of Audit Committee provides in pertinent part that 
membership of Audit Committee shall be one term of three (3) years subject to 
good performance. A shareholder who is member of Audit Committee shall not be 
eligible for re-election until expiration of 3 years after his term.416 Shareholders 
. Associations shall ensure that the internal control system of the companies in 
which they are shareholders, are effective. The foregoing constitute overregulation. 
Section 4 of the Code of Conduct commands that all shareholders associations 
shall adopt the code of conduct in their constitution, and that the regulatory 
authorities would only recognize shareholders associations which comply with the 
provisions of the code of conduct. 417 
The above diktats of the Code of Conduct for shareholders associations raise 
serious issues the least of which is opportunistic propagation of adversarial self-
interest. It is wrong to mandate market operators and cabal of corporate executives, 
with entrenched opposing interests, to design binding rules intended to encumber 
shareholders associations. Again, the Code of Conduct is facially 
416. See; Part III, Code of Conduct, supra at page 207. 
417. See; S.4, Code of Conduct, ibid. 
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unconstitutional because it conflicts with sAO of Nigerian 1999 Constitution, 
which gives Nigerians unfettered right to form and belong to any association for 
the protection of their interests. To enact code of conduct that unduly interferes 
with the citizens' enjoyment of their right to peaceful assembly and association 
amount to a violation of the citizen's constitutional right. The code of conduct is 
inconsistent with the express provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
Supremacy clause of the Nigerian Constitution provides that the Constitution is 
supreme and binding on all authorities and persons in Nigeria.418 Subsection (3) 
thereof provides that "[iJf any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
constitution, the constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of 
the inconsistency be void. "419Being inconsistent with sAO of the Nigerian 
Constitution, the Code of Conduct for Nigerian shareholders associations is void to 
the extent of the inconsistency. Stifling Nigerian shareholders with the 'Code of 
Conduct' is a genre of legislative infidelity and use of law as instrumentality of 
exploitation and fraud. The situation left Nigeria capital market without the 
important vigilance and monitoring contributions robust and unrestrained 
shareholders activism brings to securities market policing. 
418. See; Subsection (1), s.l, (1999) Nigerian Constitution 
419. See; Subsection (3), ibid. 
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5.5 Damndest Conflict of Interest Situations: When the Regulator Doubles as 
the Regulated. 
Conflict of interest ranks high amongst the epidemic of maladies that afflicts 
Nigeria capital market. Capital market is a very sensitive market.420 It is susceptible 
and very sensitive to frauds and corruption.421The threshold of integrity and 
transparency required in the market place is high. Like Cesar's wife, market 
regulators must not only be above board, they must be seen to be above board, in 
order to meet the requisite integrity benchmark for their enormous responsibilities. 
Owing to the sensitive nature of their duty, market regulators must eschew every 
semblance of impropriety. To ensure transparency, integrity, and orderliness, and 
safeguard the interest of investors, conflict of interest situations are traditionally 
forbidden in the capital market. However, consistent with impunity that reigns in 
Nigeria capital market, sacred rules against conflict of interest are drastically 
stripped down in Nigerian securities laws. The result is that principal regulators, 
without restraint, simultaneously hold conflicting positions both as principal 
regulators and major operators in the market, with resulting negative impacts on 
Nigeria capital market. Market operators also shuttle between market regulation 
and plum positions in boards of big public corporations, which positions are 
usually negotiated in advance while the regulators are still in office. 
420. See; Union Bank of Nigeria Ptc. v. SEC, (2004), 1 NISLR 115 at 161. 
421.lbid, 
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One example of the many unrestrained conflict of interest situations in Nigeria 
capital market is the case of the current Chairman of Nigeria's SEC. The SEC 
Chairman is at the same time a fulltime paid board member of several traded 
corporations he regulates in the capital market. To mention a few, he is a paid 
board member of Unilever Nigeria PLC, Vice Chairman of Linkage Assurance, 
and later became the substantive Chairman and an Executive Officer of UACN 
PLC, all blue-chip corporations whose shares are traded in Nigeria capital market, 
and, all of which are under the regulatory supervision of SEC and its board of 
Commission.422 SEC Chairman's multiple conflicted interests became so upsetting 
to the Nigerian public that Chairman of Nigeria's Senate Committee on Capital 
Market personally petitioned Nigeria's Minister of State for Finance over the SEC 
Chairman's embarrassing situation.423 
Another barefaced multiple conflicts of interest situation in Nigeria capital market 
is the appalling case of the immediate past Director-General (,D-G') and Chief 
Executive of Nigeria Stock Exchange (,NSE'), the "Cupidity Queen" of Nigeria 
capital market. This top officer's finger is in every single securities pie in Nigeria. 
This topmost officer is uniquely responsible, more than any other individual, or 
422. Note; Revelation of SEC Chairman's many conflicting positions came from Nigerian Senator's petition, infra. 
423. See; Senate Petitions Finance Ministry Over Udoma's 'conflict of interst' in 
http://odili.net/news/source/2010/feb/l11810.html (06/2010) 
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entity, for all the troubles and tribulations that beset Nigeria capital market. The 
ex -Director General and Chief Executive of Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) was in 
that capacity the official head of Nigeria's Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs). 
In reality, she is 'the goddess' of Nigeria capital market, in office or out of office. 
While holding office as D-G, she also held office as the executive Chairman of 
Central Securities Clearing Systems PIc (CSCS), a money-spinning monopoly that 
exclusively clears and settles every single unit of securities transaction that is 
executed in Nigeria capital market.424She decides her company's commissions and 
reaps obscene profit from each unit of transaction. As part of the successes of her 
maneuverings, her majority-owned425 Central Securities Clearing Services PIc 
(CSCS) steadily reaps humongous profits even when the stock market crashed with 
a colossal loss ofN8 trillion ($60 billion), and counting. 
Contrary to the ill-fated capital market, CSCS, paradoxically, continues to reap 
exponential windfalls in obscene profits. The DG ostensibly used her conflicted 
positions to enhance the fortunes of her vast financial empire. In its 2009 annual 
report released in 2010,426 CSCS recorded a turnover of N11.15 billion ($78 
million), a staggering 35% increase from the previous year's performance, at the 
424. Note; DG NSE owns CSCS Pic which has absolute monopoly for clearing and settlement of all securities traded in Nigeria. 
425. Note; ex-DG NSE owns majority shares in CSCS PIc and Transcorp, dominates and controls Nigeria capital market. 
426. Note; CSCS Pic reported phenomenal increases in profits, in its 2009 annual report, amidst the stock market's ghastly crash. 
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same time Nigeria stock market suffered cataclysmic implosion. Profit after tax 
rose to N4.2 billion ($29.4 million), a 15% increase from the previous year's N3.58 
billion ($25.08 million). CSCS shareholders' fund rose from N6.88 billion in 2007 
to NI0.61 billion in 2008, while its total assets rose to N15.49 billion from NIO 
billion in the previous year.427CSCS PIc's Annual Financial Report presented at the 
company's Annual General Meeting held in Lagos, contain details of the above 
figures. It bears to repeat that CSCS's stellar performance and increased profits 
occurred in the midst of Nigeria stock market crisis. Consider these stellar earnings 
along the fact that CSCS does no other business except clearing transactions in the 
crisis-ridden capital market. 
Moreover, the DG NSE is also the Chairman and CEO of Transnational 
Corporation of Nigeria PIc (Trans corp ), an infamous shell corporation428that was 
falsely advertised during its IPO to be the greatest business venture ever to happen 
in Nigeria.429Transcorp was subsequently used to swindle numerous innocent 
investors misled by the false hypes.43o The ex-DG represents the unhappy face of 
Nigeria capital market, and all the market's many troubles and failings. 
427. See; See also page 56 of ThisDay newspaper, Vol. 14, No. 5254 of Thursday September 10,2009, which reported news of 
CSCS Pic AGM, quoting one Dr. Ndii Okereke-Onyiuke (the then D-G, NSE, reveling on the profits of one of her companies). 
428. Note; Shell Corporations are 'brief-case corporations' generally used to acquire other corporations or to commit frauds. 
429. Note; Transcorp was hyped to have profitable business interests in 'everything under the sun', which turned out to be false. 
430. Note; In the case of Transcorp, it was used to commit massive securities and financial frauds in Nigeria. 
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Yet, another semblance of impropriety that deserves mention is the past Chairman 
of Nigeria Stock Exchange who left office and immediately assumed the leadership 
mantle as Chairman of board of directors of First Bank of Nigeria PIc, the largest 
bank in Nigeria. It is improbable that, without a prior arrangement and quid pro 
quo while in office, a top market regulator will step down as Chairman of Nigeria 
Stock Exchange and walk straight into the plum position of Chairman of Nigeria's 
largest bank. The arrangement must have been concluded when he was in office. 
Numerous instances of conflict of interest situations abound in Nigeria capital . 
market. The situation trigger serious problems that pollute Nigeria capital market, 
and have far-reaching consequences on market integrity, transparency, orderliness, 
and fair and equitable principles of trade. The above occurrences are possible in 
Nigeria because the universal standard and international best practices of 
proscribing direct and indirect conflict of interest dealings in the capital market 
were eliminated from Nigerian securities statutes. Rather, provisions that 
encourage carders of regulators to abuse their offices and engage in corruptions 
were dramatically infused into Nigerian Investments and Securities Acts. S.ll (1) 
(a) and (b) of the 2007 Act merely require any member of SEC board who has 
interest in affairs of any public company being deliberated upon by the board, or 
interested in any proposed contracts, to disclose the nature of hislher interest to the 
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Commission during their meeting.431 Subsection (2) (a) and (b) simply prescribes 
that such disclosure shall be recorded in the minute, and that the member shall not 
participate in deliberations on the subject of the disclosure.432 Also, that the 
member shall be excluded for purposes of counting the quorum on the subject 
matter.433 Disclosure of interest and prohibition from voting on self-interested 
matters do not eliminate other methods of peddling influence inside the board-
room. Implicit in the provisions is that members of the board of commission of 
SEC enjoy unrestrained rights to engage in conflict of interest activities, provided 
they disclosed their interests in the corporations or contracts to each other during 
SEC deliberations. No limits or guidelines are set to monitor the conflicts. This is 
another loophole created to tarnish Nigeria capital market. Abuse of conflict of 
interest rules constitutes one nagging matter that destroys Nigeria capital market. 
5.6 Power of Nigeria's SEC to Accept Monetary Gifts and Donations. 
S.22 (1), ISA 2007 empowers Nigeria's SEC to accept gifts, which may include 
money, from the public. This provision replicates for Nigeria's SEC a similar 
mandate given to the Investments and Securities Tribunal. The only limitation 
placed on Nigeria's SEC power to accept gifts is a vague requirement that the 
431. See; S.11,(1), (a), and (b), ISA. 
432. See; S.11,(2), (a), and (b), ISA. 
433. Ibid. 
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donors shall not attach conditions that are inconsistent with the functions and 
objectives of the Commission.434 The Act conveniently avoided to define what it 
meant by conditions that are inconsistent (( ... with the functions and objectives of 
the Commission." No agency or independent body is designated to determine when 
this imprecise condition is met or breached. There is no rational basis for 
empowering SEC to receive monetary and other gifts from the public especially in 
the notoriously corrupt environment of the capital market. This gift mandate opens 
the door to official bribery and corruption. Giving Nigeria's SEC the power to 
accept money from the public is an official endorsement of bribery and corruption. 
The mandate opens an avenue for market operators and corporate executives who 
are in trouble with the law to easily reach out and offer bribe to SEC staff and 
Commissioners. The mandate does not come with any benefit. It rather breeds 
fraud and corruption, and further pollutes the already befouled market. 
5.7 Absence of Private Rights of Action; A Grave Loophole in Nigerian Law. 
Private right of action is an important remedy that augments securities market 
regulation. Importance of private right of action as a remedy for regulating 
securities market was recognized two centuries ago. Early in the evolution of 
securities market regulation, English Parliament developed the concept of civil 
434. See; S.22,(1), ISA 
218 
liabilities of corporate executives, and included private rights of action as core 
component.435 English Parliament passed the 1890 Directors Liability Act36 (later 
incorporated into the Companies Act), whose purpose it was to modifY the 
common law of deceit, as it had been applied by the House of Lords the previous 
year in Derry v. Peek,437 so as to subject corporate directors and promoters to civil 
liability for untrue statements in the prospectus without proof of scienter.438 
Also, in recognition of the importance of private right of action in regulation of 
securities market, U.S. Securities Act of 1933 contains a number of private 
remedies for investors who are injured due to violations of the Act. 439 (See: 
sections 11, 15 U.S.C.A. s.77k, for material misstatements and omissions in 
registration statements; section 12 (a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. s.77(a)(1), for securities 
sold in violation of the registration requirements, and section 12(a)(2), 15 
U.S.C.A. s.771(a)(2), creating an action by purchasers against their sellers for 
material misstatements or omissions.44o 
435. See; Bloomenthal, Harold S. (2008), Securities Law Handbook (2008-2009 ed.), VoU, 8. 
436. See; (1890), 53&54 Viet., ch.64 
437. See; (1889), 11 App. Cas. 337 
438. See; Bloomenthal (2008), supra. 
439. See; (1933) Securities Act, s.11, 15 U.S.C.A. s.77k, s.12 (a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. s.77(a)(1), s.12(a)(2), 15U.S.C.A. s.77I(aO(2), 
See also Hazen, Thomas L. (2006), The Law of Securities Regulation, 2. 
440. Hazen, Thomas L. (2006), ibid. 
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In addition to the express statutory provisions, United States Supreme Court also 
recognizes implied right of private remedy (private right of action) in provisions of 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act 1934 that do not expressly provide so. The 
provisions include s.14 (a), s.10 (b), s.17 (a) (2) and (3) of the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934, and Rule 1 Ob-5. See J.I. Case Co v. Borak,441 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Curran,442 and Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. 
Berner,443 
Moreover, United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
established a separate set of "rules" of civil procedure for private actions initiated 
under the Securities acts so that, thenceforth, the rules of procedure that govern a 
private action for securities fraud in the federal court will be found in large part in 
the PSLRA, whereas in all other civil actions, in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.444 The PSLRA, in an effort to keep plaintiffs from unduly exploiting 
deep pocket defendants, redefines how liability is to be apportioned among 
defendants and prospective defendants if liability is found under the Exchange Act 
(and in a limited area under s.ll of the Securities Act).445 
441. See; (1964),377 U.S. 426. 
442. See; (1982),456 U.S. 353. 
443.See; (1985),472 U.S. 299. See also, Cox, Hillman, Langevoort, (2006), Securities Regulation Cases and Materials, 1066-69. 
444. See; Bloomenthal and Wolff, Securities and Federal Corporate Law, (2d ed.), s.16:40. 
445. Ibid. 
220 
Again, separate but identical provisions are applicable to private actions under the 
Securities Act and under the Exchange Act (Pub. L. No. 104-67 s.102, adding 
s.27A to the Securities Act and s.21E to the Securities Exchange Act).446 
Furthennore, United States also added other layers of fences against securities 
frauds and corruption in its array of laws. One such notable additional defense is 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 1970,447 as a 
means of curbing organized crime's infiltration and corruption of legitimate 
businesses as well as the use of certain so-called racketeering activities in the 
conduct ofbusiness.448 RICO quickly became a potent weapon because among the 
violations included within RICO's definition of racketeering activity is securities 
fraud.449 S.1962 of RICO, in sum, has four distinct prohibitions: It prohibits using 
or investing income obtained from "a pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire an 
interest in an "enterprise," engaged in or affecting commerce ( s.1962( a) ;acquiring 
or maintaining an interest in such an "enterprise" through "a pattern of 
racketeering activity" (s.1962(b); conducting the affairs of an "enterprise" through 
"a pattern of racketeering activity" (s.1962(c); or conspiring to commit any of the 
446. See; Bloomenthal, H. (2008),10, supra at page 219. 
447. See; (1970),18 U.S.C. ssI961-1968. 
448. See; Cox, Hillman, Langevoort, (2006), 873, supra, at page 220. 
449. Ibid. 
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first three prohibitions (s.1962(d).450 Most RICO claims based on securities law 
violations arise under s.1962(c).451 See generally u.S. Supreme Court decision in 
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone CO.,.452 
Despite the rich history and documented importance of private rights of action in 
the jurisprudence of securities regulation, private right of action is completely 
removed from Nigeria securities statutes. Private right of action is not recognized 
under Nigeria securities law. Rather in a twist consistent with the many tricks 
played on Nigerian investors in the Investments and Securities Act, s.107 
(prohibition of false or misleading statements),453 s.108 (fraudulently inducing 
persons to deal in securities),454 s.109 (dissemination of illegal information),455 
s.IIO (prohibition of fraudulent means),456 and s.lll (prohibition of insider-
trading)457 are all written in ways that, ironically, slacken the stipulated 
prohibitions, and also make their violations impossible to prove in court. 
450. See; Cox, Hillman, Longevoort, (2008), 873, supra at 220. 
451.lbid. 
452. See; (1989),492 U.S. 299 
453. See; S.107, ISA. 
454. See; S.l08, ibid. 
455. See; S.l09, ibid. 
456. See; S.llO, ibid 
457. See; S.lll, ibid 
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However, s.114 did the most damage to private rights of action in Nigeria. Rather 
than vest victims of frauds and other violations with the rights to take civil actions 
against violators of ss.107 to 112, as under the English law (above),458 and under 
the U.S. laws (above),459 s.114 instead vests in Nigeria's SEC only a limited right 
of action. S .114 provides that "[a] ny transaction done in contravention of section 
111 or 112 of this Act is avoidable at the instance of the Commission."46o S.114 
vests narrow right of action on SEC to void transactions involving violations of 
only ss. 111 and 112. SEC can only sue to void the fraudulent transactions. SEC 
cannot sue on behalf of the victims for compensation. Victims of securities frauds 
and violations under ss.111 and 112 can neither sue to void the transactions nor 
claim damages of any kind. Indeed, there is no right of action vested on the 
victims of anyone of the violations prohibited in the entire gamut of ss.l 07 to 112. 
In particular, no person or entity (not even the SEC) is invested with the right to 
void the transaction or claim any type of damages for serious violations contained 
in ss.107 to 110, i.e., prohibitions that are not covered by s.114. The effect is that 
most cases of frauds and willful violations (big and small) go unpunished and 
remain without remedy. See for instance Nova Securities and Finance and 
Anenih v. SEC61 AP PIc (the victim) whose stocks was willfully manipulated 
458. See; Pages 218-219 supra 
459. See; Pages 219-222 supra. 
460. See; S.114, ISA. 
461. See; ; (Unreported) (2009), Case No. IST/APP/02/09. Judgment delivered on Wednesday, 9th September, 2009. 
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32 times within two weeks, occasioning Nl17.2 billion ($820.4 million) in losses, 
has no legal right to sue Nova Securities and Finance for recision, restitution, or 
damages, or to recover its actual losses, even if SEC had won the case on appeal. 
N ever mind that the tribunal eventually reversed SEC on appeal, under 
questionable circumstances. Similarly, multitude of Nigerian investors, individual 
and corporate, who were wantonly defrauded in Nigeria capital market also do not 
have any rights of action under the law against even identified fraudsters. This is 
the nature of the extraordinary legal protections fraudulent market operators enjoy 
at the detriment of investors under Nigerian securities law. That is the state of the 
law under which business goes on in Nigeria capital market, till date. 
5.8 Treble Damages Principle; Deterrent Rule against Securities Fraud. 
In a real securities regulatory system where private rights of action exist, award of 
treble damages to victims of securities frauds and violations is one important 
method of instilling discipline and ensuring transparency and integrity in the 
capital market. Treble damages deter and discourage potential securities cheats 
from wanton acts of frauds in the market place. It is a veritable tool for fraud 
disincentive in the capital market. 
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5.8.1 Treble Damages under Old English Law. 
History of treble damages awards for securities frauds and violations dates back to 
the infamous English Bubble Act of 172(/62 described in its recital as "[aJn act to 
restrain the number and ill practice of brokers and stock jobbers. "463 Notorious for 
its many ills, the Bubble Act had its origin in the political power of the South Sea 
Company itself and the company's desire to suppress less favorable rivals without 
royal charters.464 Amongst other provisions, Bubble Act prohibited the use of false 
charters and the taking of subscriptions for such enterprises.465 Bubble Act declared 
such matters to be public nuisance subject to penalties and forfeitures. 466 Brokers 
trading in such unlawful shares were rendered liable to lose their licenses.467 
Merchants and traders whose business was injured by such unlawful organizations 
were given the right to sue for treble damages. 468Though Bubble Act was gradually 
whittled away and eventually repealed in 1825,469 treble damages doctrine survived 
subsequent enactments including the 1844 Joint Companies Registration Act,470 
Companies Act of 1867, and the 1890 Directors Liability Act,471 amongst others. 
462. See; (1720),6 Geo. l,eh.lS. s.IS 





468. Ibid. See also Bloomenthal, Harold S. (200S), supra at 219. 
469. See; (IS25), 6. Geo. 4, eh.91. See also Bloomenthal, Harold (200S), ibid. 
470. See; (1S44), 7 & S Viet., eh.llO. 
471. See; (IS90), 53 & 54 Viet., eh.64. See also Bloomenthal, Harold (200S), ibid. 
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5.8.2 Treble Damages under U.S. Law: In U.S., damages awarded in private civil 
actions for securities frauds and other violations are ample and varied. According 
to Professor Cox and his co-authors, the most significant attributes of the civil 
liability scheme established under the Securities Act of 1933 are recision pursuant 
to s. 12 (a) (1) at the option of any purchaser for any violation of s.5 and the 
extensive damage liability imposed by s.ll upon the issuer and - absent due 
diligence-those associated with a public distribution when there is a material 
falsity or omission in a registration statement.472 Additiona11iabi1ity provisions of 
the '33 Act are found in the antifraud provisions of s.12 (a) (2) and s.17.473 
5.8.3 Treble Damages in India: Under the Securities Exchange Board of India Act 
1992,474 penalties for violations in Indian capital market are in most cases three 
times the amount involved, (i.e. treble ),475 and in some other cases penalties 
prescribed are as high asfive times the amount involved in the vio1ations.476 
5.8.4 Treble Damages under Nigerian Law: In Nigerian, the story is totally 
different. Treble damages and its immense benefits to market regulation are 
completely wiped off from the securities statutes. Instead of adhering to the 
472. See; Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, (2006), 481, supra, at 220. 
473. See; 1933 Securities Act, s.12, (a), (2), and s.l7 See also Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort (2008), ibid. 
474. See; (1992), SEBI Act No.1 5 of 1992 
475. See; Chapter VIA, ss. 15G and 15H, ibid. 
476. See; S.15F(c). 
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international best practices, s.116, ISA 2007, conversely, limits the amount of 
compensation payable to victims of willful securities frauds to 'difference in 
price "'77 and actuallosses.478 S. 116 provides in subsection (1) that; 
"(1) A person who is liable under this part of this Act shall pay compensation at 
the order of the Commission or the Tribunal, as the case may be, to any aggrieved 
person who, in a transaction for the purchase or sale of securities entered into 
with the first-mentioned person or with a person acting for or on his behalf, suffers 
a loss by reason of the difference between the price at which the securities would 
have likely been dealt in such a transaction at the time when the first-mentioned 
transaction took place if the contravention had not occurred. "479 
In a convoluted provision reminiscent of IMP and World Bank's legislative styles, 
subsection (1) of s.1l6, above, allows compensation only when a person suffers a 
loss in a transaction for the 'purchase or sale of securities' by reason of 'the 
difference between the prices at which the securities would have likely been 
dealt' in similar transaction at the time the violation occurred, if the contravention 
had not occurred. In other words, s.116 (1) recognizes price disparity that occurs in 
a transaction for the purchase or sale of securities as the only compensable loss. 
477. See; Subsection (1) of s.116, ISA. 
478. See; Subsection (2) of s.116, ibid. 
479. See; Subsection (1), s.116, ibid. 
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Note that the prescribed 'price disparity' quantum of compensation cannot be 
claimed by the victim of the fraud because the Act does not give right of action to 
victims, and gives only a right of voidance to SEC. Hence, s.116 (1) is a complete 
hoax. S.116 (2) recognizes actual loss quantum of compensation, thus; 
"(2) The amount of compensation for which a person is liable under subsection 
(1) of this section is the amount of the loss sustained by the person claiming the 
compensation or any other amount as may be determined by the Commission or 
the Tribunal. "480 
Implicit in subsection (2), s.116, is that compensation for other forms of losses and 
damages not amounting to actual losses are not recognized under the Nigerian 
securities law. For example loss profit, anticipatory damages, consequential 
damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees, etc., are, by implications, 
excluded under the Nigerian law. Add the fact that neither the victim of a violation 
nor SEC has right under Nigerian law to claim for damages. It becomes clear that 
provisions of s.116 (1) and (2) do not create any legally enforceable rights. 
Moreover, in the same IMF and World Bank writing fashions, s.115, ISA 2007, 
which is the only predatory-crime' criminal punishment' provision in the entire 
480. Subsection (2), s.116, ISA 2007. 
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ISA 2007, ties criminal culpability exclusively to violations involving 'use of 
information', under Part XI of the Act, and limits criminal punishment to 
maximum of double the amount involved in the fraud or violation.481 
However, by design, many violations prohibited under Part XI of ISA 2007 do not 
involve the 'use of information'. Examples include s.105 (false trading and market 
rigging transactions),482 s.106 (securities market manipulation.),483 ss.107, 108, and 
110. Some other violations under Part XI only implicate minimal use of 
information, but their violations do not per se involve the use of information to 
make profit or to inflict loss. Hence, violations under those sections do not fall 
within the purview of s.115. It also means that under Nigerian securities law, 
victims of losses resulting from violations of sections 105, 106, 107, 108, and 110 
cannot successfully claim any compensation given that violations prohibited under 
those sections do not carry the essential ingredients of 'using information' to make 
'profit' or cause 'losses'. This is another statutory deceit under Nigerian securities 
laws that effectively shortchanged defrauded investors while shielding securities 
fraudsters. The deterrent benefit of treble damages award is totally lost in Nigeria 
to deceptive statutory intrigues. 
481. See; S.115 (a) and (b), ISA 
482. See; S.105, ISA 
483. See; S.106, ISA 
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5.9 Margin Loan: The Achilles Heel that threatens many Nigerian Investors 
and Banks. 
An investor who wishes to purchase securities, but does not have available cash, or 
enough cash at hand, may rely on broker-dealers (and others) to borrow such 
money,484 if the customer meets the conditions for the lending. Margin loan is the 
money an investor borrows from broker-dealers to invest on securities.485 
Borrowing to invest (borrowing on "margin") is a direct form of leveraging.486 It 
increases the return on the initial investment if the investment is successful (i.e., if 
the income or price appreciation exceeds the debt plus the transaction costs), but it 
also increases the loss if the investment does not succeed.487 That is to say, both the 
level of risk and the expected return may be increased, perhaps substantially, by 
the borrowing.488 
When broker-dealers encourage their customers to invest on margin-an appealing 
strategy to the customer anxious to make lots of money-potential suitability 
problems arise.489Beside dealing with the problem as a suitability issue, courts in 
U.S. have held that broker-dealers violate Rule lOb-5 directly by not providing 







their customers with all information necessary to evaluate the nature and risks of 
margin borrowing, whether in connection with a specific securities transaction,490 
or at the time the account is established,491 see Angelastro v. Prudential Bache 
Securities Corp. 492 
Margin lending is an important but high-risk hot button issue in securities trading. 
Abuse and misuse of margin loan is known to have ruined many investors, 
securities markets, investment and commercial banks, and national economies. 
Comprehensive rules are conventionally put in place to regulate margin lending, 
and to protect investors from abuses, broker-dealers and banks from credit-lending 
problems, which margin lending is fraught with. 
In Nigeria, margin lending suffers extreme abuse and neglect, with no regulation in 
place to stymie the damages margin lending does to investors, traders, and banks. 
Nigerian commercial banks mistakenly crashed into margin lending business by 
enticing their customers with margin loans to purchase the very banks' own shares. 
490.See; Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort(2006), supra at 220. See also Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 
(1981), 651(9th Cir.), 
491. See; Cox eta!, ibid. 
492. See; (1984) Angelastro v. Prudential Bache Securities Corp., (1984), 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.) 
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Commercial banks are not supposed to make margin lending.493 Most Nigerian 
banks and customers are currently mired in huge debts from margin loans and 
accumulated interests. According to NSE, a total of NI tr ($7bn) bank money is 
trapped in stocks.494Nigerian Central Bank is also credited with a report that 11 
Nigerian banks groan under N422bn ($3billion) share loans.495The loans referred to 
in the above two reports are mostly margin loans banks forced on their customers. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Nigeria ISA 2007 still failed to make regulations 
for margin loans, or set guidelines for subsidiary legislations and rules. S.l04 
merely gave a nod to margin loan, and passed the regulatory buck to Nigeria's SEC 
without setting the requisite blueprints with which SEC will make regulations for 
margin requirements.496 S.104 and its inadequacies has existed in Nigeria's statute 
books since 1999 (similar provisions exist in the repealed 1999 ISA), yet no single 
rule has been put in place by SEC to regulate margin loan. This is a willful 
omission that misled many investors into accepting margin loans when there are no 
guidelines regulating the perilous venture. Nigerian Banks seized upon the 
loophole and feasted on unwary and ignorant customers. 
493. See, U.S. Glass-Steagall Act 1933 which, inter alia, separated commercial banking and investment banking businesses. 
494. See, "Banks' Nltr loans trapped in stocks, says NSE," at http;//odili.net/news/source/2009/juV8/214.htrnl. (04/2010) 
495. See; ']] Nigerian banks groan under N422bn ($3billion) share loans'; http;//odili.net/news/source/2009/jun/15/312.htrn1 
(04/2010). 
496. See; S.104, ISA 
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5.10 Insider-Trading; Broker-Dealers and Inside Information. 
Trading on inside information, or insider-trading, is another hot button issue in 
securities trading. Within the insider trading principles, there is the tipper and 
tippee dichotomy of duties and liabilities.497The rules are elaborate, and the 
applications are intricate. Failure to provide adequate and enforceable rules to 
regulate insider-trading in Nigerian securities law is a loophole the exploitation of 
which caused great havoc to Nigeria stock market, and Nigerian investors. 
The foregoing is a cursory examination of few examples of the smaller but potent 
plots that are willfully designed into Nigerian market frameworks. They combined 
with the bigger plots to traumatize Nigeria capital market, and pave way for the 
N8.1 tn ($60 billion) securities 'hot money cycle' swindle that occurred in Nigeria 
stock market. Similar scheme is currently going on in Nigeria's bond market, and 
in the banking and insurance sectors, uninterrupted. Time and space do not permit 
the exhaustion of all the smaller plots. Some of the smaller plots that also pack 
punches, but which time and space did not permit their discussion include; 
497. See; Cox etal, 1066, supra, at 220. See also; Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, (1985), 472 U.S. 299. 
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(a).Absence of legally enforceable Code of Corporate Governance. 
(b ).Integrity/ Accuracy of Annual/Periodic Reports/Returns, and need for 
Certifications by CEOs/CFOs to be in affidavits.(Ss.60,61,62,63,64,65,66 of IS A.) 
(c ).Integrity in Calibration of ticker movements and Electronics Trading 
Infrastructures (s.55(1) ISA). (Need for transparency and statutory regulation). 
(d).Crooked Stock Pools; need for statutory proscription - s s.105, 106 ISA. 
(e ).Separation of Commercial Banks and Investment Banks. 
(f).Importance of Special Jurisprudence for Securities Proceedings; U.S. PSLRA. 
(g).Private property rights of investors versus abuse and control by market 
operators. 
5.11 IMF and World Bank's Roles in Nigeria Market Crash: The hermetic 
secrecy under which IMF and World Bank operate would not make it easy to 
establish the culpable nexus of the two institutions to Nigeria market crash. Only a 
full-scale official inquiry and expert investigation will fully fill that gap. However, 
thanks to Professor Joseph Stiglitz, an insider, the role IMF and World Bank play 
in the kind of Nigeria's stock market crash has become public knowledge. World 
Bank and IMF's link to Nigeria market crisis could also be deduced from the ties 
principal local actors in Nigeria financial crisis share with IMF and World Bank, 
and from conducts of the two global financial institutions. Then Governor of 
Central Bank of Nigeria is a famous World Bank protegee, and the then Nigeria 
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Minister for Finance was seconded from the World Bank, to which she returned 
and was promoted to the post of Managing Director after after being relieved from 
her duties by Nigerian government. 
Also, as the cataclysmic crash of Nigeria stock market sent the nation's economy 
into a tail spin, labor organizations, many concerned citizens, and agencies began 
to raise alarms. Nigerian bank workers Association called on government to probe 
unethical practices in the banks.49'Nigerian Labor Congress demanded that 
government probe banks and stock market with dispatch.4990ther trade unions 
joined to urge Nigerian government to take immediate action.sooEven the usually 
reticent and hardly conspicuous PricewaterhouseCoopers raised public alarm on 
the state of the nation's banks.solAll the alarms fell on deaf ears. The high point 
was that while concerned voices saw danger and raised alarms, IMF and World 
Bank saw differently. In an orchestrated but separate news releases syndicated on 
April 28, 2009, IMF announced that Nigeria has sound fiscal policies.so20n the 
same day, World Bank concurred with IMF and proclaimed that Nigeria's business 
498. See; 'Bank workers petition Senate over unethical practices '. http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/feb/26/307.html (04/2010) 
499. See; 'Financial Crisis-Probe banks, stock market now-NLC'. http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/feb/27/300.html (04/2010) 
500. See; 'Trade Union Warns Yar'Adua Over Collapsing Economy'. http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/junl28/310.html (4/2010) 
501. See; 'PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Auditors Raise Alarm On Nigerian Banks' 
http://www.sunnewsonline.com!webpages/news/nationaU2009/feb/25/national-25-02-2009-02.htm (04/2010) 
502. See; 'Meltdown: Nigeria has sound fiscal policies, says IMP ... '.http://odili.netinews/source/2009/apr/23/210.html(04/2010) 
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environment was sound.503In apparent reaction to World Bank's proclamations, 
Speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives, III a move that is very rare in 
Nigeria, shot back and publicly questioned World Bank's assistance to Nigeria.504 
An interesting event that revealed IMF's dishonesty in praising Nigeria's fiscal 
policies, in the face of national financial calamity that arose from bad fiscal 
policies, happened many miles away from Nigeria. In a contemporaneous 
interview with the London Economist, an IMF top official struggled to wriggle out 
of accusations that IMF policies created global imbalance that caused then ongoing 
global financial crisis. The IMF top official retorted forcefully that poor 
regulations, not global imbalances, caused the global financial crisis.505From the 
Economist's interview manifested IMF's acceptance that poor regulation is a 
catalyst to financial crisis. IMF knew that Nigeria is in: a financial crisis but chose 
to proclaim Nigeria's poor financial sector policies as sound. Law and regulation 
are road maps to policies, whether fiscal or otherwise. Nigeria's financial sector 
laws are inanely poor, pointing to abysmal fiscal policies. IMF is very aware of 
that. But, instead, IMF chose to publicly proclaim them as sound, while at the same 
503. See; 'Nigeria goodfor doing business-World Bank'. http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/apr/23/604.html (04/2010) 
504. See; 'World Bank's assistance questionable, says Bankole '. http://odili.netlnews/source/2009/apr/28/13.html (0412010) 
505. See; 'The IMF blames poor regulation, not global imbalances, for the global financial crisis' 
http://www.economist.comlfinance/displaystorv.cfm? (02/2011) 
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time telling the honest truth back home. IMF's double speak is open to different 
interpretations, but one undeniable conclusion is that IMF willfully lied to the 
Nigerian public. IMF is hiding something when it chose to publicly ridicule itself 
by praising horrible Nigerian financial-sector fiscal policies. Understandably, IMF 
is privy to Nigerian dysfunctional financial laws and policies. IMF and World 
Bank hijacked Nigeria's financial sectors and the economy, formulate policies, and 
write laws at the national and state levels.506IMF and World Bank are strongly 
believed to have authored Nigeria's Investments and Securities Acts 1999 and 
2007. Images of Joseph Stiglitz's accusations that IMF and World Batik induce 
weak countries to prematurely liberalize their capital markets, relax financial 
regulations, 'corrupt local officials', and orchestrate 'hot money cycle' schemes 
suddenly come alive in Nigeria market's many conundrums. 
5.12 Conclusion. 
N8.1tn ($60bn) crash of Nigeria stock market was not, and could not have been, an 
accident, or an inauspicious misfortune. Neither did Nigeria stock market crash 
result from global financial crisis as alleged. Iraqi stock market (ISX) and other 
similarly situated emerging stock markets conclusively laid the global financial 
506. See one familiar example; FG, World Bank to train four states on fiscal governance. 
http://odili.net/news/source/2009/juV24/303.html (09/2009) 
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meltdown claim to rest.507 Rather, as discussed in this paper, evidence show 
beyond doubt that the cataclysmic implosion of Nigeria stock market resulted from 
a well organized and ruthlessly executed securities swindle. 
The methodical distortion of Nigeria capital market's structural and legal 
frameworks, sabotage of Nigeria's SEC, expurgation of safety-nets and systems of 
internal control, positioning of securities tribunal, and the tribunal's power to 
accept monetary gifts which coincides with the tribunal's routine exculpation of 
securities fraudsters bear the culpable signs. Also, Nigeria's SEC power to accept 
monetary gifts from the public, precision in the coordination of the rise and crash 
of Nigeria stock market, magnitude of the losses that resulted from the crash, acts 
of omissions and commissions by Nigerian officials during and after the crash, and 
the numerous other plots that exist in the market - all point unequivocally to 
premeditation. Legislative infidelity is used to accomplish the grand scheme. 
Never in the history of securities regulation has any nation's statute been as 
converse and distorted in content and intendment as the Nigerian Investments and 
Securities Act 2007. Damages the Act did, and still does, to Nigeria capital market 
507. See; Chapter 1, pp. 10 and 11 of this paper for full discussion. 
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IS phenomenal, incalculable, and unprecedented. Nigerian Investments and 
Securities Act 2007 is by far worse than the English "Bubble Act" of 
1720508previously deemed the world's worst in the art of using legislation to 
commit securities fraud. Nigeria's 2007 ISA merits Maitland's apt derision of the 
Bubble Act, that; "[a] panic-stricken Parliament issued a law, which, even when 
we now read it, seems to scream at us from the statute book. "509 The difference is 
that Nigerian National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) was not 
panic-stricken when it passed the 2007 Act into law. Rather, the National 
Assembly appears to have passed a bad legislation written and handed to it by 
some interest groups, without proper deliberation and scrutiny. 
If Nigeria capital market's arrangement is analyzed with the purpose of matching it 
to a desired outcome, the only rational conclusion a reasonable person would come 
to is that the market is designed for an organized fraud. There can be no other 
reason for throwing Nigeria capital market into so much dysfunction and 
distortion. Professor Joseph Stiglitz's revelation510 that' hot money cycle' scheme is 
second of the four-step method IMF and World Bank use to destroy economies 
508. See; (1720); 6 Oeo.l, ch.18, s.18 
509. See; Maitland, F. (1911), Collected Papers, 390 
510. See; The Observer, Sunday 29 Apri12001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk./business/2001lapr/29/business.mbas (0112011). 
See also Chapter 1, pp.33-41 ofthis paper for full discussion. 
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of poorer and weaker nations solved the remainder of the byzantine puzzle in 
Nigeria stock market crash. The N8.1 tn ($60bn) losses in Nigeria stock market 
crash represent only the initial harvest. The scheme continues. The biggest concern 
is that both Nigeria stock and bond markets still run on the same perilous securities 
laws, and on the sinister structural and regulatory arrangements discussed in this 
paper. Nigerian banking and insurance frameworks are also yoked in similar chaos 
and corruption. And, Nigeria's national economy, and the fate of her 150 million 
citizens, hinge on this endless sequence of financial-sector racketeering schemes. 
5.13 Recommendations. 
Nigeria capital market is in a quagmire of frauds and deceit. The situation is dire 
and needs to be addressed with the fierce urgency of now. Nigeria is in a desperate 
situation, and the country has very few options. Any solutions must be quick, 
drastic, sweeping, and resolute. Federal government of Nigeria must muster the 
courage to do all that is required. Suggestions for solving the serious challenges 
facing Nigeria capital market include; 
(a). Halt trading immediately in Nigeria stock market, suspend operations in all the 
exchanges. Also, suspend all operations in the bond market. 
(b). Order expert audit and investigations of all activities in the capital market, with 
terms of reference that will include determination of the remote and immediate 
causes of the cataclysmic crash of Nigeria stock market in 2008 - 2009. 
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(c). Set up high caliber public inquiry to investigate and establish the roles played 
by any individuals, agencies, organizations, institutions and other entities in the 
collapse and current state of Nigeria capital market. Hold accountable any persons 
or entities found to have engaged in any serious frauds and unlawful activities that 
contributed to the crisis in Nigeria capital market. Ban the persons and entities 
found culpable from participating directly or indirectly in the capital market for 
minimum of ten years. Make them face the law, regurgitate all money stolen from 
investors, and make victimized investors whole. 
(d). Disband and reconstitute the Investments and Securities Tribunal, SEC, and all 
the committees set up under the current ISA 2007. 
(e). Study and review the structural and regulatory frameworks of Nigeria capital 
market. Determine the areas of systemic failures. Verify and confirm areas of 
distortions in the structural and regulatory frameworks of Nigeria capital market. 
Compare safety features and antifraud provisions in Nigeria market with similar 
features in other viable markets, and match the features with international best 
practices. 
(t). Repeal the Investments and Securities Act 2007. Repeal also the rules and 
subsidiary legislations made pursuant to the Act. Enact a new Securities Act that 
will contain the appropriate provisions. The new Act will include the following 
prOVIsIOns; 
i. Adequately bolster and empower SEC to be the true apex regulatory agency for 
Nigeria capital market. But, knowledgeable securities regulators will be incharge. 
ii. Subject the Investment and Securities Tribunal to the authority of SEC so that 
the tribunal acts as internal adjudicatory agency of SEC like in the U.S., with non-
exclusive limited jurisdiction. Or set up the model of Indian Securities Appellate 
Tribunal with only retired or serving Supreme Court Justices, Court of Appeal 
Judges, and Chief Judges of State High Courts as the tribunal jUdges. Increase the 
number of the tribunal judges, and locate at least two panels of the tribunal in 
every state and federal capital territory. In alternative, eliminate the tribunal and 
invest jurisdiction over securities matters in the Nigerian Federal High Courts. 
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iii. Abolish the money gift mandates of both the tribunal and SEC. In its place, 
enact stringent anti-corruption provisions that will bind the tribunal judges and 
SEC Commissioners to be of good conduct. 
iv. Make the position and tenure of office of all SEC Commissioners to be 
fulltime and executive, pay them equal salary and allowance, and ban them from 
directly or indirectly holding any other office or carousing in any way with 
publicly traded corporations. Vest the leadership of SEC on the Chairman. 
v. Abolish the office and position of Director General of both the SEC and NSE. 
vi. Ban stock traders and dealers, investment analysts, investment advisers, floor 
traders, and every regulator and official, etc., from directly or indirectly holding 
any position in publicly traded corporations, as in Ghana. Also, ban even their 
relatives from holding such offices, as in Greece. 
vii. Provide enhanced private rights of action to investors, with all the rights and 
appurtenances attached. 
viii. Introduce treble damages as standard civil compensation payable to victims 
of any willful securities violations or frauds. 
ix. Prescribe severe criminal punishments for any acts of willful or reckless 
frauds that occur in the capital market, willful or reckless violation of the 
provisions of the Act, and other similar serious infractions. 
x. Promulgate comprehensive Code of Corporate Governance and make them 
statutorily compulsory and legally enforceable. Provide private rights of civil 
action to any person or entities whose rights or interests are violated or threatened 
by any violations or threatened violation of the Code. 
xi. Provide for independent and robust shareholders associations consistent with 
sAO of Nigerian 1999 Constitution. Invest shareholders associations with full 
rights and powers under the law, in accordance with international best practices. 
xii. Enact strict disclosure provisions that would ensure integrity and accuracy of 
Annual and Periodic filings/Returns. Make CEOs/CFOs to personally certify the 
accuracy of annual and periodic returns, as well as financial statements in 
affidavits. 
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X111. Make strict provIsIons for the regulation of trading gadgets and 
infrastructures to ensure accuracy and integrity in ticker calibrations and 
movements, and in all the electronics trading infrastructures. 
xiv. Ban the practice of crooked stock pools, and make it senous criminal 
offence. 
XV. Enact comprehensive rules for regulation of the 'front and back offices' of 
stock brokers and dealers, and regulate hedge funds. 
xvi. Totally separate commercial banks and investment banks so that commercial 
banks will concentrate on traditional commercial banking business while 
investment banks engage only in investment banking. 
xvii. Margin lending is not for commercial banks. Make adequate provisions for 
regulating margin loans, margin credit lending, and securities lending activities. 
xviii. Incorporate prohibitions contained in U.S.-Corrupt Influence and 
Racketeer Organizations Act (RICO),1970, 18 U.S.C. s. 1961-1968, the Federal 
Mail Fraud Act of 1872, 18 U.S.C. s.1341 (Supp.2003), and the Wire Fraud 
Statute of 1952, 18 U.S.C. s.1343 (Supp. 2003), into the new Nigerian Investments 
and Securities Act. 
g. Also, incorporate into Nigerian securities laws the provisions of United States 
core securities enactments contained in; 
i. Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 
ii. Investment Company Act of 1940. 
iii.Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
iv.Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
v.The Williams Act of 1968. 
vi. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. 
vii. The Private Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 
viii.The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 
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ix. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1966. 
x.The Glass-Steagall Act (or the Banking Act) of 1933. 
xi.The Sarbanese-Oxley Act of2002. (Also, create Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board). 
xii. The 2010 U.S. Securities Market Act and amendments. 
The foregoing suggestions are not exhaustive, but can be a good starting point for 
addressing the pandemic maladies that plague Nigeria capital market. Each of the 
above enactments contains critical provisions that address specific areas of 
maladies in securities transactions and regulation. 
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